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THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

BASED ON KANT AND FRIES

by

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FOREWORD

The author of this volume needs no introduction to those who care for the things of the spirit. Not only in his own country, but in practically all the civilised countries of the world, Rudolf Otto's name and works are known. In so far as the English-speaking world is concerned, Otto is known, in the main, by means of his two volumes, *Naturalism and Religion*, and *The Holy*. The former shows in a very clear and convincing manner the limitations of the various forms of the mechanical conceptions of life, especially of human life. Since the first appearance of the book much work has been done in the realm of Biology, and this work, in its most fundamental conclusions, is in agreement with Otto's point of view. In the volume entitled *The Holy* he shows the undeniable presence of non-rational factors in human consciousness, and further shows how these constitute a reality which has to be taken into consideration when we deal with the problem of religion and with personal religious experience.

In the present volume the author shows the fundamental importance of certain elements of the philosopher Fries, derived from Kant and given a new orientation, with regard to the possibility of a new Philosophy of Religion. The consideration of the work of Fries in its bearing on Philosophy and Religion led Otto, the late Leonard Nelson, and others to found a new philosophical school in Germany. This valuable volume will show the significance of this school. The two volumes I have mentioned above have to be supplemented by the present volume before a synoptic view of Otto's convictions may be obtained. The volume thus fills a gap

which had hitherto existed in so far as Otto's works in English were concerned. It gives me a genuine pleasure to introduce this volume of an old friend who has laboured so brilliantly in several fields of learning, and especially in this volume in a field which dared not be ignored by anyone who cares for the things which cannot pass away.

W. TUDOR JONES

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

AHNUNG. This term, peculiar to Fries and his followers, cannot be rendered concisely in English. In its ordinary use it is "the obscure prevision of some coming event, not based on clear grounds and merely felt". In its technical sense, as found in this work, it is defined in German philosophical dictionaries as follows:

"The sensation of states and connections, which are hidden from clear knowledge; a conviction that depends on feeling, without any definite conception" (Schmidt, *Philosophisches Wörterbuch*).

"Fries understands by Ahnung (Ahndung) a conviction, originating in the feelings, without any definite conception, of the reality of the supra-sensual, which gives us a reflection of the real existence of things in their phenomena, and brings us to their eternal meaning and purposeful connection, in Nature's sublimity and beauty" (Eisler, *Handwörterbuch der Philosophie*).

The word has been left untranslated.

AUFKLÄRUNG. This word has also been left in the original, in default of a concise expression for the "Philosophy of the Age of Enlightenment".

KANT. The references to the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* are to the Second Edition, indicated by Roman numerals. (*Kritik* . . . II.)

LEIBNITZ. The most convenient spelling has been followed.

Prof. Otto's book referred to in the note on p. 64 has appeared in English under the title "Naturalism and Religion." (Williams and Norgate.)

E. B. D.

A. THE THEORY OF IDEAS

INTRODUCTION

1. Our Point of View. 2. Practical Importance of Fries' Philosophy of Religion: Inquiry as to an a priori Religious Principle—as to the Objective Validity of a priori Knowledge—as to Transcendence or Immanence. 3. Fries' Position in the History of Philosophy his Relation to Kant—Jacobi—Schiller—the Romantic Philosophers—Schleiermacher—Leibnitz and the "Aufklärung"; his Followers—De Wette. 4. Fries' Writings.

1. Amongst the various thinkers who were produced by the age of German Idealism, the name of Jacob Friedrich Fries has generally been mentioned with respect; yet in any presentation of the philosophic tendencies of his age he has usually been treated cursorily. In the history of philosophy he is overshadowed by thinkers, presumably greater, at all events more successful, by Fichte and Schelling, and, above all, by Hegel. Historians of the philosophy of religion have pointed to a certain affinity between Fries and Schleiermacher in their treatment of the theory of religious "Feeling", but they have assumed that Schleiermacher's was the more original and comprehensive intellect. Really, however, in the philosophy of religion, the points of contact between Fries and Schleiermacher are less important than their points of difference; and where their views agree, Fries is quite original, and closer study proves him to be superior in comprehensiveness, thoroughness, and solidity.¹ In the following pages, however, our purpose is not to rehabilitate Fries, nor to compare him with his contemporaries. For us the historical interest is less important than the subject itself. While we share the

¹ I have dealt with the relation of Fries and Schleiermacher in my *Naturalistische und religiöse Weltansicht* (p. 57), but I am now compelled to withdraw my remarks as to Schleiermacher's superiority to Fries.

opinion, and conviction, gradually gaining ground in philosophic circles, that in the sphere of the science of religion, after all our histories, comparisons, inductions, individual improvisations, and clever hypotheses, we must go back to that massive and systematic investigation of the rational principles of religion in the human intellect which, continuing the preparatory work of the "Aufklärung," German Idealism undertook in varied phases, we are firmly persuaded that, of all the interpreters of this philosophical school, Fries and his way of thinking have given us the most successful methods and the most trustworthy results, and that they are of importance as a basis for our own inquiry.

2. If we consider Fries' Philosophy of Religion in itself and for itself, and at the same time have regard to those inquiries which to us are of the most practical importance, we shall find that the most important of its original features are the following:

(a) In the conflict of beliefs, in the comparison of newly investigated religions, the philosophers of the "Aufklärung" reached in some cases a relativist and sceptical attitude towards religion in general (Hume and the French Materialists), whilst others arrived at the conviction that as regards the religions of history the criterion of truth and falsehood, soundness and unsoundness, could not be discovered in history itself. This conviction was generally accompanied by a quite unfair disparagement of the historic side; yet in itself it was a valuable and final judgment. In the nature of things it would be obviously impossible to decide on the greater or less value of historic formations, nor could we ourselves be capable of acceptance and recognition, of insight into the truth and validity of religious or ethical assertions, but for the "Holy Spirit in the heart", an individual principle of truth residing in us, by which we measure and through which we decide. Doctrines and decisions based on history alone could impress

us as a mere suggestion could; they could never be accepted with inward conviction and real assent. To search for this principle in man's intellect, to discover it, and to bring it to light—such is clearly the first task of all real endeavour in the sphere of the philosophy of religion, and without it no research in the history of religion can have a firm foundation. In this sense a philosophy of religion is a very sober task, having little in common with the soaring and fantastic creations, the poetic raptures, the mythological or semi-mythological dreams, which the term usually connotes. In Kantian phrase, its business is a "Criticism of Reason"—that is to say, the analysis, the testing of the human intellect, with the aim of discovering if it possesses any such principles, and if it does, to ascertain their nature. Kant himself, in his *Theory of Ideas*, the loftiest and most splendid achievement of his thought, laid the foundation for this. German Idealism in manifold ways took up and carried on the work of Kant, incomplete as it was and defaced by some grave blunders. But it was Fries who with surest touch maintained and applied the only valid method—the method of criticism, and by its aid sought to establish the principle that was the object of investigation. The immediate practical importance of his achievement is obvious. In our own time we are once more looking in all directions for the "religious a priori". Supernaturalism, the Historic Method—both are impotent to supply a criterion, a principle of what is true in religion. Of the history of religion there is no end. But how can it develop from a mere description of religion into a science of religion, if it is nothing but a history of religion—even though its comprehensiveness went as far as "The Glove in the History of Religion" which we are promised? And what is more, how can there be a history of religion without the possession of some inward principle, if only in dim outline, according to which the historical subject-matter is selected—I will not say classified?

(b) The problem of discovering the "a priori religious"—to use once more this rather unfortunate phrase, beset with misunderstandings—is now being approached from many sides. But to-day it is this very problem which leads to a new difficulty, which might well involve serious consequences for living religion, though possibly without prejudice to the scientific investigation of religion. Every inquiry into a priori knowledge means a searching after and a setting up of concepts, ideas, judgments which, independent of all experience, are founded on pure reason, which reason possesses in its own right, which are its own property, certain and indisputable. The discovery of this "a priori" in general was the great task of the Kantian Criticism of Reason. But, in establishing the a priori types of knowledge, Kant had at the same time made the perilous affirmation that their validity was merely subjective and that whatever was known through them was "ideal". Since these kinds of knowledge spring from pure reason and are not given to reason "from without", in Kant's opinion they have no claim to validity apart from our own presentation of them, no claim to a corresponding external reality. How he applies this inference can best be seen in the treatment of Space and Time in his *Transcendental Aesthetics*. He had shown that Space and Time are a priori forms of our sensation. He at once concludes that they have no value for the "thing in itself", according to this argument: because they are a priori, therefore they are "ideal", i.e. without validity as regards the real nature of things.¹ It is evident how the paths lead in our inquiry. The effect of Kant's argument from "apriority" to "ideality" has remained to the present day. And it is just in modern philosophies of religion that we find on the one hand a notable and energetic striving for the "a priori religious", for the "religious categories" which

¹ *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, p. 42: "Space presents no quality of any Thing in itself, for no attributes, relative or absolute, can be intuitively perceived before the existence of the thing to which they belong, and consequently not a priori."

are to exist side by side with the "natural categories", equal to them in their independence, their validity, and importance; and at the same time, and connected with this, a wider interest in religion and the history of religion. Then we are at once faced by the impossibility of discovering a validity, a being-in-itself, for this a priori apart from our own presentation of it. Now for a student of natural science it may perhaps be of no importance whether the category he applies in his investigation, the law which he recognises, is only a form of the world of his ideas, or whether a world of reality corresponds to it and is obedient to it: for the religious man it is not a matter of indifference. Nay, rather for him everything is absolutely dependent on the valency of religious ideas, apart from his own conception of them.

Here now is the second point in which Fries as a thinker acquires such immediate practical importance for the present day. It can be said in general that he made it one of the initial tasks of his philosophy to reveal Kant's particular and disastrous basic error, which brings into the Kantian criticism that strange, uncertain twilight, harmful to many a student, which, too, has become so important for the progress of Kantian doctrine: the fallacious inference from the apriority of knowledge to the ideality of the known, the object of that knowledge. The consequence of this fallacy in Kant is the lack of solidity in his attractive theory of ideas, the muddled teaching in the *Dialectic of Transcendental Appearance*, the unstraightforward and inadequate attempts to bolster up the theory of ideas by means of the "postulates of practical reason" and "moral proof", and, in a word, the whole cul-de-sac in which his philosophy of religion unavoidably lost its direction. To-day once more we have the liveliest interest in the immense improvement which Fries effected in the Kantian philosophy: without this advance we should again arrive at a philosophy of religion which can only destroy the object of its speculation.

(c) Also for other problems which are just at the present moment the cause of much commotion and confusion, to which belong the questions of Pantheism and Monism, of whole or partial Immanence, the philosophy of Fries has immediate practical value. His teaching brings liberation from attempts to assimilate circles of ideas, strange to each other, through similar hazy and indefinite expressions, for it shows by the critical method what ideas and conceptions have their foundation in reason and what lack such a foundation.

3. As to the position of Fries in the history of philosophy the following must suffice. He is very definitely a disciple of Kant, not like the early or primitive Kantians, who kept closely to the sacred precincts and followed in the Master's footsteps, reaffirming his teaching, grouping his doctrines, attempting to explain them; Kiesewetter is the typical representative of this class. Nor did he allow himself to be carried away by the touch of genius with which Fichte handled his philosophy, nor by that system which sprung from Romanticism; rather did he resist the general spirit and tendency of his own age, in that he applied all his efforts to the completion and the perfecting of the criticism of reason and of the critical method itself. Further on we shall be brought into contact with the great extensions and improvements that the Kantian philosophy owes to him. What is most peculiarly his own in this connection is the attempt he made, in his *Neue oder anthropologische Kritik der Vernunft* (1807; second edition, 1828), to set up a "quaestio juris" for the metaphysical conceptions, fundamental judgments, and ideas which Kant had only discovered, and to answer this examination by the "anthropological" proof of the "immediate knowledge" from which they originate.

The association of Fries with Jacobi comes naturally. There really is a close affinity between the two. Before Fries, Jacobi led the struggle against what Fries calls "rationalist prejudice", against the assumed omnipotence and despotism of Proof.

Rationalism affirmed that nothing could be accepted as certain truth unless it were capable of proof. Jacobi showed that to prove anything knowledge is previously necessary, on which the proof depends, that this knowledge is again capable of proof by means of preceding knowledge, and so forth within limits; but at last there must be an end reached, or rather a beginning, and this last must be founded on something not capable of proof, but immediately certain, since else no proof could be arrived at. And on the other hand, Jacobi perceived with some clearness the weakness in Kant's *Kritik* in respect of its wavering attitude towards the "Things in themselves", to Reality as independent of Idea. Both of these points reappear in Fries. But this affinity does not involve dependence. And in the former point there is a great difference between them. Jacobi does not succeed in demonstrating the "immediate" in reason by pure philosophic argument: with a general protest against philosophy, he flies for refuge to what he calls "belief" and "revelation"; he becomes violent and dogmatic. On the contrary, Jacobi, in the later editions of his books, adopted Fries' criticism, and consequently gained for his own opinions a greater philosophic solidity. Much, indeed, that passes for Jacobi's doctrine is Friesian property, right down to the very phraseology.¹

¹ Cp. the extensive quotations from Fries' *Kritik* to be found in Jacobi's excellent book, *Von den göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung* (1811, second edition, 1828), p. 86, following Fries' *Kritik*, I, 1, p. 339. On page 126 he expressly commends Fries as the philosopher who (with Bouterweck) "discussed this subject at length, and did such thorough justice to the problem, in a way that was quite full of instruction for philosophy as a whole." Cp. p. 133 following Fries I, 199-207. Cp. pp. 137, on deduction and proof, 138 on the objective meaning of the Categories, 142 following Fries' essay on *Die neuesten Lehren von Gott und der Welt*. Page-long quotations from Fries, *Kritik der Vernunft*, p. 146, following Fries' *Über die neuesten Lehren*, pp. 198 and 206. And note especially the terminology throughout.

Since I wrote the above, Dr. L. Nelson, who has edited the *Transactions of the Friesian School*, has placed at my disposal Fries' own private written notes on his life. Here Fries makes the following incidental remark as to his relation to Jacobi: "So I used to communicate with him in Heidelberg . . . till I met de Wette . . . Meanwhile, I was especially stimulated by my intercourse with

Schiller, the fellow-Kantian, had a profound effect on Fries. In their interest in æsthetic problems and in their method of handling them the two are very closely related. In this it is probable that the younger philosopher learnt directly from the older. Both, however, are indeed very dependent on the same master—Kant—and on his *Criticism of Judgment*. Fries upheld the objective validity of æsthetic knowledge, as opposed to the Kantian assertion of its mere subjectivity, in the third part of his *Kritik* with greater method and precision. Fries very decidedly separates himself from Romanticism and the Romantic philosophers. Their quarrel with the “Aufklärung” means nothing to him. As in Kant, so in Fries, the lucid intellect and the best impulses of the “Aufklärung” period are continued; they have gained a new wealth and a new profundity from the “Classic period”, from the new humanist learning, and the literary and æsthetic culture of the age. Fries’ mathematical training and the strict method of the Kantian school divide him from those thinkers who would make inspiration and imagination the instrument of philosophy. Very keen is his attack on Fichte’s “rhetoric” and Schelling’s irrepressible mysticism. In this he brings feeling, not imagination, to its rightful place in philosophy, and here, too, he continues what had been prepared in the “Aufklärung” period, and especially in the work of Rousseau.

Schleiermacher, like Fries, was educated by the Moravian Brotherhood (Herrnhüter); thus they both learnt religion from its emotional side. Fries often quotes Schleiermacher in

Jacobi, as is shown by my participation in his controversy with Schelling. Our correspondence enlightened me as to his unbending rationalism, and I was inclined as far as possible to agree with him; consequently, many of my critics have altogether misunderstood my relation to him. Jacobi’s novels had a pleasantly stimulating effect on my youthful mind. In philosophy, however, I was never a disciple of his; my opinions were solely founded on the teaching of Kant, as I endeavoured to carry them out in the philosophy of religion. My views on knowledge, belief, and ‘Ahnung’ (man’s deepest need and longing)—and my theory of the feelings—were developed in absolute independence of Jacobi. It is more correct to say that Jacobi, in his last writings, partly followed me in his treatment of religion.”

his *Wissen, Glaube, und Ahndung* (1805)¹, manifestly following his *Discourses on Religion*, and agrees with his views on the value of emotion in religion.

Fries' particular theory of "Ahndung" (see Translator's note) has close points of contact with Schleiermacher's "The Contemplation and Sense of the Universe". In this point two philosophers of sharply opposed tendencies come close together. But there is no sort of dependence of one on the other. The source of Fries' doctrine of "Ahndung"—so far as it is not just the positive experience of the man himself—is the Kantian Criticism of Judgment. In this connection, whoever hears the word with discrimination and compares other utterances of Kant, some quite early ones, is bound to see that this important theory was already present as a companion of his theory of ideas. As a consequence, the "Ahndung" theory as treated by Fries emerges in solid philosophical form: whereas in Schleiermacher it is primarily a kind of inspired guesswork, which has in it something of the method of "happy thoughts", which the Romantic school used to follow; and often enough in the *Discourses* the arbitrary decree of genius replaces the solid reasoning from philosophy and history. The manner in which the universe may be "contemplated and sensed", and the meaning of all this in lucid and sober language, are covered by a dim, poetic twilight. And when in Schleiermacher's later development the original idea is struggling towards clearer expression, nothing is left of the earlier wealth and exuberance but the "feeling of absolute dependence", a very one-sided and inadequate description of religious feeling, which in Fries has found a much more varied and precise development.—Yet the most serious difference between these two thinkers, a difference which compels us absolutely to consider Fries as being outside the "philosophy of feeling", is the following. Schleiermacher

¹ P. 239: "Let us declare our agreement with those philosophers who have treated of religion . . ."

only succeeds with difficulty, and always as if it were a task of minor importance, in establishing the connection between religious feeling and religious conviction: feeling without conviction would inevitably lack the support of principle and justice. Schleiermacher, at first, will not admit any validity as knowledge in such conviction. This is most prejudicial to religion, and is contrary to its most primary and essential nature. Religious conviction must be *true* and must be able to prove its truth: i.e. it must lay claim to be Knowledge.¹ Otherwise Religion itself is impossible; at most it could claim to be the loose day-dreaming of a sensitive heart. At this point there is the most radical difference between the philosophy of religion in Schleiermacher and in Fries. At the very outset in the teaching of Fries, Philosophy's noblest task is to discover the real nature of Belief, the ideal sphere of Conviction, and to make their truth secure; in comparison with this he declares that every other effort is merely "beating the air". In taking this stand he is acting in the vital interest of religion. On quite similar lines is the difference between the two philosophers in their decision as to the relation of Religion and Ethics. Fries also sees in mental vision that Religion is not Ethics, and vice versa.

Likewise Kant's fallacious attempt to find a basis for religious conviction in ethical conviction, and from the latter to borrow an additional and illegitimate force, has no place in Fries. But the close organic connection of religion and ethics, to which the history of religion offers unanimous testimony, is clearly pointed out by Fries, whereas from Schleiermacher's principles its proof involves special pleading.

Now and then Fries counts himself as a "Leibnitzian". On the other hand, in his *History of Philosophy* he speaks of Leibnitz with scant respect. But it can be said with confidence that

¹ All that is known about an object is a form of Knowledge, but not every form of Knowledge need be a knowing about an object. We use the term Knowledge concerning Faith quite precisely. In Fries this distinction between *Erkennen* in general and *Wissen* is of great importance.

Fries, together with the Kantian philosophy, is of Leibnitz' school and shares his intellectual bent. This applies not so much to Leibnitz' main dogmatic system with its pre-established harmony and its theory of monads as to certain general and fundamental tendencies of his way of thinking. Especially in Leibnitz' *Nouveaux Essais* there is a heralding of the basic idea of all critical philosophy and of its whole basic tendency: the idea that, in general terms, there is something like "pure reason" and that it can be tested by self-observation. Leibnitz' reasoned judgment, that there is nothing innate in the intellect but the intellect itself, might well be the first proposition in Fries' new *Criticism of Reason*. And then the great fundamental theory of Transcendental Idealism has a way prepared for it in the fundamental convictions, already emerging in Leibnitz, that Space and Time are of "phenomenal" nature, a recognition which cuts across the theory of pre-established harmony. (Cp. Leibnitz, *Reply to Bayle*, in the *Minor philosophical works*, Reclam's edition, p. 121: "I recognise that time, extension, motion, and rest in the general sense, as understood in mathematics, are merely ideal things. . . . Even Hobbes defined space as a *phantasma existentis*".) And Fries' theory that with space and time material existence in general fades away, and in front of the Idea the realm of intellect and freedom alone remains as eternal Reality, is also in Leibnitz the dimly apprehended purpose of his thinking, however much in his works it is dogmatically ossified and beset with wrong premises, fallacious conclusions, tangential aberrations of thought. Lastly, the whole "anthropological" foundation of Fries' philosophy, his doctrine of the obscure judgment of our reason, and the fact that it is again observed in reflection, is only made possible by Leibnitz' discovery of obscure, clear, and lucid ideas, and the differentiation of consciousness and unconscious presentation.¹ Fries' teaching on the relation of

¹ Even the errors of Leibnitz' teaching in this connection are repeated in Fries. In Leibnitz there is already a confusion of Consciousness, the conscious possession

the intellectual and the corporeal has this evident point in common with that of Leibnitz, that he admits a correspondence between the form of the organism and the soul: there is a foreshadowing of this in Leibnitz' doctrine of "plastic natures".

When Hegel was appointed Professor at Berlin, the name of Fries was considered for the post. Possibly if Fries had been elected there might have been a Friesian epoch instead of a Hegelian. For the authority and environment of the chair did much to spread the Hegelian philosophy. But, in addition to this advantage, the spirit of the age, the effects of Romanticism, the clamour in politics and Church matters for a return to the old paths, the tendency to reaction, all found wide scope in the Hegelian philosophy; in the Friesian absolutely none. Even in this unfavourable atmosphere a Friesian school

of an idea, and the "inward sense", the consciousness as to the possession of an idea. Cp. *Prinz der Natur und Gnade*, a. a. O. 140. "consciousness, or the knowledge concerning this inward state (the presentation of the external world)". This confusion is very generally repeated in Fries, and is not without results for his criticism. The sphere of obscure ideas, or in modern terminology, the sphere of the Unconscious, the Subconscious, is attracting the attention of psychologists in an increasing measure. James, in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*, has made extensive use of it in his interpretation of religious phenomena. Fries is well alive to the importance of this branch of psychology for his main theme. "Indeed, this obscure field of our ideas is actually far wider than the clear area of which we are conscious. Amid the whole throng of our actual ideas the clear impressions are merely a few bright spots in a measureless realm of obscurity. A man of learning would view half a universe at once, clear and open before him, if in a moment he could become aware of the vast multitude of memory's obscure impressions. Think what a host of ideas are in a few instants aroused in the mind of a musician who improvises on the organ and perhaps is at the same time talking to another person: when each of these ideas requires a separate act of judgment as to its suitability, for he would notice every discordant note, and yet the improvisation is so beautiful that he is sorry he does not possess a written score. How little, then, he is conscious of all these ideas while he is playing! The same is true in all reflection, when we are seldom aware of all the ideas that guide us and determine our judgment. The talent of an imaginative writer (Dichter) we call his genius, as if it were some higher intelligence that suggested his ideas and directed his activity, just because the writer is in this case wholly under the sway of his obscure impressions, and can but rarely state with clearness how he comes to produce his creative work. It was from these secret places of the soul that Socrates heard the voice of his Daemon." (*Kritik*, I. pp. 115 sqq.)

developed in which distinguished names are found. The most generally known to us is that of de Wette, the friend of Fries and Schleiermacher, who is naturally considered as a sort of middle term between the two. But the foundation of his philosophy of religion is wholly Friesian.¹ In his able little book, *On Religion and Theology* (1815; second edition, 1821), which is of actual value to-day, it finds popular expression, with some connection and approximation to Schleiermacher's teaching. And in his larger work, *On Religion: its Nature and Manifestations, and its Influence on Life* (Berlin, 1827), it becomes in his hands a key to the various manifestations of religion in history. (In this book he demonstrates by his methodical procedure how to permeate and fertilise historical research with lucid, profound, and philosophical insight into the nature of religion.) It was de Wette who, independent of the master, found a wider sphere for his doctrines by applying the theory of "Ahndung" to the realm of history. (The unconscious sentiment that there is a divine providence in history, especially in that of religion.)

Apelt, the pupil of Fries, Professor of Philosophy at Jena (*obit* 1859), in his book *Metaphysics* (Leipzig, 1857), wrote what may be called the textbook of the Kant-Fries philosophy. Acute, methodical, lucid, and full of matter, it is an admirable work, perhaps in these characteristics never yet excelled by any book in philosophical literature. It also contains the essential points of the philosophy of religion. In 1860 Apelt published a *Religions-philosophie* of his own, a kind of concise manual.

A very important examination and exposition of Schleiermacher's philosophy of religion, treated from a Friesian

¹ Henke's *Life of Fries* contains in the Appendix de Wette's article "In Memory of Fries", and his correspondence with Fries. Here, with much point and precision, he makes his discipleship clear. "I consider Fries one of the greatest geniuses that the history of philosophy can show. . . . It is already common knowledge that I am heart and soul devoted to his teaching." The whole article gives a capital short outline of Friesian thought.

standpoint, was produced by H. Schmid, Professor of Philosophy at Heidelberg, in his book *On Schleiermacher's Doctrine of Faith, with Reference to his Discourses on Religion* (1835).¹

4. Of Fries' own works we are concerned with: *Wissen, Glaube, und Abndung* (1805).² In this book, less academic in its treatment, Fries anticipates the results of his investigation, which he has given to the public in his main work, *New or Anthropological Criticism of Reason* (three volumes, 1807), followed by the *System of Metaphysics* (1824) and the *Handbook of Practical Philosophy* (Part I, "Ethics, or the Doctrine of Practical Philosophy," 1818; Part II, "Philosophy of Religion and Æsthetics," 1832), and by his philosophical novel, *Julius and Evagoras, or the Beauty of the Soul* (1822). His logical and psychological foundations were set forth in his *System of Logic* (1819) and his *Handbook of Psychical Anthropology, or the Theory of the Nature of the Human Intellect* (1820). (With this may be compared H. Schmid's *Attempt at a Metaphysic of the Inward Nature*, 1834, dedicated to Fries and a continuation of his work in psychology.) The pamphlets, *The Latest Theories of Fichte and Schelling on God and the Universe* (1807), and *German Philosophy, Nature, and Art: a Vote for Jacobi v. Schelling* (1812) are of interest. The historical place of Fries' thought can best be seen from his own *History of Philosophy, Presented as Following the Lines of its Scientific Development* (1837-40) and in Apelt's *Periods in the History of Mankind* (1845-6, Vol. II). A very detailed exposition of Friesian thought, not including the philosophy of religion, is given by Elsenhans in his *Kant und Fries* (Giessen, 1906). As to the older Friesian School

¹ Of Schmid's works we may compare his *Mysticism of the Middle Ages* (Jena, 1824). Friesian philosophy is decidedly opposed to all mysticism. Yet this book shows that even on Friesian soil some understanding and appreciation of this strange historical phenomenon is possible. And the attempt at an "anthropological and psychological" treatment of the subject-matter is very noticeable.

² New edition by Nelson. Göttingen, Bandenhoeck, and Ruprecht, 1906. Cp. the publisher's announcement and synopsis in the *Christliche Welt*, 1908, No. 34.

and the Neo-Friesian School, quite recently revived, there is a short notice in the *Christliche Welt*, as before quoted. The latter has resumed the *Transactions of the Friesian School* in a new sequence. The most striking of these papers is Nelson's *On the So-called Problem of Knowledge*.¹

¹ Published separately at Gottingen by Bandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1908. Note the review in the *Christliche Welt*, 1909.

II

FRIES' PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: ITS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND ASSOCIATIONS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS

1. Quotations. 2. Religious Truth as Necessary Truth. Rationalism
3. Unprofessional Religion. Deism. 4. Feeling *v.* Reflection. Antirationalism. 5. Immediacy. Sentiment. 6. Transcendental Idealism.

1. Whatever teaching a philosopher may present in his "system" in rigorously methodical and subtle form, in abstract and technical language, difficult of comprehension for the average man, he has held it within him and at the same time holds it as a fundamental personal conviction, as a way of thinking and a turn of mind, in his feelings, in a more general and less precise grasp. To understand a thinker in his more abstract style and to follow his more methodical exposition, it is often well to look at the subsoil on which his philosophy is built and shaped, and first of all to listen to him talking naturally at home, so to speak, before we give ear to the studied and abstract utterances of his scientific discourse. No man's thought, no man's intellectual life, is in general a self-started machine; in the main and fundamental convictions a thinker must be in contact with the intellectual movement of his age; and there is a pessimist view which sees nothing in the history of philosophy and in the systems of philosophers but the opinions and error of the spirit of the age expressed in more abstract terms. But to be in touch with the intellectual movement and the evolution of thought in one's own age is not at all the same as being a mere representative of accidental current opinion. For it is not error alone, but knowledge as well, which is active in the universal movement of ideas and gradually emerges. Whether it is real knowledge or not that

is received from the spirit of the age is a question which depends on this test: does the philosopher succeed in creating from it a real philosophy, or a mere outward semblance?—Thus we now quote a series of extracts which in very general terms express Fries' general outlook and his tendency of thinking. Connected with this is a brief statement of points of contact with the thought of the period which these extracts indicate.

"True Faith, trust in God, has the same basis in all men; it gains force only with love, with the uplifting of the moral will-power in godliness, and never through a mere scientific development of the understanding. No learning, no science can bestow on a man a knowledge of God different from and superior to that knowledge which comes through the first simple religious feeling. No learning, no science can find a basis for faith: the whole duty of learning and science in the working out of a philosophy of religion is just this—to make this faith stand forth, pure and individual, before the consciousness, and to distinguish it from everything with which it can be confused, has been, and is now confused in false doctrine and superstition" (*Handbook of the Philosophy of Religion*, p. 32).

"Religious convictions as to what we trust, though we behold it not, cannot originate in sensuous contacts of our intellect. For they are from the beginning among the possessions of reason, and must exist with equal truth in every human intellect" (*Ibid.*, p. 15).

"In faithful trust in God there live for me the loftiest sentiments of respect, reverence, and adoration" (*History of Philosophy*, II, p. 450).

"The central point of our intellect is a limitless faith and an everlasting love. It is through this faith and this pure love alone that everything that has life in it comes to the world before our eyes. From it springs in our inmost soul the single source of all our life. From this the Eternal reveals

itself to the ordinary intelligence, and from this alone, in the vague feeling of respect for the worth of goodness, in the vague feeling of satisfaction in the sublime and the beautiful, and, lastly, in the sense of the majesty of religion. If we are to conceive the ideal of the highest good, when purest love and purest respect are united in the sentiment of adoration, then the most commonplace belief and the most subtle speculation are on an equal footing. And similarly in every other matter of religion" (*Kritik*, I, p. 386).

"And so at last the whole train of thought (of the mathematical and physical view of the universe) has nothing but physical importance. For humanity it loses in the last resort, and just for the sake of its immensity, all possible meaning, in the immeasurability of its extensions in space and its lapses of time. Die, and in a moment thou art freed from time and space. But in the mind within thee there will vanish neither the beauty of the fields in blossom nor love in thy heart, nor the everlasting love that embraces all" (*History of Philosophy*, II, p. 357).

"It generally happens that those people who indeed possess religion, without being religious in the deeper sense, understand by their religion nothing more than their confession of belief, as to their relations with God and another world. But the religious man properly so-called, whose interest in religion is of a profounder type, finds in it at once something more and something quite different. Every religious man will concede, even if my terminology is not quite to his taste, the truth of this statement: the feeling on which his faith is really based is the instinctive sensation of the Eternal in the Finite" (*Wissen, Glauben, Abndung*, pp. 235 sqq.).

"Religious convictions rest on the universal antithesis of the Eternal and the Finite. Whenever in the philosophy of religion eternal Being is opposed to finite Being, then by eternity we are not to understand a Being through all time: eternity is opposed to time itself. Everlasting Being is Being

independent of all limits in space and time. All Being in time is only a finite Being, which we can now only conceive, but in faith we oppose to it an everlasting Being with God. Faith consists not merely of belief in the eternal, but of worship, and worship is that particular mental attitude which is aroused by the instinctive sense of the everlasting in the finite realm of nature. Through worship the spirit of the eternal lives in finite Being. Faith comes to us through this, that in finite nature all round us, and in our finite inner life, a sense of the eternal is dimly apprehended, our whole finite being is permeated with heat and life from the eternal, . . . and this is the temper of worship" (*Wissen, Glaube, Abndung*, pp. 237 *sqq.*).

In these quotations is expressed in terms capable of general comprehension a definite fundamental view of religion, shared with Fries by many thinkers of his period, and standing in definite connection with the historical development of thought in that period. It is a view which, with parallel and opposing conceptions, evolved during a long preparatory stage in Deism and "Aufklärung", and step by step gained ground in solidity, lucidity, and depth. Its essential characteristics are these :

2. Religious and ethical conviction, Religion and Ethics in general, cannot be "accidental truths". Especially is this persuasion developed on rationalistic lines by the "Aufklärung", which in this respect Fries follows and continues. Very soon, in the "Aufklärung", it took an aggressive tone, and from this base a campaign was afterwards waged against what everywhere passed as religion, against "positive" religion. But in reality this conception was itself the offspring of religion—nay, of scholasticism. In the doctrine of the *testimonium spiritus sancti* there was already the implication that the ultimate validity of religious truth could not depend on authority, teaching, ecclesiastical tradition, the scriptures, the miracles, or historical actuality, but on a particular principle

in a man's inner self. Hence arises the self-evident nature of this conviction. Lessing demonstrates that no necessary truth can be founded on historic fact. But he does not demonstrate that religious truth must be a "necessary truth": to him, as to his age as a whole, this is a self-evident proposition. And this self-evidentness corresponds absolutely to sense of truth in religion. The contrast between historico-empiric truth and necessary truth is obviously in total agreement with the contrast between mere being-taught and finding-out-for-oneself (being inwardly convinced). That in religion everything depends on the latter is really self-evident to this way of thinking.—From Descartes to Spinoza, Leibnitz, Lessing, this conviction always breaks through. But, to speak generally, it is a part of that extremely consistent and coherent basis of a general conception which, in spite of the variety in its schools of thought, gives the "Aufklärung" its unity. And in fact it is the sense of the fruitless but ever-renewed efforts of that age towards an "ontological proof of God", i.e. an individual ascertainment of God without any "empiric taint", purely a priori and solely from the means at the disposal of the reasoning mind itself. Behind this as a driving force there is the just sentiment that the loftiest ideas of the reasoning mind and their truth cannot and must not in the last resort be founded on anything external and "accidental".

3. Connected with this is a second characteristic, which again had its long and silent preparatory labour in the theological work of the "Aufklärung", especially of the Deists; the conviction that religion must have its own sources and a separate life of its own, not dependent on ingenious scholasticism, on reasoning and logic, on speculation, on learned research, on academic controversy and apologetics, on theological schools, on the grace of philosophers, on toilsome proofs. To follow up this trait in the general picture of the "Aufklärung" would be of value. It has its root in

the general emergence of "Lay-Christianity" at the close of the Middle Ages, which carried the Reformation along with it, was continued in the Independents' Movement in England, and thence progressed towards Deism and "Aufklärung". As a rule, in the "Aufklärung" our attention is concentrated on the "Rationalisation", the "Intellectualisation" of religion. Thereby we lose sight of this: there was a most potent urge to the tendencies thus designated in what we have here stated; in the impulse towards what is simple, immediate, and "understood of the people" as opposed to theological subtleties and the hair-splitting of experts.¹ The book from which the Deistic movement originated is the most striking proof of this: Locke's *Reasonableness of Christianity*. "Intellectualisation" of Christianity has no weight at all in this work. The word "reasonableness" is not used in a theoretical but strictly in a practical sense, something like the German *räsonabel*. Not that "supra-rationality" or "revelation" is to be argued away; a simple and practically useful meaning and value are to be demonstrated for Christianity, suitable and consequently immediately intelligible to the plain man, something that we "so-called laity" can employ. And its sum is "a plain, intelligible proposition . . . articles for the labouring and illiterate man . . . suited to vulgar capacities,

* It is quite evident that in this respect, too, the "Aufklärung" is a continuation of Luther's way and Luther's mind. From the days of his first note on the Psalms Luther is looking for the *kurze summa* of the *verbum consummatum ac breve* which shall put an end to everything that is not straightforward in the "many arts". It is a contradiction of history to place the Reformation and the "Aufklärung" in a reciprocally exclusive antithesis. Furthermore, how in the age of the "Aufklärung" the whole spirit of godliness is most closely connected with Lutheranism and the most typically Lutheran godliness; how it proceeds from the latter, and in combination with it presents a typical contrast to the specifically Catholic temper of piety; how as a consequence in its mental attitude the "Aufklärung" has its roots in Luther's teaching; how in connection with this the philosophers of the "Aufklärung", in their whole conception of the relation of the natural and the supernatural, have their evident origins in Luther . . . for a discussion of these questions see my article: "Darwinism and Religion" (*Transactions of the Friesian School*, new series, 1909, Vol. I, and separately issued).

and applicable where the hand is used to the plough and the spade". The book is in most palpable connection with the reaction of the laity in England against the artful tricks of scholastic learning and logic. And the "reasonableness of Christianity" is its plainness, its simplicity, its accessibility, helpfulness, and ease of comprehension. As far back as Hobbes,¹ and even in Spinoza, this feature is manifest, and co-operates in their polemics. It is seen again in Deism. Even in Voltaire it plays a part. In Lessing it is clear, and emerges with force as an element of religious edification. Rousseau and Kant come very closely into its scope. Kant's *Foundation of the Metaphysic of Morals*, in the first section ("Transition from the Ordinary Moral Judgments of Reason to the Philosophical"), is the always classical example for the conviction that philosophy, in the loftiest sphere of its art, creates no really new values, no sublime inner perceptions; but can only exhibit such as are latent in the mind of man, and are effective also in the "average man". And, moreover, Kant's attempts at a philosophy of religion, artificial though they may be, are everywhere a plea for the very simplest lay-religion and its assurance. The object of Kant's whole attempt is to make religious conviction safe from the artfulness of speculative thought and the roundabout methods of scholarship. Here, as much as Locke, he appears for the "average man".—At this point, and in close touch, begins the work of Fries, which, in total contrast to the theosophical systems of his contemporaries, professes to do no more than this: to find a basis

¹ What a strange notion is the current one about this "Materialist" or "Atheist"! —The same bent towards simplicity, corresponding to the average man, is shown with some emphasis in Spinoza, *Theol.-pol. Trakt.* Ch. XIII. See the headline: "In this we prove that the teaching of the Bible is very simple". Here Spinoza takes a stand against those who have introduced so many philosophical speculations that the Church has become an academy and religion a science, whereas the Scriptures contain nothing but the simplest things which the wayfaring man, though a fool, may understand. True Knowledge of God is not a commandment of God, but a gift from God. And God has demanded from man no other Knowledge than this, the Knowledge of his love and righteousness, a Knowledge which is not necessary for knowing, but only for obedience.

for the conviction already given "by the first simple religious emotion".

4. Now in this connection, in the attempts to discover a *verbum consummatum ac breve*, a *kurze summa*, clear and concise assurances of religious conviction were the objects of men's endeavour, and these were sought for in what were considered to be universal and immediately manifest "proofs"; the age asked for "proofs". So a new and learned scholasticism of "proofs" had evolved, and religion was to swear fealty to it. It is only the continuance of the characteristic we have mentioned, if now the direct and immediate nature of religious things turns in self-defence against rationalism in general; that is, in this case, against special pleading, against the mediate, derivative, scholarly, and self-conscious type of intellectual life in general, and of religion in particular, and strives towards approaches and sources which are all its own, new and straightforward. The "layman's" self-help now becomes a declaration of the rights of "feeling" as opposed to reflection. And the heralds are Rousseau, Herder, Jacobi. What is peculiar to the teaching of Fries is this: that he joins issue in this connection, with the determination to bring these thinkers to a clear understanding of what their obscure movements really mean, and, with philosophic lucidity rather than prophetic revelation, to say to reflection, "Thus far shalt thou go", and to prove, in opposition to rationalism, that there is fact and right and force in the immediate actual knowledge, non-reflective, which has its life in feeling.

5. Closely connected with (3) and (4), and accompanying them, is the fifth characteristic. In the tremendous settlement between "Enthusiasm" and the Church's "Means of Grace", completed in the Reformation, Luther had bound fast the "Spirit to the Word" and God to the "Means". Of this the result and the meaning was that the normal, nay, the sole, relation of the godly man to the object of his religion was found in "belief", i.e. in implicit faith in it, and in the

emotions and inward impulses aroused by such faith, which work through it as inspiration to character and will. "And here is the whole *mysterium Christianismi*, the Word and Faith." In theology this doctrine had grown to be authoritative. As a consequence "Mysticism", i.e. the assumption or the faculty of gaining a personal and independent experience of the object of religion, was shut out. What in the theology of the "Aufklärung" is called "Intellectualism" is nothing more than the quite natural result of this teaching, combined with a degradation of this very idea from its original level, the sense of sin and forgiveness, to a more general application. Quite in correspondence with the doctrine of the Word and Faith, there exists in the teaching of the "Aufklärung" as to God and the object of religion in general a nucleus of certain truths, which bring for man and man's life happiness, "tranquillity", and strength. The trustful acceptance of these truths for this purpose—that is religion.¹ But the immediate and personal experience of the object of religion, already scouted as "enthusiasm" and *Schwärmgeisterei*, becomes to

¹ To assert with Schleiermacher in the *Discourses* that for the "Aufklärung", religion was "metaphysics and ethics" is an utter confusion of fact. For this age religion meant also, quite emphatically, the effect of "belief" on character and will. Now this is altogether "Reformers' teaching" even if it shows the "deterioration" before mentioned. "I say that it gives us complete trust in the goodness of our Lord and Maker, a trust that brings real peace of mind, not as the Stoics' peace, an enforced self-control in patient endurance, but proceeding from a present contentment, made certain as well by happiness to come." Leibnitz, *Minor Philosophical Works*, "The Principles of Nature and Grace founded on Reason" (Reclam's edition, p. 149). Moreover, this is recognised by Schleiermacher himself. Read the generous tribute paid in page 49 of the first edition to "those simple books which some time ago were current in our modest homeland and discussed important matters under an unpretentious label". He refers to the ethical weeklies and popular religious publications of the German "Aufklärung" circulating in the same spirit. "They preach, to be sure, nothing but metaphysics and ethics, and they are apt to come back to their own preaching in the end. But they expect you to crack the nut." Quite right, for behind the artless and inadequate metaphysics of the proofs from nature and theology found in these "simple books" there is latent the strong natural religious feeling trying hard with clumsy implements to get enlightenment for itself as to what it means.—Here Schleiermacher is in perfect agreement with Fries (*Kritik der Vernunft*, II, pp. 284).

this school "fanaticism" and "extravagance". The complete justification of this point of view, common to both, lay in the fact that without a creed there is no religion, and that the substance of the creed, which determines character and will, which liberates, sustains, and revitalises the life of character and will, is the foundation of the particular religion and gives it individuality. There is, however, a manifest one-sidedness now to be discerned: the air-tight sealing of immediate experience in respect of the object of religion itself, an absolute contradiction of religious practice and testimony. And while the previous reaction against ecclesiastical doctrine asserted itself in mysticism, the age of "Aufklärung" combats this theological and philosophical "intellectualism" in its "sentimentality" and "pietism". The belief of the pietist, "Thou canst obtain a real revelation of thyself in the form of Feeling" and the "sensitive heart" easily "moved" by the disposition of the world, are parallel ideas, expressions of an age which had become more subjective, gentler and softer. These tendencies, at first parallel, meet and intersect in various ways in Rousseau, Lavater, Hamann, Herder, and others. We find them in Goethe as a sublime experience of nature and in the declaration: "Die Geisterwelt ist nicht verschlossen, dein Sinn ist zu, dein Herz ist tot. Auf, bade, Schüler, unverdrossen die ird'sche Brust im Morgenrot." In Herder they are the experience of God in Nature. In the Romantic school they find a clamorous expression. Everywhere they are uncertain as to their own nature, vacillating between mysticism and poets' dreams. But Kant in his old age, in the *Third Critique*, made a bold attempt to find some firm philosophic ground for all this vague thinking. On this Schiller based his æsthetic, and Fries carries on the work of both, in this connection, in his *Doctrine of Abndung*.

6. In conclusion: Luther, in his theology, breaks away from the superficial idea of the relation between the supernatural

world and the world of sensation, of experience, of natural science—an important advance. According to the earlier conception, God, Eternity, the Beyond, the world, are really in all simplicity assumed to be a part of the same world, only as an invisible part. And here, up to the present time, is the source of all danger for the validity of religious conviction. For, as our comprehension of the universe is enlarged, the visible world, the phenomena of nature, increase and gain ground continually, become more and more self-sufficient, until the invisible is forced to take refuge in the cracks and joints in Nature's frame. Already in Luther we find the beginnings of a conception which has a long run of development in the theology of the "Aufklärung", which offers the first effective opposition to the earlier unsophisticated idea, and thus becomes the preliminary to a safe and superior explanation. Luther not only binds the Spirit to the Word, but cherishes everywhere the conception that God works "through the instrument", i.e. that the whole system of "second causes" is none other than the form of all-powerful divine action, and that it is just in the middle causes that we must look for the working of God.¹ This conception is most vigorously summarised in his clumsy philosophic attempts in *De Servo Arbitrio*, where he brings *spiritus* and *omnipotentia dei* into union with the causality of Nature. This is precisely the method of the "Aufklärung" theology, when it aims at a reconciliation between belief in God and the new understanding of the universe according to laws of Nature, now that the old semi-supernatural Aristotelian views of nature and the old Ptolemaic views of the universe had disappeared, and the necessity of a reconciliation became much more evident. (In this we once more observe how far-reaching

¹ The "Spirit" itself is to him nothing more than the "psychological" "natural" operation of "Word". See Otto, *Luther's Conception of the Holy Spirit*, 1898. As to the important subsequent effect of this thought on the idea of the relation of the supernatural and the natural in general, see my article "Darwinism and Religion", quoted in note to page 16.

is the community of outlook amongst thinkers of the "Aufklärung", in their general view of the universe, in spite of their various schools and various nations.) As a consequence of the same need, a pure matter of apologetics, we find in a quite equal measure in philosophers who generally regard themselves as belonging to hostile and irreconcilable camps the conviction that Being in nature and Happening under the laws of Nature are nothing but the working of God. It is not in the Panenthesists of the Cartesian School, such as Geulincx and Malebranche, that we find the sole or the earliest statement of this conviction, that Nature itself is nothing more than the form of the universal divine operation; in Hobbes it is already there, clear and definite (compare the first sentence of the *Leviathan*: "Naturam, id est illam, qua mundum Deus condidit et gubernat, divinam artem"). Spinoza, in his *Tractate on Religion and Politics*, is equally explicit. His conclusions respecting second causes, God's governing through mediate causes, the universal operation of God in the form of Nature, are in no respect an advance on *De Servo Arbitrio*.¹ Moreover, in the *Tractate* the essentially religious and fundamentally apologetic tendency of this idea is clearly expressed; it is also clear that here is the main basis of that strange and inelastic synthesis which Spinoza sets up later in the *Ethics*, which, also, curiously enough, theologians seem to find to their taste. Then, again, the idea is found in Leibnitz, unaltered. He elaborates it in his controversy with Clarke and Newton. It finds consistent expression in his theory of *creatio continua*. On the line which leads from Hobbes via Locke, we find it in Berkeley, developed into Acosmism, to which destination

¹ Spinoza, *Tractate on Theology and Politics*, Ch. VI. "They (who hold the unphilosophical view) imagine two separate Powers, the power of God and the power of natural things. They are quite ignorant as to what they understand by God and what by Nature, not to speak of the Powers, they imagine the power of God as a sort of domination of some Royal majesty, and Nature as some force or impediment. . . . And so the multitude cease to marvel at the power of God, unless they also conceive the power of Nature as subdued by God." The chapter is devoted to a refutation of this error.

Luther's equating of *omnipotentia* and the causality of Nature inevitably steered, and on which it foundered. Then in the popular philosophy of the "Aufklärung" it recedes from view, but emerges most vividly in Goethe, and, above all, in Herder, in his *Discourses on Spinoza* and his Introduction to *Suggestions for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind*, where he is influenced by Spinoza and Leibnitz.—Now this attempt to overthrow the earlier and simple-minded "Dualism" has in itself a certain roughness and simplicity; really, as can be seen in Luther and many passages in Spinoza's *Tractate*, it is nothing more than the pronouncement of the plain religious judgment, which without further argument actually posits God's action and governance in natural things; and this judgment is here dogmatically repeated, without any real effort to scrutinise and solve the underlying problem. Very soon, however, the speculation becomes more profound, and guides gradually to the train of thought which attains completeness in "Transcendental Idealism". One thing is the impulse to another, and between Luther's *De Servo Arbitrio*¹ and Kant's great doctrine there is a complete chain of development. Instead of crude Dualism, the conviction now begins to gain ground that Nature and Nature's happenings, and obedience to her laws, are rather to be regarded as inadequate, mere phenomena, an image of real things conditioned by limited comprehension, and therefore insufficient as an image of the real world, which is a world free from laws of Nature, free from mathematics and mechanics, a world of spirit and of intelligences, a "realm of grace", a world of God. The great liberating doctrine of "transcendental idealism" is being worked out; its motives are unmistakably religious. In co-operation with this task there are actively pursued in various schools (Bacon, Hobbes) researches into the contradictory

¹ The after-effect of this book as seen in the "Aufklärung" may be noted in Hobbes' controversy with Bishop Bramhall (the questions concerning liberty, necessity, and chance).

nature of Space, infinity and continuity, infinite divisibility and limitless extension. This theme is most clearly present and expressed in Leibnitz (and at the same time it is hard to reconcile it with his "world of pre-established harmony" and the *creatio continua*, which was planned to suit nothing more than this world in Space and Time and under the laws of Nature). Here, also, it is Kant who carries on the "Aufklärung" and completes it. Through his theory of the Antinomies, which springs from the second motive, he finds a firm philosophic basis for that great foremost and fundamental antithesis of the eternal and the transitory, of the infinite and the finite; and he presents in the form of a solid philosophical doctrine that transcendental idealism which, starting from the feeling for truth, had till now maintained itself only in imaginative guise and as a dogmatic hypothesis. Fries accepts and elaborates this teaching, and he obtains individuality and originality for his own philosophy of religion by opposing the world of Knowledge to the world of Faith; by demonstrating that Faith is a form of higher Knowledge, with a firm base in the reasoning intellect, in comparison with which ordinary knowledge can but claim to be valid for phenomena; by searching for the power to become conscious of the eternal world of faith *within* the world of phenomena. If his efforts are successful, then we have attained to the solution of the most formidable problem in the "Aufklärung" theology, the problem set by the new science of Nature's legality; and we have come to the limit of that current of thought, following which the Friesian philosophy here makes its appearance.

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III

THE ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF NATURE

1. Method. 2. Foundation of the Actual Knowledge of Nature in Pure Reason. 3. The Critical Method v. the Sceptical and Dogmatic. 4. Establishment of the Principles of the Actual Knowledge of Nature. 5. Clues to the Discovery of the Categories. 6. The Categories. 7. Objective Validity of the Categories. 8. Schematisation and Limitation of all kinds of Actual Categorical Knowledge through the Idea of Time yields the First Principles.

1. It is only possible here to give an outline of Fries' laborious task in its entirety. And this is not easy, for in his investigation everything is already very concise and nothing is superfluous. An attempt will be made to use language that can be generally understood as far as possible, and thus to translate Fries' carefully chosen terminology, novel in these days, into more current phrase. To reproduce in detail all his subtle and difficult investigations would be impossible. We shall thus abstain from following the rigidly methodical procedure of his great work; we shall endeavour to construct for ourselves such approaches to his thought as may seem to present themselves most conveniently for the introduction. We do not wish to find a substitute for his work; we desire to make it known and to prepare the way for it.—The first aim of Fries' work in critical philosophy is, like Kant's, directed to natural philosophy, i.e. to obtain those kinds of metaphysical knowledge and principles, through which mathematics and natural science (to which he also considers psychology to belong), and consequently the whole world of "Knowledge" in general, is possible. It is exactly from this point that his work proceeds to the doctrine of "ideas" and to the world of "faith". Only the latter is of real concern to us. But we must obtain such preliminary knowledge of the former as is necessary to the comprehension of the latter.

2. Critical philosophy merely completes what was begun by science in the "Aufklärung": it solves the mighty problem which the latter age had presented in ever-growing urgency. It gives the ultimate justification of Galilean and Newtonian science and their picture of the universe. The new science had won its way through, believing and asserting with confidence that it substituted rigidly causal knowledge for semi-animistic ideas, universal and necessary cognitions for unstable opinion. Yet in doing this its own methods were themselves crude and "dogmatic". The edifice was founded and built up on certain ultimate axioms and principles, let us say, those assembled by Newton in the *leges* of his Natural Philosophy; the validity of these once granted, all was sufficiently sure and incontestable. The discovery of these principles, too, as well as their presentation, had been correctly made. But their validity had been assumed without investigation. Active thought was in this matter bound to feel that it had to ascertain the fight for itself. And its task was bound to fail, as long as it only followed the two chief methods of that age: the method of experience and the method of proof. Laws such as the law of substance or the law of causation can never be obtained from experience; for experience, scientific observation, experiment, are all obviously themselves based on the law of causation, and can have no meaning unless it is presupposed. None of them can ever produce of themselves a law, i.e. a universal and necessary rule. The method of proof, too, could give no result, for first principles are those which are not provable and are bound to be unprovable. It was Hume's scepticism which revealed the problem that lay at the root of the new science in its entirety. But even without him it must have appeared in its time.¹

3. The solution of the problem lies in the criticism of reason and in the ensuing demonstration and discovery of a fundamental and rational real knowledge, which it possesses,

¹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, II. Introd. pp. 1-30.

obscurely, independent of all experience, i.e. a priori, of itself alone, as "pure reason", and in the demonstration that those first principles of natural science, that "pure knowledge of Nature", are based on pure reason.¹ But the new science all through was based on mathematics. Mathematics was the queen of the sciences, and its validity was so unquestioned that even Hume's scepticism was reduced to silence before it; helpless through the belief that mathematics was absolutely subject to "proof", i.e. that its first principles were created after the purely logical laws of identity and contradiction, that its judgments were "analytical".² At this point Kant himself interrupts the "sleep of dogmatism" as none had done before him. He lays stress on the logical character of fundamental judgments in mathematics, shows that they, too, are synthetic, and that the character of mathematical knowledge is intuitive rather than logical.³ Just as the earlier problem was, "How is pure natural science possible?" the question is now raised: "How is mathematics possible?" Here, too, there is a corresponding answer: critical proof that the foundation of mathematical knowledge is in the mind itself, immediate and independent of experience.

In this connection it is significant that this kind of philosophy does not proceed from Descartes' *idée fixe* "doubt everything", but from the assurance that we possess cognitions, especially in sciences, which, in spite of all sceptical attacks, march on as surely and as unerringly as mathematics and physics. Philosophy's task is not forcibly to convert sceptics at all cost, but to bring to an understanding of the elements of their own actual knowledge people who have been

¹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, II, Introd. I. On the difference between pure and empirical knowledge. II. We possess certain kinds of real knowledge a priori, and even the ordinary understanding is never without them.

² *Ibid.*, II, Introd. IV. On the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments.

³ *Ibid.*, II, Introd. V. In all theoretical sciences of the reason synthetic judgments a priori are contained as first principles. Proofs for Mathematics, Physics, Metaphysics.

trained to quiet thought and live an independent life of their own, with a natural and healthy trust in reason. The work begins with the actual given kinds of knowledge, examines what suppositions underly these, and if and how these in their turn have their foundation in the reasoning mind. When the "if" and the "how" are established, then we have the final justification for the particular starting-point. Thus it is that distinguishes the critical method from sceptical and dogmatic thought alike. It does not rake up first principles and run them up for a start, proceeding to develop them into a progressive system of knowledge. It does not attempt hypotheses and hypothetical speculations, to lead along certain views or data on the path of speculative imagination until they attain the unity of systematic thought. No; the analytical observation moves backwards from the given cognitions, tries to find their underlying assumptions, separates them according to the sources of the knowledge, and thus at last discovers what fundamental kinds of real knowledge Reason really possesses, and what philosophy is possible for Reason.¹ From the "geometrical method", which Rationalism would have readily employed in philosophy (cp. Spinoza, *Ethica more geometrica demonstrata*) the philosophico-critical method is most positively differentiated in this: it constructs no chains of proof, but effects an analysis of the knowledge, and thus is able to select the purely rational fundamental and actual knowledge.

4. The critical proof, that we have the "pure intuition" through which reason a priori, independent of all experience, and consequently with universal and necessary force, cognises intuitively the fundamental conditions, space and time, gives the answer to the first question, "How is mathematics possible?"² The demonstration that mathematical knowledge also is "synthetic", that there thus exists, here, at any rate, an

¹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, II, Introd. I, p. 1, par. 2.

² The theme of "Transcendental Aesthetics" (of Space; of Time), (*Critique of Pure Reason*, II, pp. 33-73).

a priori, a principle of knowledge independent of experience, had by its own force overthrown the empirical and rationalist prejudice in favour of experience and logic (proof) as the only principles of knowledge, and had left the way open to answer the question, "How is pure natural science possible?" There exists in our mind, deeper still than mathematical knowledge through pure intuition, another knowledge, purely rational, obscure, "fundamental". This becomes known to us, clear to us, in certain conceptions, the "Categories," which have their source in it; in these "Categories" Reason, absolutely pure, absolutely a priori, and thus necessary and universal, gains actual knowledge of the first most general determinations of all that exists, of all that can be experienced. Since now the knowledge of things which we possess through the Categories of them is united with the conception of them that we obtain in pure intuitive contemplation (as the categoric knowledge "becomes schematic" in time and space), there results the possibility of "pure natural science", i.e. the first and supreme fundamental knowledge of nature and being-in-nature expressed in the most universal of natural laws (law of substance, law of causation, etc.). It stands forth as a universal, necessary, and incontestable knowledge for all human reason in general; and from this source the sciences based upon it derive their self-assurance, their unassailable and apodeictic character.¹

5. That Kant, after the discovery of pure intuition, should have succeeded in finding the "clue" that led to the sure discovery and determination in their place of all the Categories in Reason, in spite of Schopenhauer's flouts and jeers, was really the most serious and important achievement in all philosophy as yet. After the discovery is made, it appears quite simple, like Columbus' egg. All scientific cognition becomes expressed in judgments. All the material of judgment is given by intuitive observation and not by reason. Thus, if

¹ Theme of the "Transcendental Logic", first part, i.e. on "Transcendental Analytic." Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 74 sq.

there is any particular that comes from pure reason, over and above the perception, it must be exhibited in the Form of the judgment. And in this way the forms of judgment in their possible varieties become a clue to the discovery of the contributions made by pure reason. In this way Kant makes the certain discovery of the twelve Categories, and establishes the fact of their presence.¹

But after this *quaestio facti* we are faced with the *quaestio juris*: Are these Categories valid? The question is first answered by Fries. He proves that all nature-concepts are merely the various forms of one fundamental idea of the reasoning mind—the idea of universal unity and necessity; or, differently expressed, that they are single and individual determinations of the fundamental knowledge about the necessity and unity of everything that *is*, in general, which rests on the foundation of every single Reason as something most immediate and most profound. This “Deduction of the Categories” is Fries’ most individual achievement in this branch. To the whole splendid theory it gives the stability it needs, and takes the place of Kant’s futile and contradictory attempt to find a solid base for his theory in “transcendental proofs”.²

6. Our kinds of actual knowledge of things under the Categories are “trivial” and general in the highest degree. We know a priori, and of ourselves conceive without having need of experience, not *how many* things there must be, not even that there are actually *some* things—all this could only be known from experience: there might, indeed, also be nothing at all—we know that if there exists Something, this Something must come under the law of Quantity, i.e. it may exist

¹ Theme of Book I of the “Transcendental Analytic”, the “Analytic of Concepts” (i.e. of the pure group-concepts, which are the Categories). Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, II, pp. 90–169. Cp. page 91, clues to discover all pure concepts of the understanding.

² Table of the possible forms of judgment: Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, II, p. 95. Table of the Categories corresponding to these: Kant, *ibid.*, p. 106.

as One or in the Many, and that multiplicity is comprised in the unity of the individual. Furthermore, we know a priori—not how All or an individual thing must be constituted; no single quality could we know, apart from experience—but we do know that if Something exists, it must be thus and thus constituted. That everything which can ever exist must be “somehow or other” is quite self-evident: otherwise it is just nothing: this is “obvious to a child”. Quite so: but at the same time this self-evident truth is altogether independent of experience; it is more correct to say that it is assumed in every experience. Everything is subject to the law of “quality”. Everything possesses “reality” of some kind (note that the term as then used is not, as frequently in our time, synonymous with “being”, “actuality”, existence; it applied rather to the real thing, what something is, e.g. blue, sweet, clear, ill). This is the application of the Categories of Quality (“reality, negation, limitation”).

Of much greater importance than these first six Categories are the next three, those of “Relation”. They are the really significant Categories; they are the “metaphysical” Categories, which give us ontological teaching, which throw light and bring assurance as to the fundamental relations in the Being of things. By following the guiding thread of the categorical, hypothetical, and divisive forms of judgment, we now discover for the first time the Category of Substance and Inherence, i.e. the fact that what really *is* is conceivable only as a thing with qualities. All these three Categories of Relation are nothing more than the three forms, the “three dimensions” one may say, of our reason’s fundamental idea as to the general unity and association in the character of the universe, in all that *is*, or subjectively expressed, in the multiplicity of our perceptions. In the perceptions we are only given what we term the qualities of the things, not a “thing” as well. But in the perception and behind it we are bound to think of “things” as possessing and holding the given qualities in

the given association. (Take "gold" as an example. Here we have the perceptions—hard, heavy, electro-magnetic, chemical. Is all that "gold" with nothing more? Not at all—it would be a mere "rhapsody of perceptions". And our idea "gold" only comes into being when it has within it the idea "thing", the idea of something at the root of these qualities, something possessing them in union, which is at the same time the law of their peculiar and indestructible coexistence.) Hume challenged the existence of "things", pointing out that we have no experience of "things" and cannot prove that they exist. And he is right as to knowledge and proof. But a sceptic, too, "sees at once" that Being is only possible as the being of things with qualities.

Unity and association among the perceptions are presented in Substance and Inherence. Unity and association in the multiplicity of things are presented through Cause and Effect (causality and dependence), and in the interdependence of things through reciprocal action: both of these, again, being "Categories", absolute a priori conceptions and cognitions as to the being of things. (Hume again shows quite conclusively that they have nothing to do with experience or proof. He knew nothing of immediate knowledge, and so could merely resort to the sceptic's device of denying it altogether. The psychological fact, the unassailable truth, that the idea of causation is possessed by every man and constantly put into practice by him—for without it not science alone, but everyday life would be impossible—is explained by Hume as the "expectation of a similar case through habit, governed by the laws of the association of ideas". But custom itself is only possible if the causation holds good. It is a psychic effect of repetition. And the *expectation* of the similar case is not implicit in the association of ideas: the remembrance alone is implicit.)

Finally, the consideration of Modality yields the last three categories—Possibility, Reality, and Necessity.

7. The Categories are "pure a priori conceptions". As such

they are *real Knowledge*. In them we comprehend, quite independently of experience, from pure reason, purely of ourselves alone, what is the fundamental condition of all Being. We know beforehand that all that exists must correspond to them. In this sense we are prescribing laws for Being.—In Kant this last principle acquires a singular meaning, which developed later on into the Ego-speculation of Fichte's thought and his "Acosmism", as well as the beginning of Schelling's philosophy.¹

Kant infers that, since this knowledge is altogether a priori, it can only hold good for the subjective world of our conception, not for an objective world of Being-in-itself, independent of ourselves. From the a priori nature of the Categories he concludes that they are ideal. A reality independent of ourselves, he declares, is manifested in sensuous perceptions only in so far as it actually "affects" us. But the Categories are to be subjective principles of form; they enable us to shape for ourselves a picture of the universe which has consequently no claim to objectivity. Kant had already in his *Transcendental Aesthetics* inferred the "ideality" of space and time along similar lines. We have already shown how Fries corrected this error. The inference from apriority to ideality does not hold good; it is based on a false supposition, i.e. that the causality of the object towards us is made a criterion of objective validity. But this criterion is also in sense-perception applicable in appearance only; and at this point Kant is forced to attribute reality to that category of Causality which he precisely declares to be ideal. And, above all, it is true that we must subsequently assume this causality in the being-affected (just because the a priori law of causation is objectively valid); but as to the truth of the sense-perception we can in no way appeal to it, for it affords us *no perception at all*

¹ See already Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 148, section 23, and "more of this subject later on". Especially pp. 294 *seq.*, section on "reasons for the division of things in general into *phenomena* and *noumena*."

to go with the other. We cannot, therefore, consider its presence or absence as a criterion of the knowledge. The fact that we really *know* something in our sense-perceptions, i.e. that we conceive an object which really exists and conceive it according to its being, is solely based on Reason's natural self-confidence that it is capable of truth and knowledge, a confidence that no scepticism can really shake. This applies with no less force—rather, with more—to a priori kinds of real knowledge than to such as depend on sense-perception. Those “self-evident” truths, which every child grasps at once, are valid for Reason, as laws for the objective world itself. In them Reason sees at once what really is thus or thus; it could only renounce this conviction by renouncing itself. Thus, also, the ideality of space and time is in no way a result of the apriority of pure contemplation; but, on the contrary, the latter gives them “their empiric reality” in universality and necessity. If, as space and time, they have as such no validity for the true nature of things, the reason is something quite different: the cosmological antinomy discovered by Kant. Here, too, we are not to conclude from the term “ideality” that space and time are as good as nothing at all; but that they are an inadequate conception, bounded by the limits of the human reason, of their higher analogue (a comprehensible variety, difference, and separation), the idea of which we can only express, it is true, in a “double negation”.

8. In themselves the Categories in no way yield those ultimate principles of natural science itself of which we are in search. These principles, however, follow at once when we subject our knowledge of the real nature of things, given under the Categories, to our accompanying conception of it in space and time.¹

Before our sense-perception we have nothing except the

¹ Theme of the “Transcendental Analytic”, Book II, i.e., on the Analytic of First Principles (Physics, Knowledge of Nature), *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 169–315.

indirect (figurative) synthesis of phenomena in space and time. Categorical knowledge is applied to this like the tinfoil to a mirror, and begins our possession and comprehension of Nature's world around us.¹

For example: in sense-perception we have a certain complex of separate perceptions, limited in space, some of which are continuous in time, while others are changing, appearing, disappearing. To these data, the result of perception alone, is applied the actual knowledge of the "Thing with qualities". I cognise that the thing persists, and in its changing conditions also remains identical. Let us say, the thing "water", which persists as water with the chemical character H_2O , even when it ceases to be liquid and becomes ice or vapour. Since thus the phenomenon contemplated in time is understood through the subsumed category, since the category "formulates" it in time and at the same time "restricts" it, there comes into being in each case a pure first principle. For example, in our case, "that which persists—precisely that is Substance"; or, "Substance is persistent": a principle of the highest importance for natural science which experience can never give; it can merely confirm. It must be observed, however, that the principle is "synthetic". For the category in itself knows nothing of the considerations "persistence" and "duration"; they belong to Time alone. "Substance" pure and simple is just that which is identical with itself, however varied, however different its conditions may be conceived. The fact that for us all Being is only given in Time leads up first to the perception that variety in conditions must be a "change" "*in Time*" (that is, a time-sequence), and that the Identity-with-itself to which we have referred must be a persistence in Time. When the categoric knowledge (i.e. that the subject of Being is "Substance with *accidentia*") joins forces with the time-formulation (duration and change), then the fundamental

¹ See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 176 sqq., "von dem Schematismus der reinen Verstandsbegriffe."

principle yields itself. And with this the knowledge that in Time there must plainly be persistence (and this, however much an axiom of all natural science, is once more not to be obtained from experience). Thus then, in general and applied to all the Categories, we obtain the "Magna Charta" of the knowledge of Nature, those "twelve tables" of the metaphysical principles which are the basis of natural Science.¹

¹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 187 *sqq.*: System aller Grundsätze des reinen Verstandes. And pp. 197 *sqq.*: Systematische Vorstellung aller synthetischen Grundsätze desselben. These fundamental principles are enumerated in the four groups as axioms of intuitive knowledge, anticipations of perception, analogies of experience, and postulates of empiric thought in general, with extraordinarily penetrating vision of their nature and differences. At the same time he makes a fallacious attempt to "prove" these first principles transcendently—fallacious because they do not admit of such proof and, according to their deduction, do not need it.

IV

TRANSITIONS TO IDEAL ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE

1. Law in Nature not based on the Category, but on the Schematised Category.
2. Importance of Discovering the Pure Actual Knowledge of Reason.
3. Transitions to the Idea.
4. Limits of Knowledge. Capacity for Ideas.

1. This doctrine of the "formulation of the Categories in Time" and the resultant pure science of Nature was developed by Kant to its perfection. Fries adopted it unaltered, as a complete and solid achievement, and it will be sufficiently well known. Yet further space must be devoted to its discussion, for a theme of great importance for the "Idea" is the natural sequel. The natural science of the "Aufklärung" was at last based on absolute first principles and stabilised beyond the power of assault. But this signifies as well: the dominion of law in Nature, mathematical and mechanical uniformity, the shackles of a causation which admits no exception, action and reaction which make slaves of all, the world of natural science, ungodlike and knowing no God, barred and bolted against freedom and creative initiation, against the everlasting and the idea of a super-world. But note precisely the point where this motive enters our consideration, and what has led up to it. It is just this "schematisation" of the Categories! And there is nothing of it in the category itself. As the category is schematised, it is "restricted" at the same time—Kant often uses the term¹—i.e. *limited*,

¹ "It is obvious that, although the formulæ of sensation give the Categories their first reality, they *restrict* them at the same time—that is, they *limit* them to conditions which are outside the understanding (i.e. in sensation). Whenever we abandon a restrictive condition we appear to amplify the previously limited conception. Thus the Categories in their pure meaning, without all conditions of sensation, ought to hold good of things in general *as they are*, whereas their schematisations only present them *as they appear*, and consequently they possess a meaning quite free from all schematisations and far wider-reaching."—*Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 186.

and limited indeed to barriers which do not belong to it by Nature. The category in itself is far more general and comprehensive than in its restricted and schematised form. In the category of Quantity *per se* there is nothing more than the consideration of the manifold, and not yet of the manifold as governed by the law of number and measure. In the category of Substance and Accident *per se* there is nothing more than the conception of that which is identical with itself in a possible plurality of diverse conditions. In our time-sequence such identity can only occur as that which persists through all time and has neither beginning nor ceasing. The object of fixation and the object of non-fixation are in no way excluded from being in the category.¹ The category of Cause, when schematised, certainly excludes "free causation". For, since the occurrence of a change is to be understood as the effect of cause, it follows that in the sequence of time every cause must be the effect of a preceding cause, which itself was a change, and so forth: that is, if the cause were not itself a change in what had hitherto existed, its effect would of necessity be present as well, and so would itself be no change in the hitherto existent. But in the conception of the pure category of Causation there is nothing more than this, that a thing is the reason for the existence of another thing and its conditions; there is nothing as to the necessity of its being an effect if it is to be a cause. Solely through the "narrowing-down" of the category as it is projected upon the time-sequence does this consideration come in; it is quite foreign to the category itself. It is to be kept in view, and becomes significant if it is proved from another side that the idea of space and time does not comprehend the real nature of things themselves, but arises from the limitation of our own knowledge.

¹ "Thus substance, if the sensuous determination of persistence is left out of sight, would mean nothing more than a something which can be thought of as subject (without being a predicate of something else)." — *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 186.

2. The discovery of this a priori knowledge has, however, a value here and now self-evident for the sphere of ideal conviction. Let that given fundamental knowledge bring with it whatever "naturalistic" consequences it may for our picture of the universe: yet there is revealed in it something in the highest degree marvellous—namely, an immediate knowledge of reason, which lies hidden in Reason's secret places, on its foundation, dim and unconscious; to those who have it, a completely unconscious possession—so unconscious that it is possible to dispute its very existence. It is dormant. And not until a man begins to have experience and to express his experience in judgments does it begin to stir within him and "does its bit" to perception. And only in this way is it that a man obtains the real knowledge of his universe, which he already possesses in everyday life and amplifies in the life of culture. At first he thinks he owes it all to experience; through reflective analysis and self-criticism, and nothing else, he picks out the thread of pure reason, and concludes that through this, and this only, he attains real knowledge and all that makes knowledge certain and solid. But, long before reason has arrived at this critical discovery of the immediate knowledge, there it is, active in ordinary life as well as in science. Every reasoning being *has* in himself mathematical as well as metaphysical knowledge, which he continually if unconsciously applies. Everybody knows dimly that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points; everybody acts on this knowledge when he has to find a path. Everybody has a dim knowledge of the law of causation, and makes it the standard of his judgment and action in the commonest relations of life. And it was because the "pure science of Nature" lay in the minds of Galilei, Kepler, and Newton, and had long been active there, that their science could march along, unconcerned, sure, successful, even before the critical justification was at hand. But the condition in which immediate Knowledge shows itself as active, even before

light has penetrated to its primal obscurity, is the *Feeling of Truth*. In this feeling of truth we possess obscure and deep experiences which compel us to recognise them as valid. To express these with clearness and to give them consciousness of their own force is incumbent on Philosophy and is her most important task.¹

¹ As to the confusion between the theory of Immediate Knowledge and that of Innate Ideas I will summarise as follows. The theory of innate ideas was in fact a preparation for the correct theory. It was presented in an inadequate and fallacious shape, which, one may notice, Leibnitz had already almost overcome in his *Nouveaux Essais*. The Empiricists and the Naturalists in their age most resolutely challenged the existence of anything like innate ideas and flouted the theory; to-day the same Naturalistic school preach it with equal ardour. All creative impulses in animals, all the "associations of ideas" underlying instinct, are just innate ideas, which in the course of evolution and of history are acquired to a species and then are innate in the individual member of the species as "mneme" or "engraph" or "inherited memory". And Naturalistic philosophers of this type are artful and audacious enough to play at "going back to Kant," and to admit that ideas of time and space, categories, law of causation and all a priori laws, even judgments of values, are independent of the experience of the individual; they even assert it with emphasis. But a difference, it is now not God, but—shall we say—the Devil, i.e. the Struggle for Existence, who implanted this a priori in man. This theory forgets, however, that neither God nor the Devil can implant actual knowledge. Innate ideas are thoughts due to compulsion and are, therefore, not knowledge at all. Knowledge is not a matter of possessing peculiar ideas which we cannot abandon: it is a matter of possessing the *insight*, that something is thus or thus. To this end it is of no advantage to have something like innate ideas from some source or other, even if they were *per se* absolutely correct. It would be of no advantage, even if these ideas emanated from the spring of eternal truth. In that case they might at most be called teachings, they would be neither knowledge nor insight. If Knowledge is to exist, then God himself can do no more than create beings, who are what he is himself: beings with pure reason, i.e. beings capable not merely of right thoughts, but of an individual immediate perception of Truth. Now there are such beings. This present-day resurrection of the old theory of innate ideas is quite right as long as it is discussing Instinct, for the inquiry after Knowledge it has nothing to tell us; it rests on an error in psychology. The whole solution of the problem is contained in the introductory paragraphs of the *Critique of Pure Reason*: "But although all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it arises from experience. For it is quite possible that even our empirical experience is a compound of that which we receive through impressions and of that which our own faculty of knowledge (*incited* only by sensuous impressions), supplies from itself, a supplement which we do not distinguish from that raw material until long practice has roused our attention and rendered us *capable of separating one from the other*" (tr. Max Muller). That is to say: not a single actual knowledge exists in the soul prior to and without experience. But when experience and knowledge begin through

But what has here been proved for the sphere of "theoretical reason" already affords us in anticipation a key for under-

sensuous perception, simultaneous with the latter and mingled with it, there is developed a Knowledge which does not originate in experience, but is present and coexistent, *independent of all experience*, e.g. all mathematical knowledge. This points back to the preliminary existence in the mind, not of non-empiric cognitions, but of the possibility of having such cognitions, an aptitude for them, and a special source of them.—If a priori is always rendered by *independent of experience* the false notion of a Knowledge previous in time and occurring *apart* from experience is definitely excluded. There is just as little of the time-condition in the meaning of the words "primary", "immediate". When the "naturalists" of the present age derive innate ideas from inherited experience their procedure is much more crude and inadequate than that of the old rationalists. The latter, indeed, would permit us to observe that we have, in general, *conceptions* of cause, necessity, law. With the former school even that is impossible. For the "mneme" to which they refer in this connection is nothing but accumulated and inherited experience. But, since in experience as such, nothing of that sort is capable of ascertainment, the mere appearance of the concepts in our thought would be an utter miracle—Compare Kant himself, *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 166: "If anyone wished to maintain that they (the Categories) were subjective dispositions for thought, implanted in us, and so arranged by our creator (e.g. Darwin's Natural Selection, which term might here quite well be substituted for 'God' without altering the sense of Kant's pronouncement) that their use coincided exactly with the laws of Nature along which experience proceeds, there would be a decisive answer: in such a case the Categories would be deprived of that Necessity which is an essential part of their conceived character. For, to take an example, the concept 'Cause' which predicts the necessity of an effect under a presumed condition would be erroneous if it only rested on some subjective necessity, implanted in us, to combine certain empirical ideas in accordance with a law of relation of this type. I should be unable to say, 'the effect is united with the cause, in the object (i.e. necessary)'; I could only say: 'I am so constituted that I can conceive this idea in no way except in this combination' which is exactly what suits the sceptic best of all: for in that case all that we perceive through a supposed objective validity of our judgments is mere appearance and no more; and there would be no lack of people who would never admit of themselves this subjective necessity (which must be felt); at least it would be impossible to wrangle with a person about that which merely depends on the manner in which his 'subject' is organised." On this is founded Fries' *Critique of Reason* right through, as it sets forth that our reason is spontaneity affected by stimuli, i.e. that it is wholly subject to the limitations of the senses. Reason's total life and activity only begin, only become actual, in response to the *stimulus* given in the sense-perception. And without such a preceding stimulus reason has neither idea, nor effort, nor action; it is, in fact, only *tabula rasa*. But if the stimulus comes, then appear together with the characters written by sensuous perception, mingled with them, other characters which are not given by sensuous perception, and could not be so given. The only question now is: "Are you competent to discern them?" And this is the primary task of the Criticism of Reason. The discovery of "how they are possible" comes next.

standing the realm of "practical reason", and a confident expectation that here, too, shall be found a Something belonging to immediate knowledge alone, in which everything that has universal and necessary validity shall have its foundation and ultimate criterion. And at the same time a key is presented for the comprehension of historical development in this sphere. Quite apart from the question whether this principle, hidden deep in the intelligence, is observed or not observed as such, from the very outset it is there, active in the history of the human mind, in the shape of the feeling of truth—ethical, religious, æsthetic—capable like all other feelings of every variation in degree, clear or obscure, feeble or powerful, differentiated according to national or individual character; capable of lying dormant for centuries, and then breaking through in a Personality—a chosen one, a genius, a master-mind, a discoverer, a prophet—standing forth and bringing enlightenment, mighty as the Oracles of God and speaking with the authority of the highest. In this way are we led to comprehend how varied its utterances may be and how its manifold revelations are closely related below the surface, a thing more astonishing still. And thus, too, we comprehend the claim to supreme and immediate authority made by every "Prophet", and, on the other hand, the claim that the hearer himself must assent to the prophet's message. The difference between the Feeling of Truth in Practical Reason and Theoretical Reason is this: in the latter it is capable of being completely "analysed", i.e. the obscure knowledge in the form of feeling can be completely "unravelling" and the feelings themselves can be brought into concepts; while in the former it is only capable of being analysed in part—in part it is non-analysable. To begin this analysis on the one hand, and on the other hand to determine the sphere of the non-analysable—this is the fundamental task of philosophy in this department of thought.—"Pure Reason", and with it the Criticism of Pure Reason, only exists because

this immediate, primally obscure knowledge exists. The idea of this guides Kant in his undertaking, if with too little precision. The lack of clarity in his conception of it was in many ways prejudicial to his criticism, and, more than anything else, made it impossible for him to find a basis at this point for the theory of the Idea. It is especially in this connection that Fries is Kant's successor, and a true successor, as he only brings into clearness that hidden pole around which Kant's speculation had revolved already without coming to rest.

3. The picture of the universe, according to Kant and Fries, as given from "the pure science of Nature" we have called "naturalistic". And "naturalistic" it is, inasmuch as it subjects the universe to law in Nature, unfolds the world as immeasurable in space and time and self-contained, eliminates from the plan Heaven, the Empyrean, the Creation, every vestige of the supernatural, and explains everything in the world by immanent causes. In this world no "miracles" can be admitted: a miracle is an exception to a natural law. Such an exception could never be established. Everything comes to us by sensuous perception alone. But whether a sensuous perception is "objective" or imagination, hallucination, and the like, can only be judged by the criterion of conformity with the law itself. There is, too, the repudiation of all spiritual dogmatism. "Rational Psychology" is impossible, together with the proof that the psychical nature of man and what it includes is a "simple and incorruptible" substance. This psychical nature is certainly presented to us as a "unity", which, being single, cannot be lost through resolution into its parts; but as a "unity" of inward qualities, which, like all quality in this world of number, is an intensive magnitude subject to the laws of degree, and consequently to a graduated transition into nothingness. In this connection it is only the spiritual which, as compared with the material, appears to have an unstable basis. In this universe it is Matter alone

which has for us a firm and indestructible foundation. Matter, defined as "that which can move in Space," is cognised wholly through attributions belonging to Space and Time, and therefore absolutely *a priori*. And since "Persistence" is here the schema and at the same time the sole criterion of the applicability of the "Substance" category, then Matter is Substance, absolutely so; but nothing will justify us in applying this category to the psychic, since here the sensuously perceived criterion of applicability, namely, "Persistence", is wanting.

And yet there is a misconstruction which must be disallowed: that this theory, altogether Kantian in origin, is really a "concession to Positivism", or quite certainly has naturalistic or materialistic results, which were subsequently glossed over by a mighty leap into the realm of the Idea. This is absolutely foreign to the tendency of Fries' thought. No, the "world of Knowledge" is itself of such a nature that it "fits on to" the Idea in a certain respect, that it possesses and provides "transitions" to ideal knowledge in "Belief".¹

For knowledge also it is "clear at once that the living cannot be derived from the dead", the spiritual cannot be derived from the material. The material, with its phenomena of motion, stands side by side with the spiritual: they are incapable of union, nor can they be derived from each other. In the material and the spiritual alike there is manifested a special coherence of phenomena: for the spiritual is always explained by the spiritual alone. Psychological comprehension is not gained from physiological-physical processes. Psychology and Physics have nothing to do with each other. And therefore with the existence of the bodily organism, which for us is always bound up with "Soul", no explanation is furnished for the existence of the psychic. It remains in complete obscurity; and while in the other case we have a possible

¹ This is the sense of the assertion on page 27 of my *View of the World in Nature and Religion*.

task for the phenomena to follow up the causal connections, here we are faced by a bar to causal explanation which is absolutely immovable. The Spirit is the inward, living, and wholly active principle; in its activity subject indeed to Law, but a law entirely its own, unfolded in Psychic Anthropology, in Logic, in the Criticism of Pure Reason. Above all, the discovery of pure reason itself lifts the freedom and nobility of the Spirit not only above all onslaughts of Materialism, but above the belittlements of Psychological Empiricism, which from its own side would deny it all its individuality and liberty, and reduce it to a mere confluence of sensations. Yes, even in Time there really exists already for the mind itself an utterly different world, a world of quite other import than the world of mathematics and matter. Only in the relation of things to each other are they these material substances under the laws of motion. But for the mind they are cognised further as the world of colours, sounds, and scents, as the world in qualities; a real knowledge which for the mathematical and scientific knowledge of this world of time, space, and matter cannot be given a firm hold, but must be transformed: and yet it is in itself a real knowledge as well, and though without significance in one direction, in the other it serves precisely as a "transition" to the Idea. Most important for this transition is the Ego-consciousness given in "pure apperception", which is the irrevocable form of the content of the inward sense, just as Space is the form of the content of the external sense. In the Ego-feeling the heterogeneous in the inward experience is reduced to that homogeneity in which it really stands. And in this unity of the Ego is presented what, in spite of the Atomic Theory, can never be presented in space and matter, an absolute *Monad*.¹

¹ For a more detailed discussion see Otto, *Naturalistische und religiöse Weltanschauung*, pp. 225-244; Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 419 sqq.: "But in the third principle the absolute unity of Apperception, the simple Ego . . . becomes important *per se*, although I have determined nothing at all as to the constitution or subsistence of the subject. The apperception is something real and its unity

4. Our knowledge extends over this world in space and time. We have no other *knowledge*: we can have no other knowledge. To go Beyond and Above is impossible: the very problem whether there could be any meaning in a Beyond and Above would be a waste of time, and could not present itself to us but for two considerations: Reason's own knowledge of the limits of its own knowledge, and the capacity for Ideas.—A man born blind, who knew the world only through the four lower senses, would never be able to realise that there might be another and a higher knowledge of things than his own. Not until the existence of such knowledge is communicated to him from *another* side does he experience the limitations of his knowledge. But Reason is in a position

is already present in its possibility. Now in space there is nothing real which would be simple, for points (which constitute the only incomplex in space) are merely limits, and not in themselves something which serves to constitute a part of space. From this follows that it is impossible to explain my nature (as a thinking subject and no further) by materialistic principles."—And pp. 424 sqq.: "In this, however, the severity of the critical method . . . is useful to no small degree, inasmuch as it is thereby secured against all possible assertions of the contrary (i.e. Materialism)." And compare the whole of the admirable section 423-6.—And a general comparison may be made with Fries, *Religionsphilosophie*, p. 80, on the relation of "Knowledge" seen in the light of law in Nature, and the teleological view of Knowledge demanded by Religion. "But with this theory we may not combine the assertion that Naturalism and Teleology are contradictions of each other. Quite the reverse. for the teleological view can be conceived as superimposed on the whole of naturalism. Teleological views are born in the mind's inner knowledge, and can always appear to us only in analogy with the pragmatic estimation of human activities. Here the relation is clearly to be seen. Every machine must have an explanation on purely natural grounds for the production of its results, an explanation according to the laws of efficient causes. But the human Will is able to make use of these natural laws by subordinating the parts of the machine to conditions given by those laws, so that the natural result corresponds at the same time to his purposes. So things also stand for the world. If I assume that a higher Will subordinated things to natural laws, to bring about the natural consequences in the world, there is nothing contradictory in the assumption. But we add this: that this assumption holds good for us men not as a scientific assumption, but only as in accordance with the ideas of eternal truth." Cp. in this connection *Naturalistische und religiöse Weltansicht*, pp. 59 sqq., where the problem of Law in Nature and Teleology is handled in the same way, in greater detail, and Ch. IV (Darwinismus) in special relation to the theories of the Origin of Species and Natural Selection (pp. 66-144).

to observe *of itself* that its knowledge is limited, and where these limitations lie: and in the course of its development it is bound to come to a point where they are seen.—In the phraseology of the period the word “Idea” had quite lost the original profound meaning which Plato had given it; and especially through English empiricism and the theory of the association of ideas had been debased to “Vorstellung”, even to “Sensation” and “Perception”. Kant had restored its higher import.¹ Idea is the conception of something which absolutely transcends all experience, which, moreover, cannot be applied to experience, like the pure concepts of the understanding (Categories); and at the same time a concept which we must make necessary for ourselves from pure reason. Fries shows why we must make such concepts necessary for ourselves, and demonstrates their objective validity by revealing their origin in the “immediate knowledge” of reason itself. He goes on to show that, based on the immediate knowledge of reason, we construct for ourselves ideas through which we cognise the essence of things as opposed to our knowledge of them in time and space; that in them we possess an imperishable understanding of the essence of things themselves, compared with which their cognition in space and time is limited and therefore terminates, i.e. proves itself to

¹ See the *Transcendental Logic*, second part. As the first part dealt with the pure concepts of the understanding and the “principles” derived from them, which in their combination produce the lower metaphysics (the pure knowledge that underlies natural sciences), so the second part treats of the “concepts of reason”, the “ideas” from which the higher metaphysic is produced, which Kant erroneously insists can only hold good as “transcendental appearance”. One immediately feels, however, that it is just in this metaphysic from Ideas that his own interest is most deeply centred.—The first book of the *Transcendental Dialectic* deals with “the Ideas in general”, “Transcendental Ideas”, and with the “System of Transcendental Ideas”, pp. 368–96. Cp. p. 370: “Plato, in his use of the term ‘idea’, clearly shows that he means, not merely something which is never derived from the senses, but something which rises far above the concepts of the understanding, Aristotle’s subject-matter . . .”; and 377: “Anybody who has once been familiarised with this distinction must find it intolerable to hear the presentation of the colour ‘red’ called an Idea. It is not even worthy of the term ‘notion’.”

be a knowledge which for us only holds good for the appearance of things and not for their essence. This is the great theory of Transcendental Idealism in its particular presentation by Fries. Appearance is not "illusion"; it is not a personal and peculiar product arising from our own subjectivity; it is the appearance of things themselves, for us, but for us as knowing them under limitations. He who sees a landscape through a mist does not cognise an utter Nothing; he is not dreaming, and it is no *fata morgana* that he beholds: he cognises the landscape itself, and his knowledge is valid, but valid with limitations. And if he is also aware of the meaning of mist, and its effect on vision, he knows also the reality of his limitation, and can overcome the latter as long as he can figure to himself what elements would be absent from the perfect actual knowledge (i.e. greyness and haziness), although he cannot supply for himself the *positive* accretion.

V

FOUNDATION OF IDEAL KNOWLEDGE

(a) The Antinomies. 1. The World is Infinite in Space and Time; the World is Complete. 2. All is Complex, Nothing Incomplex; the Ultimate is Incomplex. 3. Natural Law, no Free Causes: Free Causes. 4. Infinite Conditionality: Necessity. (b) The Problem solved by Transcendental Idealism. (c) The Positive Foundation of Ideas.

(a) The limitation of our knowledge is manifested in that singular fact, the "Antinomy of Reason", which had puzzled philosophers through the ages. The Eleatics are aware of it, though their consciousness of it is confused and their examples inadequate. The philosophy of the Middle Ages devoted much attention to it. In the struggle between Averroes and Thomas Aquinas it lurks in the background. In Bruno there are clear traces of it in the dialogue *Della cosa, principio ed uno* and in *Del infinito, universo e mondi*. And in the philosophy of the "Aufklärung" it diagnoses "something wrong in the works" and makes no serious effort to proceed beyond this. Bacon already enumerates almost all the points and leaves it at that, without coming to a clear understanding of the vast range of the subject. In Hobbes and Leibnitz it is very much alive. Similarly in Shaftesbury. And the popular philosophy of the age of "Aufklärung" thinks hard about it.¹ Really, however,

¹ Cp. a very thoroughgoing article in the weekly review *Die Ehre Gottes aus der Betrachtung des Himmels u. Erde*, No. 55 (1767), "The Divisibility of Bodies". "A professor of natural science sets a limit to the divisibility of bodies in nature when in his thought he has got down to the original corpuscles, which are indivisible as having no intervening spaces. The teacher of mathematics laughs at the assertion that infinite divisibility of matter is impossible. He produces rigid proofs, and in his department they are quite correct. The pity is that his elements, points, lines, plane surfaces, and therefore the elements of the bodies as well, are mere figments, but figments of infinite utility. One might wish that all other human sciences were constructed on figments as practically useful. Then they would possess the same correctness and conviction as mathematics itself." (An age of enlightenment indeed, which read "reviews" of this type, instead of magazines and Sunday papers! It is comprehensible how, in a general intellectual atmosphere like this, Kant's philosophy could be an event, not for the specialist alone, but for the man in the street.)

it was the inevitable beginning of every cultured man's vision of the universe. For without it the foundation is not well and truly laid; and the structure resting on this unstable foundation is at most a dogmatic makeshift. These cosmological principles involve, not casual and indifferent side-issues, but fundamental conditions of Being itself, as to which clarity and certainty must be attained or all our knowledge of the universe is bound to be nebulous and unsettled.¹ In "Cosmology", as we meditate on the universe and cosmic Being in general, Reason, as it appears, becomes involved beyond the hope of rescue in self-exclusive and contradictory conditions, which, on both sides, are of equal importance and necessity for it. (At this point Kant, misled by his prejudice in favour of "Proof", states a *proof* for either side of the antinomy.²) An impossible and contradictory task. But it is a matter of forms of actual knowledge, which are opposed to each other: a real "scandal for reason", if the conflict is left unsettled. The antinomy is well known and will need no more than a brief outline.

1. (a) Without any possible contradiction, we cognise our world as extended in Space and Time. But space and time go on beyond any limit, without end. And our imagination can at once conceive world and worlds extending in space, as it incessantly enumerates and adds to the total, star to star, system to system, cosmic plane to cosmic plane. Omitting these possibilities and setting a barrier to imagination, if we wished to assume that the "universe" only existed with us in space, and beyond was the Void, there would still be no ground for the conclusion that space should be full, here and nowhere else. And, at any rate, space would go on without

¹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 432-89: Second Book of the *Transcendental Dialectic*, II, "The Antinomy of Pure Reason" (sections 1 and 2). In the second section the two sides of the antinomy are printed in parallel columns (pp. 454 *seq.*).

² *Ibid.*, p. 454, *Proof* of the thesis, and p. 455, *Proof* of the antithesis. And so forth for all four phases of the antinomy.

end, and within it spaces upon spaces as its parts. Similarly with time and what happens in time. Time, at any rate, goes on without end, *a parte post* and *a parte ante*. And if it were sought to conceive an island of happening in time, and to consider all that preceded as empty time, then, again, there would be no reason why a beginning should be made just at that point of time, why the thing should not have always been.

(8) Thus the world incontestably appears as we contemplate it: and at the same time we see with equal clearness how impossible it all is, below the surface. The example of Time makes it clearest. In a succession of days, hours, or any divisions of time that may be chosen, the fifth, sixth, *n*th can only occur whenever all the preceding units were given as previously closed. Their *entire* series must have come to a *complete* conclusion. But Time *a parte ante* goes back without end. An *infinite* time would necessarily, therefore, *have been completed*, which is a contradiction in terms. Before every interval of time extends another interval of time. There is always yet one more; there is never an All.

But if a Now is to occur, an All must absolutely be given. That is such an obvious and immediate conclusion of the reason as to make all denial impossible. In a word: "in reality" a *regressus in infinitum* cannot happen; for the "essence of things themselves" we must close the series. And the same thing is true of Space. What really *is*, is *as it is*, and not with something continually added. It is, in the complete totality of its factors, whether these be stars, systems of stars, molecules, or space upon space. This incessant "something continually added" is for that which has real Existence absolutely irrational.¹

The paradox in the idea of Time can also be made clear in this way. At first, nothing seems clearer and simpler than this idea. And yet its paradoxical nature has always made

¹ Treated in greater detail in my *Naturalistische und religiöse Weltansicht*, second edition, pp. 52-5.

itself noticeably felt. This feeling can easily be dispersed by the following reflection. When do we really live in Time? What is real in Time? Clearly, what *was*, is not real. What was, is no longer, and therefore *is* not: just so. Further, what is yet to be, is clearly just as unreal. Since it is *not yet*, it *is* not: just so. There is no doubt that only that which *is now*, *is*; and that what is not *now*, is not at all, since it is either no longer or not yet. At first this sounds quite simple, and seems to present no difficulty. But on closer examination it is seen to end in an utterly absurd proposition. It is seen that there is no Now at all, that the idea of it is self-contradictory, and that if the principle holds good—that alone *is*, which is *now*—then, in fact, nothing at all *is*. That, however, is as good as saying that the idea of Time is incompatible with the idea of real Being. Just ask ourselves the question: What really is *Now*? Is it to-day? No; for to-day is half already gone, and exists, therefore, no longer. And half is yet to come, and is, therefore, not yet. Or, is it the present hour? But that is in precisely the same case. Or, is it the present minute, the present second, the present fraction of a second? Or is it a quite incredibly small measure of time? But even the trillionth part of a second is always already past as to one part and future as to quite a different part. The former would be no longer; the latter not yet. Well, then, let it be the point which lies between past and future. And here the impossibility of the whole idea is just manifest. A point is in no sense a part of the line, but only a boundary of a line. Whenever we say “only a point” we are either expressing ourselves loosely and really mean a part of the series which is very minute for our powers of perception, or nothing more than the limit of two parts of a line, which, however, cannot also be a part of the line, for if it were it could not be a limit. No sceptic can ever talk us out of our conviction that something really is. The belief in Reality, without phrase, is founded in reason itself beyond all possibility of contradiction. On

it the idea of time comes to grief. It manifests itself as a *limited* form of the comprehension of true Being.

2. The second instance of the "Antinomy of Reason" appears in the "Simple and Complex". The first antinomy dealt with outward infinity; proceeding to the ever greater; the second deals with inward infinity, proceeding to the ever smaller, with the "continuity" of space and time.

(a) Intuitive perception shows us beyond a doubt that everything given in the world is "complex", i.e. is capable of resolution into parts, of reduction and division, and that an Indivisible can in no way be conceived by intuitive perception; for all divisions of magnitude are merely relative. And the most amazingly minute thing in this world of space and time, whether we take a body extended in space or an event extended in time, a microscopically minute fraction of space or a millionth part of a second, is made up of its halves, thirds, thousandths, billionths; and these, again, of their halves and billionths, and so on without end, just as much as the largest masses, the widest spaces, the longest ages. But that is the same as asserting that in the world there can never and nowhere be an incomplex Last and First, which would no longer be compounded of parts and with which all composition would begin.

(β) The answer is, the proposition is quite impossible and nonsensical. It really cannot be so. Anyone can see that in this way nothing, properly speaking, *is* at all. The world would be a complex of complexes of complexes . . . *ad infinitum*, without ever coming to a Something which furnishes the matter for all possible composition. It must be granted, however, that there is given to us something which really *is*. And as it really *is*, the process of composition in it must be settled, *complete*. We see at once that an Incomplex must exist, because there must be a Something in the complex, and, again, because a *regressus in infinitum* is contrary to that completeness under which it is alone possible to conceive a thing really being.

3. (α) There can be no *Free Causes* in the world. Causal connection is presented to us as this or that perceptible series of changes in time-sequence; this being so, all free causation is excluded. "Effect" can only be presented to us as some change in the previously existing condition from a certain point of time C. (If nothing changed, if everything remained as before, there would be no effect.) The cause for this change effected in the previously existing, at the point C, must itself have been a change in the previously existing, at the point of time B. For, if there were no change at B, if everything remained as before, then the change occurring at C would have no reason for its first occurrence at C; it would necessarily have already existed. Therefore, in a causal series, which, like the world, appears as a series of changes occurring in temporal sequence, all free causation is excluded.

(β) But, again, that is precisely impossible to conceive. There cannot be such a world. For in such a world no event at all could ever happen. There must be free causes, i.e. such causes as may originate a causal connection, freely and independently. For without them it is impossible to conceive a single action as taking place, a single event as really happening. Let us take a phenomenon G. Perhaps it is not in itself "free", i.e. independent, but the last factor in a causal series of several factors; it is the effect of F, that, again, of E, and so in succession. But at last there must be an A, a real and individual commencement of the series; for it is clear that only when *all* the causes of a phenomenon have worked *perfectly* and without interval can the phenomenon itself occur. Here also totality and perfection are in contradiction to any recession into the infinite. The latter would only be equivalent to a continual postponement of the acknowledgment of the causal connection; the same as a refusal to "allow" it in its completeness. There is no peg to hang the chain on. There can only be a world if there are also "free causes" in the world.

4. (α) The intuitive perception of this world teaches us the unerring truth, that everything therein is "conditioned" and that an unconditioned and necessary being never and nowhere exists in it. Each phenomenon, each relation, each position of one star to another, of one subject to another, has its reason, not in itself, but in some other happening, being, position. In the unending interpenetration of reciprocal cause and effect, in simultaneity and causal connection, in sequence, the conditionality of all and of each is given, dispersed in directions infinitely different, tracing its path back to a distance infinitely remote.

(β) But all this is precisely opposed to our immediate knowledge, that a real world cannot *be* thus. Everything that *is* has its own necessity, its sufficient reason why it *is* rather than *is not*, and why it is just *thus* and not otherwise. This knowledge is already crudely effective in the ordinary man's thoughts and acts; it is the motive principle, the guiding thought of all natural science. That nothing exists and happens "of itself", "through accident", as a *lusus naturae*; why everything is just *thus*, happens just *thus*, as it is and as it happens—this is, indeed, the purport of our explanations, researches, legislation. But a world which was to be no more than a connection of conditionalities proceeding *ad infinitum* would itself remain as a monstrosity of the accidental.¹

We can only conceive a world that really *is* if there is also necessary Being, in which, in the last resort, all that is dependent has its foundation. (The question whether necessary Being of this kind is itself to be conceived as intramundane or extramundane is as yet outside our discussion.)

¹ Really, in the last resort, it is this supreme and last necessity of all and each in general which is the aim and the import of Reason in all its work of investigation, and it is only the single data of space and time which deflect its attention to an endless stream of conditions in sequence, in which, instead of finding for itself the necessary and sufficient cause, it can only replace the conditioned by the conditioned, and as a poor substitute for sufficient reason it can only discover the infallible rule for the result of the process (the law under which it stands).

And this knowledge again excludes at once the *regressus in infinitum*.

(b) In the history of philosophy these antinomies had fought an age-long struggle. Each is right in its own place: and reason must have confessed its bankruptcy had it not been for the fact that in the whole dispute a single error had crept in unobserved. Kant reveals the error; and in so doing settles the discord for ever. And, what is more, the discovery of this error is at the same time the final discovery of Transcendental Idealism.¹ Incompatibles are predicated of the "world", and in such a way that the predicate on either side is irrefutable. On close observation, however, it is evident that "World" is not used in the same sense in the thesis and the antithesis. (This is put with greater clearness in Fries' and Apelt's exposition of the antinomy.) The antithesis, which we have always placed first, speaks of the world as it lies before us in spatio-temporal perception. But the thesis speaks of World and Being, conceived as necessary and incontestable, *in se* and *per se*. And now appears the fact that the actual data of perception are contradictory to what we ourselves know, with fixity and certitude, as to the real nature of things. Not till this is established, but then with irresistible force, comes the conviction that the world which exists in space and time, under number and degree, continuous and never complete, governed by law in Nature and *regressus in infinitum*, in no way corresponds to the real nature of the world in itself; that all these conditions are to be revoked by negation; that for the real nature of things we have to face them with contradictory predicates, which predicates, fettered as we are to that limited conception, we cannot present to ourselves in positive form, but solely in "double negation". The "mist" before the landscape is not

¹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 490-595. "The Antinomy of Pure Reason," Section III: "On the Interest of Reason in these Conflicts." Section VI: "Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the solution of Cosmological Dialectic." Section IX: "Solution as regards the four points taken separately."

lifted, but it is known as a mist. In this way the "appearance" of things is for us set in opposition to their true nature: not in the sense that it is only illusion and that nothing is really known in it. We certainly know, and not merely our dreams, but things, and reality itself. Our knowledge is, however, not a perfect and unlimited knowledge of things as they really are: we know in a restricted form.

If we now take a look backwards, it is clear that all that knowledge which came to pure and individual expression in the Categories themselves, in the Categories as not yet "schematised" and "restricted", remains unimpaired. Here there is no sort of "antinomy"; there is no opposition between the Categories and our conceptions of things themselves. It is exactly in the Categories that these conceptions are expressed. But space and time, that continuous and never completed form for the manifoldness of things, are absolutely withdrawn. There remains nothing but the idea of a conceivable analogue of these two, of which no more than this can be said, that it is bound to be a form of manifoldness, where imperfectibility and continuity are wanting.¹ With this, however, the "restric-

¹ It is impossible to say how unity itself is produced in that multiplicity which we conceive as space and the temporal sequence of the event. In the last part it will be shown that we have, if not a conception, at least a dim notion (*Ahnung*) of it. In æsthetic impressions we actually do comprehend and criticise forms of the Unity in the Manifold (Kant's "æsthetic ideas"), where the principle itself is beyond our powers of expression and is understood in feelings that cannot be analysed. The real Being of things, which conceptionally we can only grasp as appearance, we are now simultaneously able to *feel*, and that in accordance with what it really is in itself. It is clear without further explanation that over and above separation in space there can be manifoldness and apartness and difference. The world of sound, a symphony, are simple examples of this, but above all our whole psychic inner world. Thoughts and feelings are not over or under, before or behind, or in one another; in this manifold the "dimensions" are non-spatial. For time we are not able to make a corresponding comparison: our inward life itself appears, quite certainly, not in space, but in time. And yet the paradox of Time and its incompatibility with the idea of real Being is almost more immediately obvious than the paradox of Space. We have in Logic a non-temporal system of the manifold as governed by laws of unity and combination. This example of Logic will here serve, immediately and once for all, to emphasise this warning, that manifoldness, cause, condition, connections, are not at once and in general equivalent to conditions of relation in time. The example can

tion" of the categories through the schematism of time is removed.

(c) The dramatic representation of the Antinomy of Reason is really no more than a specially emphatic method of arresting our attention and fixing our consciousness on that which lies hidden in all Reason as a most profound and immediate fundamental knowledge. We have touched on this in many ways. Even apart from the exposition in the antinomy it can be reached and ascertained.

First of all, we shall once again allude to the *fact* of Reason's confidence, that it possesses real knowledge, i.e. at first and in general terms, belief in the objective reality of Being and Existence in general. This belief is utterly incapable of proof. Reason can never get outside itself: therefore it can never make comparisons from another source and ascertain if an Existence corresponds to its real knowledge. But this is the clear and unmistakable meaning of such real knowledge. And the claim, or rather the conviction, that all such knowledge has to do with Being is immediately present in the first instance. (Otherwise it would be impossible to understand how even the mere concept of the objective validity of our knowledge, of something existing apart from our presentation, could have entered our consciousness.) It is not as if this, Reason's belief in the objectivity of its own knowledge, lay in the will of the individual, and ultimately depended in a way on some ethical decision (namely, to be able to act; "Primacy of the Practical Reason"). No; this belief is simply a fact in every reason. And only through sophistical logic-chopping is self-deception possible in the matter.

Immediately connected with this is the second point. As a most profound knowledge and as the one particular fundamental mystery and fundamental essence of the Reason there certainly be carried no farther (Leibnitz' error!). For metaphysical relations are not logical relations. And it is just the individuality of action and of free action, which must be posited for the Being of things *per se*, that excludes all real similarity with the relations of Logic.

is revealed the knowledge of the unity and necessity in the essence of things. The demonstration of this fundamental idea in Reason is quite the most important thing in Fries' criticism. In it he speaks out "loud and bold" what had obscurely grown to be the fundamental law of all the new knowledge, and its infallible guiding principle; what lies at the root of every investigation into the connection, law, and explanation of phenomena.

First, then, Unity.¹ This does not imply the ridiculous notion that all the Many in the world is really just one thing. (The contradictory form in which "Monism" tries to express, crudely and confusedly, the real basic thought of Reason.) No; it implies that each and every thing in general is a *synthetic unity*, i.e. constitutes a whole, in the complete connection of its elements, a coherent world of Being and Happening. Not a hotch-potch of disparate and disconnected phenomena, of which there could be no experience, no observation, no science, which would be blind and senseless, a "mere rhapsody of perceptions": not this, but an association of thorough and coherent interdependence. This association is founded upon the Categories, especially the purely "metaphysical" categories: Substance, Causality, and Reciprocal Action. These are nothing more or less than the "Dimensions", the various modes of

¹ H. Poincaré writes in *Wissenschaft und Hypothese* (translated into German by Lindemann, second ed., Leipzig, 1906): "The Unity of Nature", p. 147: "Above all we must observe that every generalisation assumes to a certain degree the belief in the unity and simplicity of Nature. As for unity, no special difficulty is involved. If the various parts of the universe did not behave as *organs* of one and the same body, they could have no *effect on one another*. They would have no reciprocal knowledge of one another, and we, especially we, should only know one of these organs. Thus we need not pursue the question, whether Nature is a unity; we need only investigate the causes of this unity." This is certainly true; and without unity in Nature Physics would have no meaning. He says also quite rightly that we are dealing with a *belief*; but this belief is absolutely incapable of any sort of gradation (see above, "to a certain degree"): it is presented, as a fact, in every reason and with complete consistency. The Physicist does not possess it to a *certain degree*: if this were so, his own work would only have significance to a *certain degree*. But the question "how this unit is brought about" is not a question of physics at all.

Reason's fundamental conception as to the complete synthetic unity of Being itself. "Substance" is law and form of unity for "accidentia". Causality and Dependence are the relations of the unity and association of things with each other. Community through reciprocal action is the association of each and everything in general to the unity of a World-All.

And, secondly, Necessity. The same thing, only viewed from another point. Instead of the double expression "Unity and Necessity", "necessary Unity" serves as well. Only in the ingenuous state of mind, in which reason has not yet come to full consciousness, is it possible to misconstrue this fundamental idea of reason, and to talk of "chance" and the "accidental". As the intellect matures, as the scientific impulse awakens, we at once become clearly conscious of the knowledge that "chance" signifies nothing more than a lack of full perception on our part, that in the nature of things "chance" cannot exist, that all that *is* has its necessity and is based on the Necessary. It is nothing more or less than an *intuitive* grip of precisely this necessary synthetic unity in the real nature of things, that which is presented to our perceptions in space and time, and is here scattered into interminable series of things and the equally interminable concatenation of the temporal succession of changes. The import of spatio-temporal perceptions themselves is to be a clear conception of the necessary unity. In so far as they achieve this end, they do not display a mere illusion; they declare an Objective. But with limitations, for a limited comprehension. For they are cancelled out by the very thing they are seeking to depict: by the thought of the really perfected necessary Unity.

From this necessary unity conceived as really perfected, in combination with belief in the reality of things, there immediately results, as supreme law for the essence of things, "the principle of completion" (as was seen in the second proposition of the antinomy), which excludes the *regressus in infinitum* in every possible respect. Real Existence can only

be conceived in *completed* totality of that which is. (Necessary synthetic unity, expressed differently.) Consequently, not in the "yet one more" of the infinite sequence of numbers; and certainly not under the law of number, of numerability, of mathematics. It can only be conceived in the completed totality of its combination, as made of elements that in the last degree are simple, in the completed totality of its causes, and thus admitting free causes, and in the completed totality of its conditions through their termination in necessity.

VI

THE SPECULATIVE IDEAS

1. Absolute Existence : Perfection, Absolute Simple and Real, Eternity, the Unconditioned. 2. Soul. 3. Freedom. 4. Deity.

1. We have now found the positive foundation of the "Ideas" of reason, as laid in reason's immediate and fundamental knowledge of the necessary synthetic unity in the essence of things, a knowledge in itself obscure and deeply hidden. The "Ideas" express in clear and distinct terms what is dimly outlined in this immediate knowledge. Fries sets forth very clearly how the Ideas must be presented to the consciousness. They are to express the View of the Universe, which, as opposed to the inadequate view afforded by time and space, expresses the essence of things, not as presented to sensuous perception in space and time, but as conceived by reason pure and simple, i.e. according to the "principle of completeness". Now our knowledge of the essence of things was generally expressed in the Categories, and our sensuous perception of the world assumed shape as the categories were schematised through space and time. Thus we shall arrive at a purely rational view of the universe if, instead of spatio-temporal schematism, we apply to the categories "ideal" schematism, i.e. if we conceive them without restriction and as following the principle of completeness. So for the categories of quantity we attain an idea, and that with precision, an idea which long ago was active, though obscure, in the feeling of religious truth and gave the impulse to various forms of metaphorical description and expression, which also was vaguely present in all philosophies and gave the impulse to dogmatic speculations: the Idea of Absolute Being in general (that is, of Completed Being, *absolutum* being equivalent to "settled" and "complete"). And for the categories of Quality the Idea of the

Simple (Incomplex) and Reality "without phrase". For the categories of Modality the Idea of "Eternity". This is the idea of the cessation of spatio-temporal existence and everlastingly "conditioned" existence in the Unconditioned, i.e. in the absolute general and fundamental Necessity of all that Is. ("Unconditioned" side by side with "completed", the second fundamental of "absolute" Being.) Once again, an Idea which has ever and again made itself felt with immediate force, especially in religion, in sentiment and obscure conception ("Ahnung"), and has captured the human mind with its mysterious spell. Vividly present in the immediate feeling, it has come to full expression in the profoundest and most emotionally effective types of poetry, mythology, and eschatology. From it is derived the arresting force which every simple and natural person finds in the most crude notions of the "end of the world", of "heaven" and the day of judgment, of the "Twilight of the Gods" and "last things": for they all are the temporal-spatial elaboration and disguise of this "Idea", and through feeling we become aware of the *Truth* hidden within them, to which the "Spirit in the heart within us" bears immediate witness.

2. Most important for us become the "peculiarly metaphysical Categories" of the third phase, Relation, namely, Substance and Accidentia, Cause and Effect, Community through Reciprocal Action. What are these Categories "thought of as complete" under the schematism of Completeness? That which Is appears to us in a curious double nature, which cannot be rounded off into a unity, in spite of all "Monism"; first as "material existence", i.e. in purely spatio-temporal predicates (extension, motion, change of motion and position) and according to purely *quantitative* relations; and this is the conception in which "knowing" terminates, and no more. On the other hand, it appears to us in an utterly different form in the mode of *qualitative* conditions. In the external qualities, namely, colour, sound,

odour, pressure, warmth, hardness, sweetness, etc., and in the inner qualities, such as pleasure, dislike, feeling, imagination, volition, desire, anger, hate, love. With the application of "temporal schematism" a firm foundation for the category of Substance could only be discovered in the quantitative conception, in the material world, for its "temporal schema", i.e. the criterion of its applicability, was in this case "duration in time", "persistence", and this criterion only appeared in the material and not in the "qualitative". Hence at this point the ever-present difficulty, the problem ever to be faced: how to find a secure basis for what in this sense also is seen to be the really and only Living, the compulsion, in fact, which everyone must inwardly feel as a monstrous paradox, to degrade, in this respect, the Living in favour of the Dead. But with the "ideal schematism" this relation is utterly reversed. "Space and Time" are abandoned as inadequate; "Matter" is exclusively known in spatio-temporal predicates (that which is capable of motion in space), and therefore from that very reason loses its validity for the higher knowledge. We have nothing left of it for thought, nothing but the empty thought of "something in general". With the qualitative real knowledge it is quite different. Here it is only the temporal *form* that disappears: not in any way the qualitative *content*, for that has nothing in common with space and time. The content remains. And it is precisely here that we cognise that which Is, as a result of our reason's belief in Reality in general. But precisely here it becomes possible to apply the category of Substance in the knowledge of the Spiritual, i.e. in that unity and simplicity of "pure apperception" which was previously presented to us in the Ego-consciousness of the mind. Here the datum is really an "Incomplex"; it has nothing in common with extension and as a consequence with "divisibility"; and in it the category of Substance is automatically subsumed. In the individual (personal) mind with its "inner qualities" do we alone know

with certitude and clearness what Substances are. By way of analogy to it we interpret that which Is, then, as a world of spiritual Being and life, of spiritual Substances in general; and such analogical knowledge only becomes more and more obscure and inadequate as its circles are drawn further and further into the profounder gradations of Being.—In every belief in the soul, from the crudest to the sublimest phase, this idea is obscurely at work. It is the ultimate reason why the belief can never be uprooted, or, rather, surrendered. Against all Naturalism it always reasserts itself. Its disguise is the doctrine of “Immortality”. This doctrine possesses cogency and truth in the knowledge that Spirit is “incorruptible” Substance, above all time, and eternal; it loses its force, just as the eschatologies lost theirs under the idea of eternity, when it confuses the Eternal with the shadow it casts in our knowledge: with the idea of endless duration in time, which may be said to amount to nothing.¹

And it is just individuality, personality, and eternity of the mind in personality which is the peculiar fundamental thought of reason. The supposed reabsorption into a general Universal or Cosmic Spirit, into a superpersonal and superindividual

¹ Religion says when a person dies that he “is called from Time to Eternity” (abgerufen aus dieser Zeitlichkeit) that he is “eternised” (verewigt) and with correctness opposes “eternal being” to a “being through all time”. Whether “Immortality” is an attribute of the soul, in the sense of continuous duration in time after separation from the body, is a question for itself. It must not be confused with the problem of the eternal nature of our true Being, which is religion’s problem alone. We must admit that the former is not excluded by the latter. “Being eternal” and “persisting in time” are not reciprocally exclusive ideas. For we, who are alive, do both. But the soaring thought of religion, at any rate of our religion, aims at the former alone. To show interest in the latter is Spiritualism. Spiritualism is not metaphysics, still less is it religion; it is physics. Bad physics or good physics; the investigation may be left to those who like “that sort of thing”. “Spirits” are not to be met with the thunderbolts of metaphysical excommunication. For were it possible to prove to them a priori that in our world of sensuous perception spirits cannot appear without matter, they would retort that they indeed possessed matter . . . but in a very attenuated form.—“*Belief*” thus refers alone to the eternity of our existence. On the other hand, either continuance after death or the mortality of the soul is a theme for internal physics as to which *knowledge* is necessary, or at least an estimation of probabilities can be effected” (Fries).

"Ego", and similar conceptions, are not the loftier and more enlightened ideas of a man who has risen above the simple views of the man in the street; they are merely the unprecise and hazy forms of reason's fundamental idea. "Common-place" and "Crude" mean nothing more than the confusion of "eternity" and "endless duration", than a failure to distinguish clearly between the motive of ideality and that of sense-perception. (These attributes are present, noticeably so, in the theory of the "Universal Mind", for resolution into the Universal Mind is a spiritual aggregation which is to resolve, *in time*, the aggregate constituents of the individual consciousness.) It is the "pure apperception", the Ego-consciousness, which enables the category of Substance to be subsumed with safety for the spiritual as opposed to the material.

3. The second category of Relation is Cause and Effect, Causality and Dependence, i.e. the action, the working of Substance and its form. As we have already seen, when ideal schematism is applied, the restriction of causation to the temporal succession of changes under natural law is abrogated. Its place is taken by the idea of Freedom, i.e. of an effect which is not itself the effect of another cause. Now the meaning of Substance only becomes clear through the idea of the soul with its inward qualities; and under ideal schematism causality in general will become spiritual causality in the shape of Will. And as we are led from causality under natural law to the idea of Free Causality, the category of Causality becomes the Idea of the Free Will of spiritual Substances, to which by the way of analogies, which here also lose precision as they descend deeper, I must in thought refer all causality in the true nature of things.

4. But the profoundest underlying thought of reason, its most immediate mystery, is that which is expressed to reflection in the idea of Deity. It is hard to discover—

Τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὑρεῖν τε ἔργον, καὶ εὐρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν."—(Plato, *Timaeus*, 5.)

It has been present, however, in the feeling of truth, always there and all the more vivid; in its effects it can be followed and unveiled far down in the myths of the most primitive peoples: the more practised eye discerns its working already in the forms of mythology, often the crudest and most grotesque, as well as in the beginnings of thought. It here becomes possible to indicate with certainty the deeply hidden source of the highest thought, or, rather, the highest knowledge of the human mind. Or, to put it baldly, the third and most significant metaphysical category under ideal schematism, the category of the Community of all that *is* in general, conceived as "completely" valid, leads to the idea of Deity. This sounds very abstract, but is capable of rapid simplification. That all accidental is based on necessity is the fundamental thought of reason itself, as was previously set forth in discussing the antinomy; this, too, underlies all science as a guiding principle (generally unrecognised and unphilosophically applied as self-evident). It is absolutely actual knowledge a priori, for without it the concept of the Necessary (and consequently the concept of "Law") could never be ours; and yet we all possess it. "Experience" will never furnish it; it is this that makes experience first of all possible. And we have already marked that it rejects the everlasting complex of conditions. For conditions assume, on the one hand, an unconditioned, and, on the other hand, they must be given us as "completed", though only *one* conditioned thing is to ensue.—This conclusion is irrefutable. By itself, however, it does not yet lead on to the idea of Deity, to a Necessary beyond the world and above it. Why should not the Necessary lie in that which *is*, of itself? The general principle "everything must have a cause" is erroneous, if it is to mean "a cause outside itself". (For in that case God would of necessity have an external cause; that cause, another cause; and so on *ad infinitum*.) Let us say, rather, the concept of the Necessary contains of itself, just of itself, an existence

which has its cause within itself. Certainly there is bound to be a general reason why there is Something rather than Nothing, and why *this* thing is *thus* and not otherwise. But this reason might exist in that which *is*, itself, and unknown to us. We fare quite differently, however, if we endeavour clearly to realise how we can actually conceive, and alone conceive, the "category of Community" of all that *is* in general, as holding good in itself. By "Community" we mean the fact that all that is constitutes the one totality of the world in reciprocal conjunction and relation—a fact that is the self-evident foundation and axiom, e.g. in astronomy;¹ a fact not to be attained by experience, and cognised purely a priori. But what is this Community? How can it exist? What is the "Bond" of the world, as Schelling terms it? Let us assume that every single thing in the universe, every moon, planet, sun, fixed star, is for itself *causa sui*, i.e. that it bears eternally in itself its necessity, has in itself the reason why it is, and is this: even now we have no explanation for the existence of a "world", a completely unified Whole, in which all is joined to the closest unity of co-existence and interpenetration. World is not a summation of many single co-existences: it is an organic Whole of its parts; it is a Community through Reciprocal Action. And why a World exists, and is as it is, cannot be found in the individuals that it comprises. The reason for it can only be conceived as in a necessary existence, distinct from all that *is* in the world, the cause of all that is, in general, and also the cause of the Community of all in general. The category of Community can only be conceived, as completed, as the operation of one unified, essential, necessary, extramundane Cause of All in general. We may also envisage the subject as follows. What do we mean by explaining a phenomenon in the world,

¹ It was because Leverrier possessed this knowledge a priori that he was able to cognise the existence of Neptune a priori and to fix the planet by telescopic observation a posteriori.

a given state of things in the world, the present state if you will? Nothing more or less than this: to investigate and show why this must occur *of necessity*, just this, just thus, just now, just here; that is, to understand its Necessity. I understand this necessity if I know the law of reciprocal action, which determines the sequence of all that is simultaneous, and if I know the laws in accordance with which this state of things, and no other, was bound to result from previous states of things. More than this no scientific explanation can achieve. In two points, however, this explanation is imperfect, and fails to attain the necessity which is our aim. For, supposing I knew every law of every possible event in the universe, if I were master of that famous world-formula of which Laplace and Dubois-Reymond used to talk, I could then calculate every occurrence in the world backwards and forwards *ad infinitum*, if I only were given a certain transverse section of the world at a given moment; just as in astronomy it is possible to fix with precision every position of the astronomical universe for thousands of years in the past and the future, given a certain period. Now, however, only the *result* of the changes is recognised according to the law as "necessary"; not the fact that something exists which obeys the law, that this thing exists; and, lastly, not the fact of this definite and individual grouping and *combination* of the manifold. The existence of things in general and their combination are both "accidental" in opposition to law and need their sufficient reason. Leibnitz discusses the point in this way.¹

Assuming that the universe were infinite *a parte ante*, and there were found in it, either now or at some other time, books, e.g. the *Iliad*, which were explained as copied from earlier books, which were copied from earlier books, which were . . . *ad infinitum*: all this does nothing to explain the

¹ Leibnitz, "Ueber den letzten Ursprung der Dinge", *Kleinere philosophische Schriften* (Reclam edition), p. 217, xx.

existence of books in the world in general and of Iliads in particular. For that purpose Homer is necessary as a sufficient ground of the condition-sequence in general, even if we think of the latter as infinite and admit that the chance single copy has come into existence by transcription from another. And so, for the composition of the universe, and for the fact that there is a universe, and a universe of this sort, a *unified* cause is needed. That this complex manifoldness interacts in the way it does is explained to us in accordance with the law of its reciprocal action. But law is admittedly only the rule of a happening; not itself an efficient cause. Law only exists in the conception of thinking beings: of itself it is absolutely unsubstantial. But Real Existence, and the unity of Real Existence in its manifoldness, can only have their foundation in effective and independent Being. The world as a community of Substances can only have its foundation in an *essential, necessary cause* of all substances and their powers in general. It follows at the same time that all Pantheism, which puts the world itself on an equality with God, is a muddled and confused expression of the real fundamental knowledge of reason. Pantheism would conceive the world as God also; and is ready to do justice to the fundamental knowledge of reason to this extent, that it seeks to advance beyond the accidental in its composition, towards that absoluteness and necessity which reason actually demands. But by the equating of God and World it falls into the same error as Schelling in erroneously considering the "Bond", i.e. the law of community, as something effective, something real, which is quite absurd. Pantheism follows the pseudo-Realism of the classical philosophers, who saw in universals, in the ideas, in the *logoi*, effective forces, despite the knowledge that only that which really exists, only Being, can be effective, appoint, determine. It is Reason, and nothing but Reason, that postulates the absolutely "transcendent" cause, that exists above and beyond the universe. And only as the effect

of such a cause can the category of Community be completely conceived.¹ (Spinoza, on the other hand, fell into the error of believing that the idea of Deity could be reached from the category of Substance. The latter category, as we have seen, leads, not to the idea of Deity, but to the idea of "Soul".)

¹ Fries: "In popular opinion the Deity is conceived as the supreme *Cause* of the universe, and as the sacred foundation of the supreme order of things; all that abstract thought can offer by way of correction for this conception is to clarify the idea by differentiating the Appearance of things and their eternal Being. Philosophers endeavour by subtle reasoning to rise above this idea, but they have always remained on a lower level still."

"If we propose definitely to unite all Being in the one and only Substance, Deity, then there is nothing outside God and everything is One. In that case, however, the subordination of the finite and the eternal would be quite unthinkable. In that case we cannot allow Appearance any reality in relation to the eternal; Appearance itself would not even be possible as Illusion. For since all Being here is only the one and highest Being, there is nothing more that can appear. There is then to be found only what exists in itself, and thus no changing picture of Appearance is possible. (*Neue Kritik der Vernunft*, II, pp. 284 and 286.)

VII

THE IDEAS COME TO LIFE

1. Practical Schematisation of the Ideas. 2. "Ahnung". Mystery, in Nature and the Spiritual Life. 3. Impossibility of Proof. Deduction. "Proofs of God", Kant's Errors in the Theory of Ideas. 4. Immediate Life of the Religious Conviction in the Feeling of Truth. 5. Knowledge and Belief. 6. The Eternal is inconceivable to Positive Conceptual Knowledge. 7. But it can be Positively Experienced in Feeling. "Ahnen". 8. Philosophy of Religion and Science of Religion.

1. The conviction founded in immediate Knowledge of Reason, expressed in ideas of this kind, is in itself not Religion at all, but cold and formal Metaphysics, whereas Religion, as opposed to Metaphysics, has its life in the character and will. For this life, however, it needs firm and solid conceptions. And in all religion these conceptions are metaphysical in the highest sense. A non-metaphysical religion cannot exist if God is really to mean God and eternity a really real thing. And every religion fashions for itself a primitive metaphysics, which generally originated in such a way as to confuse the fundamental knowledge with temporal images and mundane figures. Thus by themselves and for themselves the Ideas are frigid and void, would remain so and never guide to religion, unless they first received that great and individual Content which gives them life, which acts on character and will, from a quite different region: from the practical side of the reasoning Mind. "Mind" becomes from the first time a concept of real meaning, if its life is manifested in the "practical" with all its wealth of content.* Thus it becomes first manifest

* "The lifeless Word" of our speculative Idea amounts to this, that we conceive of Deity as the supreme Cause in the Eternal Being of things, the Cause through which the supreme order of things comes into being. This idea derives life and heat in the first place from the innermost part of our active existence. In abstract thought this idea is the last that can find expression: for living Faith it is the first and deepest thing in our real nature, as the faith in the reality of the Highest

why the invisible and eternal realm of mind can be the "Highest Good", the object of yearning and obscurely felt desire. And not till then comes the understanding how the thought of God can become the sublimest of all thoughts, the mightiest of all as it grips the soul and brings it blessing. The cold and indifferent "essential and necessary cause of things in general" now becomes the living personal, almighty Maker and Father of intelligences, the Lord of the Eternal Kingdom, the Giver of the highest good, the eternal and utterly holy Goodness. And in the sphere of the Practical the conceptions of "Freedom", lifeless and formal in themselves, gain those profoundest contents that religion could attain: the ideas of good and evil, responsibility, the possibility and the fact of sin, and sin indeed as guilt: the profound and significant appraisalment of existence as guilt-laden, the great fundamental judgment of religion that the "temporal" is a non-adequate form of existence and contrary to our own inward self; religion's longing to escape beyond the world and to be with God, to expiate and to be sanctified. With all this begins the understanding of religion as that most potent force, arousing, inspiring, converting mankind, profound in its effects as none other in history.

2. Moreover, as we take account of the Practical in our mind the Idea becomes Living in another way. Not by *faith* alone can we in conviction confront the world of Appearance with the true one, the World of Idea; we can become aware of the latter as a reality, and a reality fraught with blessing, by *experience*. As pure abstractions the Ideas are "highest forms of unity" in the essence of things. But in the æsthetic sentiment we have the faculty of referring and subordinating the Manifold, that appears to us, to the highest forms of unity. In this lies, as Kant already shows in the Criticism of Judgment,

Good, from which proceeds all ideal life and to which it returns, after diffusing itself through Nature and individual life in the history of mankind in the living play of Beauty" (*Kr.*, II, p. 291).

the precise individuality of the æsthetic process. This subordination comes about, apart from any precise middle term, in Feeling alone, and indeed in a feeling which cannot be resolved into a conception (Kant calls it "undeveloped conception").¹ A perception of this kind, not capable of being expressed in terms of a concept, and developing in the Feeling alone, is called in German "Ahnung". The reason why this dim perception of the Idea is able to produce such a powerful impression on us, ranging through every degree of experience, is this: the Idea has already become "schematised" in the secret places of the mind, and has *come to life* with the great "practical" content which we were discussing. In our experience of the sublime and beautiful we dimly see the eternal and true world of Spirit and Freedom, in Nature's life as well, the world of the highest good, the power and wisdom of the highest good. It is in the truest sense a Platonic *anamnesis* of the Idea, and through it alone is conceivable the unspeakable profundity, the mighty rapture, the spell of mystery that plays around this experience. Only thus is it conceivable that the soul in such experience sometimes almost steps beyond her confines, and on her lips hovers the unspoken word which would reveal the secret of all Being. Here "mystery in religion" comes into play. Religion itself is an experience of mystery; not the sort of mystery which would only exist for the uninitiated, which would be solved for the adept, but the sensible mystery of all existence in Time as a whole—eternal reality breaking through the veil of temporal existence, to the unlocked heart. Here is the truth which underlies all "mystic" excess and imagination; here is the seat of the mystic element in all religion. In Kant, and still more so in Fries, careful attention must be given to the meaning of the terms "æsthetic," "sublime", "beautiful". These conceptions are easily narrowed

¹ Compare the quotation from Kant's *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels* in Otto's *Naturalistische und religiöse Weltansicht*, ed. 2. p. 57; and for the whole question, *Ibid.*, pp. 58-9

down to beauty and sublimity in Nature. The latter, however, are in reality no more than the lower grade on which the *spiritually* sublime and beautiful is raised. And consequently the "Ahnung" of the eternal and its revelations discovers a far more important stage in the mind of man, his personality, his character, and history, in which all these are developed.

(To give an exhaustive presentation of Fries' philosophy of Religion it becomes necessary to state his practical philosophy as well, and the "practical schematisation of the Ideas" which it elucidates.)

3. In the Ideas, clearly and lucidly presented, we become aware, by the way of reflection and mediate cognition, of what dimly lies in the reasoning mind as an immediate real knowledge. Now and then, as a whole or in parts, in less or greater completeness according to the stage reached in man's intellectual development, the ideal knowledge breaks through, ignorant at first of its own origins, like a gift from above, with conquering might, in its own strength, without any "Proof". In ages of religious activity and creativity proofs play no part; they come after: and when they appear, it is forgotten that religion existed as a vital thing long before all proofs, and thus must possess origins of its own quite different, and that only indeed in these latter can the ultimate reasons for its validity be situated. If the question is raised "how far is religious conviction valid?" there is only one method, the method of the individual ascertainment of the religious consciousness, i.e. nothing other than the investigation of its origin, immediate knowledge and how far it can be trusted. This method is the Method of Deduction. It is the critical demonstration that Ideas are founded in reason; how this arises; and what ideas are thus founded. It has the *form* of a proof, but is really no more than reflection with discussion. There is no possible proof that space is in three dimensions; there is merely the demonstration that every rational man knows it in this way in fact; there is no proof that the law of

causation holds good; there is merely the exhibition of its real Knowledge in our reason, and an ("anthropological") deduction of its "possibility", i.e. the indication of those intellectual faculties and their relations which give it a place for our reason; there is no proof of the "monad" or the "existence of God"; there is merely the reflection that reason in fact cognises the "community" of things, not through an unessential law, but only as the effect of a unified and essential Cause. All proof is analytic. It can only bring out what already lay in the premisses. But reason's fundamental idea of the unified and the necessary can never be derived analytically from any premisses afforded by experience; it comes by the way of synthesis alone, from reason's individual treasure. In deductive consideration the fundamental knowledge is not *gained*; it is only induced to make itself plain as such and to become *conscious*.

Thus Kant is right in his criticism of the proofs of God. The ontological proof *proves* nothing at all, for in its character as a proof it comes to grief on the fact that the "existence" of a thing cannot be "picked out" of its possible concept. And the cosmological proof will not work, for, since by analysis the necessary can never be got from the accidental, it is bound to fall back on the ontological proof; and the physico-theological proof must retreat on to the other two. But attentive readers of Kant will already have seen without difficulty that the argumentative matter contained in the erroneous form of "proof" has a very great influence on Kant himself. And everyone must have the same experience, for reflections are engendered which from grounds of reason itself are bound to appear in this impressive way. It is really true that in judging the limitless contingencies of existence the fundamental knowledge becomes observable, that World-Existence and World-Event are both founded in Necessity. And thus there is a sound import in these ontological endeavours; namely this, that the highest idea is not wafted to man

by external currents, but is founded in the secret places of reason, and that its objective validity is bestowed immediately and of itself from reason's trust in itself.¹ This positive feature in the Kantian criticism of proofs is generally altogether overlooked, quite unfairly. And the cognition also, that in reflection it is precisely the category of "community" that leads to the thought of God, is very definitely present in Kant.²

If in Kant the great and novel theory of the Ideas assumes such an unsatisfactory shape in relation to the dialectic of the "Illusion of Reason" the cause lies in two mistakes. First, in the empty ingenuity of his attempt to discover the Ideas as situated in the forms of the conclusion. Misled by his great success in discovering—in the Categories—an individual and independent actual knowledge-content from pure reason, through the form of the *Judgments* alone, he tried to do the

¹ Fries: "Not one of the physico-theologians really implies a scientific teleology of nature so rigid as this . . . a wrong line was taken in the dialectical presentation . . . this opinion is opposed to the bloodless materialistic judgment, which perceives the necessary laws of condition in space and time, and claims therefore to interpret the world by them alone. . . . To this claim our opinion answers, plainly and with authority: Thou canst not interpret the spiritual import of a single note, of a single colour; thou canst not comprehend the shaping of a single stalk of grass—how much less the whole spiritual harmony of Nature moved by Life" (*Religionsphilosophie*, pp. 84-5). "The earlier philosophers were not alive to the distinction between the discussion of these ideas for the feeling of truth, and the adduction of proof . . . they really only lost their bearings in the logical form, and as a consequence the refutation will always be one-sided and unfair if, while repudiating the logical form, we fail to give proper consideration to the teacher's real intention" (*ibid.*, p. 96). Compare in the same connection the acute observations on ontological "proof".

² Cp. in Kant, *Anhang zur transscendentalen Dialektik*, p. 706. "Under the cover of such a fundamental cause to render possible systematic Unity of the Manifold in the World-all"; and p. 709: "Reason can only conceive this systematic unity while conceiving the idea as an object as well"; and p. 714: "Than that Reason orders us to regard all the *intrication* of the world according to principles of a systematic unity, and therefore as if they proceeded from a single and all-comprehending being as the supreme and all-sufficient cause"; and, finally, *ibid.*: "The third idea of Pure Reason, which contains a merely relative assumption of a Being as the single and all-sufficient cause of all cosmological sequences, is the rational conception of God."

same with the Conclusions, and thought he could reach the Ideas here, whereas conclusions, as being purely analytical judgments, offer no solid ground, either on the side of form or matter.¹ Second, in Kant's fallacy, which has been already quoted several times, when he argues from the apriority of a kind of actual knowledge to its absolute ideality, which inference is quite untenable.²

4. The aim of Deduction is to ascertain for oneself the utterances of the Feeling of Truth. It is necessary, since all such utterances, which alone appeal to the feeling of truth, are subjective and unstable, and only thus can certainty be reached as opposed to individual fancies, dreams, prejudices arising from the spirit of the age and from sheer tradition. Thus it is impossible to dispense with the work of anthropological criticism. On the other hand, it has been already hinted that ideal knowledge does not owe its origin to this criticism, but emerges and assumes shape quite independently and at an earlier stage in the development of the intellectual life of man. And so, what is presented in "Deduction", in the artificial demonstration of the organisation of reason, in its schematisations, restrictions, and abrogation of restrictions through ideal schematism, with great labour and penetration, is presented in the spirit's actual life, in the immediate unity of its functions, with no investigation, with no effort, and with immediate certitude. How easy, how infallible, how universal and immediate is the application of the law of causation, or of the supreme law of practical reason in the judgment

¹ In the second section of the *Transcendental Dialectic*, Book I, p. 378, Kant says: "The form of judgments produced categories, which guide every employment of the understanding in experience. In the same way it may be expected that the form of the conclusions of reason . . . will contain the origin of special a priori conceptions, which we may call pure concepts of reason or Transcendental Ideas."

² In Kant's speculations (*Kr. der r. V.*, pp. 599 *sqq.*) on the *ens realissimum* as supplying the fundamental content of the idea of God, he becomes a victim also of that perilous "ambiguity of the concepts of reflection" which he had himself previously so ably discovered.

of actions ; what a laborious and delicate business, to find their critical foundation !¹

5. The ideal conviction is "Faith". Faith is a conviction which holds a thing for certain although it cannot be seen,

¹ "Thus everyone cognises and knows many Laws in mathematics and physics. Conformably to them he acts and judges without being consciously aware that he knows them. And then, after we have scientifically mastered mathematics and philosophy, we rediscover these laws within ourselves. Thus, for example, everybody looks for a cause where he notices a change. But only through philosophy do we become conscious in ourselves of the Law of Causation."

All metaphysical principles which are lifted above natural science are thus bound to be founded on Ideas. Call the acceptance of these as true—faith, or by any other name you like, this acceptance, to the ordinary understanding, will always assert itself and maintain itself as an immediate conviction from reason alone. But it is the philosopher's heaviest task to discover the mysterious track, if the word may be permitted, by which these principles, independent of all perception, come into our judgments."

How the Ideas, long before their methodical inference is effected, come to life in every thinking man as a result of the constant pressure exercised by reason's immediate and fundamental knowledge, active as it is in the feeling of truth, whether religious, ethical, or scientific, can be studied in the most convincing example possible. the physicists' Atomic Theory. This theory is in its lowest terms simply this: that which really is, in all its complexes, must ultimately have an Incomplex as its foundation, since there must be a Something in the complexes, and since the complex must be *completed* if there is to be any possibility of a complex existing at all. (Now this cognition is beyond dispute correct; and here we have the reason why the Atomic Theory takes the stage with such robust and ingenuous self-assurance: ingenuous, for its prophets cannot see that the whole cognition is "ideal" and that they are attempting to apply it to the realm of natural science, i.e. to the world of space and time, exactly where it is impossible. In all seriousness the assumption is made that this matter is made up of ultimate monads, indivisibles (*atoma*). And hence results the tragi-comedy of the flight to the ever smaller. You have just come to rest at the atom, and up spring the primary atoms, electrons, ions, electric charges. All these very minute things are in space, however, all spatial conditions are purely relative; thus it appears a priori that all this assumption of an "ultimate" of a "monad" is nothing more than an arbitrary halt called in an endless retreat. A molecule as schematised to-day is the same as a solar system. And "great" or "small" are in this connection quite secondary points of view.—And another example of ingenuous reasoning is generally found. It is just these "Atomists" who are the most convinced champions of Natural Law, that universal unity and union along the guiding thread of the law of causation, infinite and all-determining. But, if you wish to bring the "incomplex" into the universe, you cannot help bringing in "free causes" as well. For both conceptions arise from one and the same ground, and each postulates the other. Each is an element of the one identical and infallible knowledge of the real nature of things themselves, as against which all cognition in space and time must needs withdraw, as being merely limited.

6. *The Eternal is Inconceivable to Positive Conceptual Knowledge* 99

although it cannot be comprehended by sense. Fries expressly refers to Hebrews xi. 1.¹ Thus Knowledge and Faith are brought face to face in their unlikeness. Knowledge has to do with the world of perception and has its testimony in the senses. Faith is abandoned by all evidence of the senses. Faith is cognition which Reason possesses purely as reason, in which Reason has trust purely in herself alone; Faith first becomes really vital as moral Trust. But from the very same ground Faith must be estimated also as knowledge: what we believe is really true. Yes, and more than that, as the higher real knowledge, contrasted with which, mere Knowing—on the side of its form, that is—becomes withdrawn and rejected for the real nature of things. The common interpretation of Faith as a “knowledge” from defective foundations, or an acceptance of truth according to probability, is not tenable. But the Kantian sense of the word “faith” is also to be repudiated; he interprets faith—in the form of the practical postulate and the primacy of practical reason—as the acceptance from interest of a thing as true. From a very important Interest, to be sure; the interest of morality itself. But interest can never be a standard of truth. And practical convictions could never have weight for us, unless they were already true. Thus religion is not based on ethical conviction, but the latter itself has its last anchorage in the Ideas.

6. Through Faith knowledge is brought about, and that in “double negation”; i.e. in such a way that we do not obtain positive cognition-contents as to transcendental realities; rather do we conceive them by denying the limits of *that* knowledge which we possess. To predicate positively as to

¹ For the general relation of Fries' philosophy to Hebrews and Paul, see his monograph, “Faith and the Ideas of Good and Evil in reference to the Teaching of the Apostle Paul”, in the *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Philosophie. Eine Oppositionsschrift*. Ed. by Fries, Schroter, and Schmidt, Vol. III (Jena, 1830), p. 85. This review, whose aim was especially to oppose ecclesiastical reaction, Hegel, Schelling, and romantic mysticism, was quite in the Friesian spirit, and was mostly conducted by his disciples.

the real nature of eternal things is not given to us. No philosophy can penetrate behind the veil of space and time (except through the negation of both). And Faith can predicate absolutely nothing as to the *in se* of Deity; just as little can it predicate of the World as proceeding through God. And in this connection Fries is a persistent and determined opponent of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Baader, who in their soaring flights of speculation tried to conceive in "intellectual intuition" the proceeding of the many from the one, the transition from God to the Universe. The passion for roving, the mania for building airy structures in the Transcendental, all cosmogonies, all theogonies, are rejected. It is not necessary to state in terms how serviceable such a knowledge is to religion itself. Every protest against the confusion of religion and metaphysics, every erroneous contention that religion exists without metaphysics meant, after all, no more than this: Metaphysics as a science of the Beyond is, in fact, not religion, and God is cognised only in the purely religious predicates that are stated above. This conception just corresponds to the anti-dogmatic touch in Luther's creed and deed, that God is not to be sought as He is "in His majesty" but as He is "for us", and Melancthon's thesis in his *loci communes* of 1521, the earliest Protestant dogmatic, *mysteria divinitatis rectius adoraverimus quam vestigaverimus*, and that Christian knowledge consisted in *practicae cognitiones*.

7. For a *positive* affirmation on the Infinite, an "intellectual intuition" of the kind that Fichte's school loved to describe, would be necessary. But no such intuition is granted to us. Our intuitive perception is wholly confined to the sensuous. It follows that a "comprehending" knowledge, a knowledge of the Infinite in positive concepts, is not possible for us. The Infinite for us is still the Incomprehensible. But what the comprehension cannot achieve we may achieve in the Feeling. Feeling, with Knowledge and Faith, gives a third kind of real knowledge, one which combines and unifies

both of these—"Ahnem". Obscure sentiments of the beautiful and sublime in all its phases, in the natural and spiritual life, have us in their power: and so we understand without any medium the Eternal in the Temporal, and the Temporal as an appearance of the Eternal. Intelligibly enough, positively, although beyond our powers of expression, the world of Faith here manifests itself in the world of Knowledge by means of "Ahnung".¹

8. Natural Philosophy is not Natural Science: the philosophy of history is not the science of history. Philosophy is the science of the principles of every single science. Philosophy gives the sciences the universal and formal supreme concepts and laws which make their existence possible. Thus the philosophy of religion is not identical with the science of religion, and is not itself able to undertake its task. The relation of the two appears as quite definitely conceived in the Friesian philosophy of religion. The Ideas it has to show are purely formal and void in themselves and do not of themselves constitute religion. And thus the scientific demonstration of these ideas is by itself in no sense of the word a science of religion. The service rendered by philosophy is here, as elsewhere, to establish the purely Formal that is supreme, and, further, to prove anthropologically how religion becomes possible in the mind of man: through "practical schematism" and through the "religious feeling". But at this point the realm of a priori principles has reached its limit, and just as in the other sciences, experience now steps in, i.e. religious experience, and with it History, as enlarged experience; and with them the whole of the science of religion in itself, as comprehending religion in its historical manifestation and variety, as a comparison and a determination of values, as criticism, elucidation, and, if possible, a means of progress, as a practical study of how the disposition to religion and religious com-

¹ Fries gives a special exposition of the relation of these three separate modes of real knowledge in his book, *Wissen, Glaube, und Abndung*.

munity is formed. And so far as Theology has ceased to be a supernaturally inspired physics and metaphysics of heavenly things, and is a Science of Religion as explained above, aiming at the practice and maintenance of religion in actual life, then the relation of philosophy to theology is defined as well.

B. OUTLINES OF PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

VIII

THEORY OF THE PURPOSES OF MAN

(SUBJECTIVE TELEOLOGY)

1. Relation to Kant. 2. Pure Practical Reason. Sensibility, Feeling.
3. Values, Aims. 4. Agreeable, Disagreeable, Inclination. 5. Noble, Ignoble. Pure Love. The Principle of its Judgment is a priori.
6. Good, Evil. Reverence, Duty. 7. Dignity of the Person. 8. Theory of Duty, Ethics 9 Duty of Religion. 10 Foundation of Ethics.
11. Realm of Purposes and Aims. 12. Psychological Freedom through Rational Decision. 13. Rejection of Hedonism. 14. Theory of Rights. Politics.

1. In practical philosophy also Fries in every respect carries on the work of Kant. The foundations of his thought lie in Kant's great discoveries, which can never be abandoned by any further system of morality; in his conceptual fixation of the universal and necessary fundamental laws of human action, known a priori, of the idea of Duty, of the good will as the absolute and incomparable Good, of the "formal" definition of the Good Will, as obedience to the moral commandment for the commandment's sake, of the autonomy of the moral law, of the rigid separation of "pure respect" from all "Inclination". But at the same time he makes a significant progress in the task that Kant began and corrects the defective places in Kant's investigation which seemed likely to imperil the undertaking as a whole. His most important achievements are as follows. Fries abandons Kant's impossible attempt to evolve from the Categorical Imperative itself a detailed system of moral commandments. He shows that the Kantian "categorical imperative" is itself conditioned by another law, the law of Absolute Value. In place of the Kantian moral table of categories, with their "blind windows" and their fallacious assumption of the idea of Freedom as the highest object of classification, he obtains the real table of the basic concepts

of ethics by proving that the object of classification is the idea of "value". He settles the controversy between Schiller and Kant by differentiating between the *καλόν* and the *ἀγαθόν*, by placing the cultured judgment on the morally beautiful in relation and subordination to the pure imperatives, by precisely defining the relation of the rigid commandment of pure duty to "pure love". He sets aside Kant's mistaken confusion of the Decision of pure reason and that of the understanding; and in so doing averts the confusion of metaphysical and purely psychological Freedom. And he bases the whole doctrine on a fully worked-out theory of practical reason.

2. If reason and man were nothing more than knowing, the work of philosophy would terminate with theoretic philosophy. But over and above real knowledge there are two other intellectual faculties, through which Reason first becomes really alive, in which Reason first completely defines her real nature, her higher essence, and manifests it in perfection. Fries calls these two "Heart" and "Energy".¹

These are both independent faculties as regards each other and as regards knowledge—that is to say, they cannot be referred to each other, but at the same time they postulate each other. True knowledge lies at the root of all. And Reason can only attain to the power of action if she is granted the intermediate faculty of "Heart", i.e. of "Impulses", of the "*Attaching of Values*". Reason not only cognises various things; she attaches value to them, and varying value, according to the varying "impulses" she discovers in herself, by virtue of which she estimates values. This is the only way in which her energy can attain life and translate itself into action. On the other hand, the faculty of judging values is not in itself action; it merely furnishes the motive to action. It is possible to conceive an intelligence, accessible to the value of things in the feelings of pleasure and pain, in approval and disapproval, and yet only

¹ Fries' psychological classification agrees roughly if not completely with the usual "Knowledge, Feeling, Volition", but is more penetrating.

so in a passive manner—as perhaps the souls of plants are—which cannot be translated into action. The inner life of such an intelligence would be actuated by such feelings, by fear and hope and volition, but could produce no actions. Human Reason—and presumably all reason—can produce action, for it possesses Energy.

Meanwhile, however, it would still be impossible to arrive at a practical *philosophy* if Empiricism were correct. In dealing with Knowledge Empiricism ventured to assert that the mind received all its content from without, through the senses, and that knowledge is built up out of sensations. Here also it endeavours to prove that the impulses to action are given in sensations, and that action is nothing more in itself than the result of these sensory impulses. The mind, as a consequence, would possess nothing in its own right; as in one case it is denied its own theoretical principles, so here it loses its own practical principles. “Pure Reason” could not exist. And therefore there could be no practical principles drawn from pure reason. Philosophy would be replaced by a description of sensations and a mechanics of sensation. In the sphere of theoretical knowledge this interdict of Empiricism was first lifted by the proof that “pure” knowledge really does exist, and that it is this which first makes “Empirie” or experience possible. With this proof the fangs of unfounded “sensationalist” prejudices in general were drawn; and the ground was cleared for an unprejudiced *investigation* as to whether we possess principles of the Practical; and if so, what they are, i.e. for the Criticism of Practical Reason. Such an investigation can only be “anthropological” (i.e. a psychological investigation). It is only effected by inward self-observation, in “inward experience”. Its object is to cognise what practical principles we possess a priori. Such a knowledge *of* the possession of cognitions a priori is, of course, not of itself a knowledge a priori; it is wholly given by experience. And now our first duty is to become absolutely clear as to the meaning of Sensa-

tion and its general relation to our inner self. In its theoretical discussion Empiricism confuses "sensation" and "sense-perception"; here, also, there is a confusion of "sensation" and "feeling", even with "feeling of pleasure and pain". If sensation and feeling were identical, if pleasure and pain (and therefore impulse) were aroused in us externally, together with sensation and through the senses, then in fact we should be in no respect individual; in our actions we should amount to nothing more than the product of influences outside ourselves. Pure practical reason would be impossible from the outset. But even in the simplest sensuous pleasure this is not the case. Delight, disgust, are not the sensation itself; they are something over and above, proceeding from our inner self as *Answer* to the sensation. "Feeling" is not sense; it is a particular *judgment* as to a sensuous datum. Feeling is a power of judgment. The datum in the sensation may again and again be absolutely identical: in each case our answer to it in the feeling, judging and evaluating, may be very different. The same taste, the same odour, the same sensation of heat, may, if the disposition of my inner self is differently poised, arouse utterly opposite feelings of satisfaction or disgust. The sensation alone comes from without: the feeling that judges it is in no way given from without; it proceeds from within myself.

3. Since in our conception of things we attach a value to them (cognise a value in them) we feel ourselves urged towards them. To attach value to a thing, positive or negative value, is to have satisfaction or dissatisfaction in it. This attaching of values, this satisfaction in a thing as presented to us, gives causality to its presentation for us; it sets Will and Energy at work to make the idea a reality. The combination of a conception with causality like this is a *Purpose*. Our attaching of values, our striving after purposes, the nature and relation of these purposes—all this is purely a matter of inward experience and self-observation.

4. This shows us that our first attachment of values is effected from the standpoint of the Agreeable and Disagreeable. If confusion is to be avoided, our terms must be employed with rigid precision. The Agreeable is not everything in general which pleases and is esteemed; it is that which is pleasing to the senses, that which is judged according to feelings of sensuous pleasure. The delight with which I judge of a delicious perfume, a current of fresh air, the easy conclusion of a train of thought—all sense-perceptions, external or internal—is different in nature from the delight with which I admire, say, a neat tree-group, a resolute action, or a performance of duty. All can be classed under “satisfaction” or “approval” or “delight”. But in this Genus the species are quite distinct. “Agreeable” is always “agreeable to *me*”. That is to say, by this concept it is always the *relation* of a thing to me, and no more, that is estimated. “Agreeable” is everything—be it in itself what it will—which carries on and intensifies my sense of vitality for the moment. And thus I predicate nothing of the thing in question. I gain no real knowledge in it; only something as to its relation to me, nothing more than its relation for the moment. It is only to this that I attach Value—and thus really to my own sense of the deeper feeling of life: so when I call a thing agreeable I really approve the existence of my own life and its stimulation. In the loftier type of satisfaction the case is quite different. Here I attach objective value, outside myself, leaving myself out of the question; I cognise, not as to a mere relation to myself, but as to the thing itself.—It is at once evident that the valuation of things as agreeable or disagreeable is empirical. To cognise anything a priori as agreeable or disagreeable would be absurd. For if my sense of vitality is either checked or stimulated, the cause is wholly dependent on time and environment: with every fresh impulse it may be utterly different; and it is known through experience alone. Therefore it is impossible at the outset to derive an ethical code

from the agreeable, with a character of unconditional validity. (Yet it must be added that at this stage an important consideration appears, from a different angle. In the feeling of sensuous pleasure and the reverse it is already clear that Reason attaches value to the conditions and postulates of its own life, and that is equivalent to—itself and its existence. The “sensuous” is not in opposition to the “rational” as classical morality would have it; on the contrary, the sensuous feeling of pleasure is itself an expression of reason’s knowledge of its own value and of its vital existence, which here comes forth on its own lowest grade, and reaches its further development at the higher stages. *But this Knowledge* is absolutely a priori. Inward experience can show that we all really possess it; but to attain it in accordance with its content is beyond the power of experience.)

5. Judgment through the sensuous feeling of pleasure and the reverse, according to “agreeable and disagreeable”, is an attribute of everything in general that has life; it relates to the animal conditions of reason’s existence and is produced by the “Animal impulse” which the human reason has in common with every living thing. Set above it, we discover in ourselves another impulse differing from it to an important degree: the “human” impulse by which we assign values to existence specifically human according to all the possibilities of its evolution. It coincides with the impulse of “perfection”. Through it values are determined from the standpoint of “Nobility”, spiritual beauty and sublimity, the beauty of the soul. Now, in speaking of things, “perfection” is that state in which they correspond to their purpose, to the end for which they are used. Here it is applied to the state in which all the aptitudes and powers of the intellectual nature of man are developed and joined in harmonious union, a harmony which is esteemed as beauty of the soul and in the ideal of “wisdom”, and as such is pursued. “Inclination” urges towards the “agreeable”; “pure Love”, which itself is spiritual

beauty, impels to the "Noble" or the "Excellent". It is the source of all that is noble and sublime in human activity. This impulse acts as a powerful and vital factor in the history of mankind. Its continual advance towards perfection is precisely the meaning and the rational purpose of all human history. It is the origin and the standard of esteem and love amongst human beings. It can be in opposition to the first impulse. Both impulses present their motives to the will; the understanding selects and decides between them; and through resolution guides to action.¹ And in this process the second impulse claims to be the higher, which the other serves. Here, however, the value lies, not in the suppression of the one, but in the harmony of both (following a principle yet to be discussed); for both proceed from a value-cognition of the same reason, which in both of them attaches value to its own existence.—To disregard the living reality, force, and effectiveness of this second impulse, active in every stage of humanity, is only possible to a lamentably deluded intellect.²

The intellectual content, which we evaluate according to this impulse, is unfolded to us by *Ethics*. This is an inward and practical science of Nature, and must clearly be distinguished from the Theory of Duty in the narrower sense (morals). It is obtained solely by inductions from inward

¹ "The power of self-mastery or of the understanding, which belongs to us in our inner nature . . . (18) . . . our so-called psychological freedom of will" (Fries, *Ethik*, p. 124).

² "The view commonly held by many anthropologists, which considers a human being as good for nothing more than eagerly to pursue his own pleasure and profit, or reluctantly to submit his mastered impulse to a law, is utterly wrong and one-sided, and proceeds from an arbitrary assumption as to our feelings of delight. The games of children, to begin with, and still more the self-abnegation of friends, and most that is strong and splendid in history, can show us the mistake" (*Kritik*, III, p. 107). . . . "In reality a human being attaches values to life to that of others as well as his own, to that of the Whole above the particular, and in accordance with this value he is urged on by the interest of the act. Once the needs of the individual are supplied, he will begin to live in the true sense, in enterprises for something outside himself, something strange to him, which may appear to him the most important thing on earth . . . and thus of his own free-will" (*Kritik*, III, p. 108).

experience. Only a posteriori can we arrive at knowledge of the faculties, the capacities, the forces, the sentiments and activities that dwell with reason in this, its higher stage, of the elements which constitute spiritual beauty and sublimity. And clearly we have no a priori knowledge of spiritual growth, nor of love, nor of energy and creative activity in a man's calling, in art, science, and national life. But the Principle which directs us when we attach a particular value to each of these, or to their totality in harmonious union, is absolutely a priori, and therefore also universal and necessary. What as following the first impulse I posit as "agreeable" is such for me only, and for me only in a particular case. To-morrow I may loathe the fruit which to-day was delicious. And what is agreeable to *me* is very likely detestable to another. Here the saying holds good, "*De gustibus non disputandum*". I assume anybody will grant that friendship, devotion, patriotism, industry, self-culture have a value; if this is not self-evident to you, I have to declare your judgment to be crude and uncivilised. When the second impulse affixes its values, it aims at universality and necessity. And this is only possible if its principle is a priori, if it is founded in reason itself, if it is independent of experience, evident to reason alone in her own right, and admitted as necessary by everyone in whom reason has developed. What is this Principle?—A closer examination of our æsthetic judgments, which offer an analogy to the judgments of the second impulse, will be our first step to enlightenment. And no more than this can be said: all those things that are evaluated according to this impulse have something individual in them, which we call beautiful or noble or excellent, to which we assent with one and the same feeling of inward emotion and exaltation. But to express in the form of a *concept* what this attribute of beauty, excellence, etc., may be, is impossible. We are dealing with a cognition through feeling alone, without a *concept*. And therefore to attempt long-drawn-out classifications and systematisations

in Ethics is labour in vain. Hence, too, the sure touch in moral judgment, possessed by a man of delicate susceptibility and intuitive insight, as against the common-sense person who thinks everything out. And thus we find a similarity in the Ethical and the nature of Genius. It is a matter of feeling, i.e. of undeveloped concepts, of concepts that cannot be developed, of obscure Knowledge, not admitting expression in clear concepts. But at the same time it is a matter of *Knowledge*, which lacks nothing in certainty and universal application, Knowledge independent of all experience. For, if we are to recognise "beauty" or "nobility" in a thing, we must first know of ourselves what "beauty" and "nobility" are (Plato's *anamnesis*).

6. High above the law of value of the noble, the beautiful, the excellent, stands that of the Good and Duty. Here reason begins to express its innermost self; and this it does in the "pure impulse". Also, incomparably higher than "beauty of the soul" and "nobility of the soul" in the meaning previously explained, are placed "personal dignity" and the virtue of the "Good Will"; higher than "inclination" and "love" is "Reverence" for the absolutely binding commandment of the Good in itself, without any "inclination" arising from the pure feeling of duty.—What is good? That cannot be observed in or derived from anything else, nor can it be obtained externally in any way. The aim can only be reached if we come to an understanding with ourselves as to the supreme cognition of value that reason possesses. The term "good" applies, not to any talent or distinction, not to any delightful or estimable quality of our intellect in general, but to our *Will* alone. The will is good when it acts "from duty". That is, struggles for and wills, does and leaves undone what absolutely *ought* to be done or left undone. Now this involves three things: First, there is something that ought to be done or not done, without phrase, i.e. there is a Value "without phrase", an "*absolute* value", positive or negative, in the

nature of things, a supreme purpose, which is a purpose in itself, and not for anything else, and a purpose absolutely, i.e. something which is absolutely bound to take place. Secondly, this purpose must be known and recognised as such by the person who wills. He must at once perceive that it is the absolute value and appoint it for himself. He must *himself* make it the law of his action, i.e. he must will independently. And thirdly, he must obey the law, not because the content of the commandment is pleasant to him, not from "inclination", but purely "for the law itself", i.e. in such a way that the Knowledge of the absolute "Thou shalt" is itself the guiding principle of his action. Thus Good is a Will that follows the maxim, "Act in such a way as thou art convinced thou shouldest act".

This is a rule from clear conceptions. And in it the "pure impulse" and its legality are clearly distinguishable from the second impulse. The latter judges from feeling, which is incapable of being analysed conceptually. "But Good is that which is pleasing according to conceptions." The second impulse approves *in* its judgment; the pure impulse approves *after* the judgment.

In all this the Kantian foundation is evident. But essential differences, too, must be borne in mind. As yet we have no *Imperative* to place above Kant's well-known *Categorical Imperative*. But the latter can have force only under the *condition* that there exists some absolute value, whose law determines whether an action is to be done. It is conditioned by the existence of an absolute *objective value*, which it does not bring with itself. This is just the same with the well-known summary that Kant invents to express the supreme principle of action: for his commandment, "Act as if the principle by which you act were by your will to be made a universal law of nature", amounts either to an empty formula of the "love of order", in which it is impossible to discern how it could absolutely determine a will, how it could possess

"majesty" or inspire "reverence". Or in "by your will" it points to an external standard of fitness, and in so doing leads back to an absolute value as *condition*. But Kant is absolutely right in his "rigorous" insistence that the law must determine the will, not through its matter, but through its form, i.e. as *law*. There is no doubt that the attraction to the commandment in its content will proceed mostly from "inclination" or "love" or the like. But what constitutes the morality of the action is my acceptance of and submission to "Thou shalt".

7. But what is the *content* of the commandment? What "shall be" in the absolute sense? What has the absolute value, which is the object of the pure impulse, the recognition of which makes a will *good*? Nothing that could be met in the world of experience. As we have seen, among Ideas an Absolute can only be conceived by opposing it in "double negation" to the Finite in the world of appearance. All the values of our existence as appearing in Time can be high, very high; they can never be absolutely high. To all finite value we oppose the absolutely completed value in the word "Dignity". It is applicable to that which, under the Idea, was conceived absolutely as Substance: the spirit of the person in its independence and freedom from the machinery of Nature as a whole. "Dignity of the Person" is the ideal principle under which we judge every man, as the appearance of an eternal and personal spirit. What in so doing we attribute to it can only find negative expression, as with all ideal subsumption, i.e. a value which is not subject to Degree, to a *more* or *less*, but is "completed" and "absolute". For our conceptual knowledge the positive element in the idea is quite hidden from us: it is all the more vivid in the feeling of the personal spirit concerning itself, concerning its value absolutely transcending all nature, concerning its freedom; in short, concerning the "supreme boon of earth's children—Personality" (Goethe).

8. As from all ideal principles, so, too, from the principle of the Dignity of the Person no systematic deduction is possible. This Theory of Dignity cannot be developed into a canon of applied Ethics. Personality cannot be created; therefore Personality and its existence cannot be laid down as a positive purpose of action. Yet in two ways it can be applied for our actions. Firstly, it includes the commandment which enjoins reverence for all personality, without phrase. With this follow (*a*) Rules governing our attitude in respect to ourselves and our fellow-men, and (*b*) Maxims which, although in themselves they prescribe no positive purpose for our actions, do in fact plot out lines of direction to guide us in our actions in general. These lines of direction make themselves felt as limitations and prohibitions; just as all lawgiving in morals finds its first utterance in definite prohibitions. They are, however, expressions of a decidedly positive fundamental conception, which is not "Thou shalt not", but "Thou shalt". To them belongs everything that ensues from the Kantian law: "Act in such a way that you make use of mankind, in your own personality as well as in others, never as a means alone, always as an end at the same time". And under (*a*) belong, as an immediate expression of reverence for personal dignity, in our own selves the postulate of Honour, and in others the postulate of Justice. Honour and Justice, together with Prudence and Courage, are purely and simply the Cardinal Virtues. Secondly, however, for this our temporal life, underlying the pure impulse and its call to duty, are the other impulses, the second and the first, nearer or further according to the gradations of their scale of values. It is reason which attaches value to their being: simply, in the absolute value of the Dignity of the Person; relatively, as following the gradation of values in the two other impulses. And, since reason appears to itself in temporal Becoming and under the condition of perfectibility, then the sphere of action according to the two other impulses (and therefore the vigour

and health of the animal, the beauty and perfection of the spiritual, and the harmony of both) attaches itself to the idea of Duty. And thus positive injunctions are set before the Good Will, inasmuch as the conviction as to how it should act is given by the value-judgments of the second impulse. But this subordination is wholly effected in the feeling, just as in Ethics the discoveries and developments are wholly a matter of the moral "feeling" (and not of moral "meaning" only). Thus Ethics appears as the Theory of the life and activity of the reasoning spirit in Time. To the history of humanity it gives meaning, task, and purpose. (Cp. Schleiermacher, *Ethik das Formelbuch der Geschichte*.)

As the highest thing in "General Ethics" the Theory of Duty itself stands out in rigid and complete separation. (Theory of Morality in the severe sense.) It is concerned with the Idea of Duty as previously expounded; further, with the supreme maxims of morality, the injunction of reverence for personal dignity, the teachings of honour and justice, the formulæ which in general limit action and prescribe its direction; and, lastly, with the theory of the Good Will itself and its virtue, which evolves as character, strength of character, prudence, courage, honour, justice, and a clean heart. Rigid conceptions are possible in all this domain. It is the doctrine of Virtue in the strict sense of the word. What we generally call by this name is purely a matter of tradition. Fries proves very decisively, by the well-known examples of Kant's *Kritik*, that it is impossible to evolve from this starting-point a code of single "Duties" in conceptual form. And this is very fortunate. For any attempt of this kind is doomed to end in "perfect and imperfect" duties, whole duties and half duties, and thus throws the very idea of duty itself into confusion; or else it extends the sour and rigid behest of duty over every postulate of the moral feeling, without exception, thus setting itself up against the reality of the moral judgment,

which admits all kinds of degree in the value and importance of ethical things. The solid partition between the value-estimates of the second and third impulse tends to disappear; and there is a real danger that the Good may be confused with the Noble and the Excellent, and so its peculiar and exclusive dignity may be imperilled.

9. The things which, after the rule of the second impulse, are excellent and admirable, only come into relation with the Good and with Duty in the strict sense through that which in this connection Fries calls "Religion", and consequently places among the fundamental virtues, namely, the persistent and living inward relationship to the Idea, and the readiness to lead one's individual life absolutely in accordance with the aim of the Idea, i.e. to act conformably to it, where and in whatever way the moral feeling may point the way.¹ It is just this religion, belief, and relationship, by way of feeling, to the idea of the absolute value of the reasoning spirit, manifested in history as a thing in development, which gives all moral action its profoundest meaning, namely, to subordinate the purposes of the individual life to those of the history of mankind (which, indeed, must be the history of Reason in a process of constant becoming). It is difficult, or, indeed, impossible, to express conceptually how we may reach this, the sublimest principle of all moral achievements. Purely dependent on feeling, it is nevertheless a subsumption in all confidence of the individual Being and action, under the idea of absolute value, which reaches perfection through a maxim which is a part of Godliness—though how this is we cannot express. For all conceptions of our duty to co-operate in world-purposes (*cooperari Deo*) are palpably figurative. And yet in such metaphors is unquestionably found the deepest purport of our moral life-work.

¹ Thus, for religious virtue, we mention first that enthusiasm which lifts the character above the ordinary outlook of everyday life. This, the virtue of the spiritual eye looking constantly heavenwards, is the true virtue of our gospel" (Fries, *Ethik*, pp. 367-8).

10. Quite in accordance with this is the development of Fries' Ethics. He begins by discussing moral philosophy in the narrower sense, embracing the ideal of character, the ideals in general of the duty of virtue, and of that of justice as the duty of justice in the narrower sense; also of the duty of the virtues of veracity and loyalty; he then expounds what it is that, conformably to the second impulse, underlies the Idea as Beauty of the Soul, i.e. love, its activities in sympathy, charity, and thankfulness; its special phases as friendship, family life, and common spirit. Connected with this is the ideal of human dignity, or the duty of the virtue of honour; and in a corresponding manner he expounds what it is that in this case underlies the idea as Beauty of the Soul—the ideals of spiritual charm with sincerity and spiritual equipoise. And following this, the ideal of Godliness (in the above-mentioned connection) and the ideals of vocation.

11. The reason that assigns purposes and is active, if it occurred only as a single thing, or in isolation, although manifold, could only be directed to individual purposes, and could only set itself tasks, say, of self-development, improvement, and the mastery of Nature. It is not, however, a single thing, nor are the individual possessors of reason isolated; they exist in community and reciprocity of their actions and the purposes they assign. And thus, from the fundamental principle of the dignity of the person is derived the loftiest of moral ideas—that of the Reign of Purpose. This falls to some degree into three stages. Firstly, for all action arising from any reason whatever, the ethical principle gives the limiting form to which all reciprocal action is bound to submit. Secondly, the general idea of "for one another" is derived in a positive shape; under which idea the purposes of the other are recognised as being at the same time one's own. Thirdly, the idea of the common purposes of the general body of mankind, proceeding to the community of the human race and of its purposes in history as a whole. To appoint

one's own life-work in relation to these ideas, and to offer oneself even to the point of self-sacrifice, is the highest thing that can be attained in morality. As pointed out in (10), the subsumption proceeds wholly from the second impulse, according to "maxims that are not to be expressed", and it is religious.

This realm of purpose is the real world itself; compared with it all physical existence is of no importance; it faces the Idea alone as reality properly so-called. It is the sole reality itself. Now reality in itself would be known by means of the Categories according to its fundamental determinations. So all we have to do is to apply these categories to this higher reality, Reality of Value, and we immediately obtain the whole scheme, ready for use, of the possible fundamental moral conceptions. Thus the Categories of Relation—Substance and Accident, Cause and Effect, Community through Reciprocal Action—here become Person and Situation, Person and Fact, Right and Obligation. Quality, the "Real", the "Whatness" is in this case the Value. And the three Categories of Reality, Negation, and Limitation appear as Value, Non-Value, and the Clash of Values. According to Quantity, the individual itself is "the Aim". To the Totality correspond the "Ends" in general or the "Final Ends". And between the two the "Means" stand now subsidiary to the main "aims" or "ends". According to the category of Modality, "Possibility" in morals is "Thou mayest"; "Reality" is "Thou canst"; "Necessity" is "Thou shalt" (Duty). Thus the three modal categories are Permissibility, Capacity, and Duty.

12. From Ethics in itself the doctrine of metaphysical freedom must be totally eliminated. It is a preliminary assumption of the theory of morals, and not its content. Motives for the Will are given by the various impulses. Here also is seen the difference between man and animal: man does not need to follow the impulse of the moment; through rational self-control he is capable of suspending the action of the momentary

impulse, of correlating the various impulses of the same propensity, and of the different propensities, of prescribing for himself maxims which themselves can act as permanent impulses, and consequently of deciding according to choice. This constitutes rational decision, which is the property of our actions; which, by means of training and education, removes the will further and further from the reach of over-rapid conditioning through sensuous and momentary impulses. But the choice of the rational decision is also sufficiently determined, namely, through the impulse which is strongest at the last. The purpose of all formation of character here is to allow the nobler motives within us also to become the strongest. In the world of temporal appearance Freedom has no place. It may be said that we reproach ourselves in our conscience if the action has proved contrary to law, and in so doing we assume that we are free, in spite of the complete catenation of motives. But the justification for this judgment comes later: it does not come by interrupting the series of phenomena and trying to introduce in it a "free cause" which cannot exist there. As compared with the subjection of the animal world, rational decision is a sort of freedom; but it is emphatically not to be confused with metaphysical freedom.

13. For our existence as appearance in Time, Determinism remains justified. Not, however, hedonistic determinism, to which it is often prematurely assumed to be equivalent. The argument of Hedonism proceeds on this line. If the sense of duty is regarded as a motive, the process is, after all, eudæmonistic. Not to obey duty would expose me to the agony of self-reproach. To obey duty brings me the rapture of self-respect. I act so as to shun the former and to attain the latter. Thus my action is eudæmonistic, although in a subtler sense. But this conclusion is a somewhat crude fallacy, and is at the same time founded on defective self-observation. I can, in fact, only attain to the rapture of self-respect—unless there has been a mere instance of self-deception—if I have really

acted well, i.e. if the law has previously been fulfilled purely for its own sake. Therefore, speaking generally, the rapture can only be a consequence and an accompaniment if the action has previously been performed from pure impulse; otherwise it is a lie, and short-lived at that. But supposing that we had previously had an eye to the rapturous sensation and wished to act for its sake, we are now, in fact, overcome by moral disapproval and the sensation of pain. Thus Hedonism is self-destructive. The degree and nature of these subsequent accompanying sensations, the question as to whether they appear at all, it must be added, depend entirely on circumstances and external forces.

14. As a counterpart to the Theory of Virtue, which investigates the Good Will purely for its own sake, the philosophic Theory of Rights presents itself. In the former problem Fries abandoned the unsuccessful and pedantic attempt made by Kant and the strict Kantians to derive from pure Duty a canon of duties; in the latter he relinquished their attempt to construct a priori a "Natural Law". In this theory Philosophy's only part is this: here the same law of Duty, which in the Theory of Virtue was subordinated to the "doctrine of the inward nature" (Ethics) and to the action of the individual, is now subordinated to the community of mankind and man's dealings with man. The sole imperative derived in this way is the Equality of Persons, which is then capable of a certain realisation. Politics now corresponds to Ethics in the former discussion.

IX

THEORY OF WORLD-PURPOSE (OBJECTIVE TELEOLOGY)

1. Being is itself subject to a (hidden) Eternal Purpose. 2. Religion is the Relation to this Purpose. 3. As such, Religion reveals itself in its Fundamental Mysteries: (a) Our Eternal Destiny; (b) the Consciousness of Guilt, (c) God's Eternal Providence.

1. The Theory of Ideas explained what conceptions we are in a position to form as to the Transcendental. These conceptions in themselves were as yet in that theory cold and abstract matters of thought, all very well for metaphysical speculation, impotent for character and will. They first attain life and vigour through the knowledge of existence as a realm of values: as the basic thought of the "practico-ideal view of things" they grow to be the potent factors, soul-possessing influences, as religion knows them and has them for her own. Now therefore, and not before, a philosophic theory of religion can emerge. But it is for itself the second part of "Practical Philosophy", not because in Kant's teaching it lives by means of "practical postulates" and would thus be a mere appendix to moral philosophy, but because in its deepest foundation and in its most particular intention it is also "Teleology". Ethics has given us the values and the purposes, which are possible for men as individuals, for humanity as a whole in the course of its history, which are laid upon them. This was based on Reason's practical and fundamental perception, that our existence is subjected to laws of value, to be realised *in Time* by development and culture. In the form of ideal knowledge, however, this knowledge of itself advances, until it becomes the faith in the absolute value of Being in itself, in the *objective purpose* and the objective purposiveness of the real universe itself, which, on account of

its holy and all-powerful cause, the Godhead, dwells in man, and by means of this becomes for him the "Highest Good".

2. To be aware of this eternal purpose, and to live in relation to it, is Religion. Consequently, the theory of religion is entirely directed towards a "theory of World-purpose", an "Objective Teleology". *Conceptually*, this is only effected in "doubly-negating" predicates; affirmatively, however, it is attained in the development and description of religious feelings, through which we comprehend and recognise the real world according to its objective value and purpose in the world of appearance. This exposition has much more in common with the usual academic sense of "Religion" than is at first apparent. For, even according to the latter, the supreme purport of our belief is to believe that the World and Existence and Ourselves are a "Universe of God", in which the "*decretum aeternum*", the "eternal decree of salvation"—call it what you please—becomes realised, and with it is given the "kingdom of God". But Theology, and especially Protestant Theology, even in its scholastic period, followed the impulse given by Luther, and aimed at being, not a kind of speculative celestial Physics, but a real theory of the divine decree of salvation, i.e. a theory of the Highest Good, founded in God, and through Him realised as the "Kingdom of God". And that is "Objective Teleology".

3. "Objective Teleology" of this kind asserts itself in Religion with great force and emphasis. It finds expression in the great fundamental *Mysteries* of religion, and therefore, in an *intellectual* sense, it does not speak clearly at all. And all dogmatic Theology that would seek to interpret these mysteries by way of concepts is both futile and crude. Religion will have its mysteries as mysteries intact. A religious mystery is not something obscure for the time; capable, like the mysteries of chemistry, of ultimate solution; nor is it an "arcanum", mysterious only for the lower orders, the "profane", and convertible for the adepts into Gnosis; it is an

3. *Fundamental Mysteries of Religion. (a) Of our Eternal Destiny* 125

ἀπόρητον, an absolute *ineffabile*. On the other hand, it is not an affair of imagination and fancy; its place can be defined with certainty, its force and inevitableness can be proved for all human reason, its manifold facets can be shown . . . and its solution in the Feeling is proclaimed to us in a way that is beyond expression.—This doctrine of the necessary Mystery in Religion is, in my opinion, the most subtle and delicate thing in the whole Friesian philosophy.

How truly, how genuinely, this theory corresponds to the immediate testimony of religious feeling itself is clearly seen when we compare it with, say, the obtrusive mystery-mongering and the “absolute” philosophising from the standpoint “of God” which kept Fries’ contemporaries so busy! And it is not unprofitable to emphasise the distinction between this theory of Mystery and certain recent attempts to reveal once more the “Secret of Religion” while looking for it in the tricks of the professional prophet and the raptures of the medium.¹

(a) The development of the philosophical theory of religion and its mysteries proceeds quite simply; the previously discovered “highest Ideas” are explained as “conditioned in practice”: and at this point theoretical exposition has little enough to do, and the field is left in possession of religious experience alone.

Absolute Substance, real Being, appeared by means of the Idea as the personal Spirit (and all that can be conceived as analogous thereto). By practical determination, and at the same time by ideal antithesis to its merely relative values in the phenomenon, we now reach the Idea of the eternal and absolute Value of the personal Reason and an eternal purpose of the same. It comprises all that we have already become familiar with, as “Dignity of the Person”, and, over and above that, an eternal assignment of values for the individual

¹ From these it follows that it is “Religion” to find “the asses that were lost”; while the life of Buddha is not “Religion”.

in the Whole and for the Whole: which assignment was only capable of negative explanation in expressions such as "Independence of and superiority to the whole general framework of Nature". Now this, and still more our eternal destiny, we can only conceive in *positive* form through "Ahnung" in the feeling of bliss. It is precisely "an everlasting, whose command no earthly ear hath heard, no earthly eye hath seen; and no human reason shall lift the veil of its mystery". Yet to Feeling it is made manifest with vividness enough.

(b) The idea of "Freedom" admits of a more copious exposition. Here is presented the doctrine of Free-Will, and with it that other problem, echoes of which, faint or clear, are heard in other religions too, which, however, gives Christianity its profoundest content, its central point: the problem of Good and Evil, the utterly mysterious fact of the sense of Sin, common to all humanity, for which in every age the conscience brings testimony, if its voice is only heard. "It is only the wishy-washy and superficial thinkers, wishing to flatter the sentimentalists, who have dared to say that man is absolutely Good. The one-sided empiricists consider him as good in patches and evil in patches, or, in fact, as neither good nor evil. Vigorous philosophic judgment has, on the contrary, always voted for a stern separation of good and evil, and, in respect to man, for the sentence of damnation. But how shall we assign motives for this and find its limitations?" (*Kritik*, III, p. 247).

According to ideal Knowledge, personal Spirit is the true Substance, Will is Cause. And this cause is also a free cause. In accordance with it man, in his free volition, determines his actions and states, freely to himself. In Nature, it is true, no such freedom exists. Here states and actions proceed as determined by law, from the interaction of the empiric character with the stimuli and the conditions of its simultaneous environment. Every man's empirical character itself appears as the necessary result of his parents' characters, and

of other precedent natural conditions. But, according to ideal knowledge, the empiric character is but the appearance of an intelligible something, which as such is no part of the sequence of causation in Time, and is not subject to law in Nature, but is to be conceived as the act and the self-determination of a free cause. If the character has determined itself, it enters into connections and complexes in the comprehensible order of things, the real nature of which complexes is entirely hidden from us, though in their appearance they are presented to us as connections and complexes of causation-sequences in Time. But its self-determination (which at the same time appoints its place in the Whole) *can* be conceived as free; for, as we have seen, there must be free causes in the world; *must* be conceived as free, because of the pronouncement of our sense of responsibility, because of the infallible pronouncement of our Conscience, which makes us the authors of our deeds. Nor is there any ear for the excuse that our actions are a necessary consequence of our nature: what conscience says, in the last resort, is, "Why are you what you are?"¹

The voice of conscience turns to blame, or, rather, to condemnation, as it observes that our action is not absolutely determined by the commandment of duty. The reproach is not that we are perhaps also actuated by sensuous determinations (as in Classical Ethics). For so we ought to be. And not as if we had within us no motives to duty at all. For that is false; and only a miserably unhealthy and distorted mind could make the assertion. No; we reproach ourselves for this, that the decision is not wholly and absolutely determined by the commandment. And the sufficient reason for

¹ "If anybody says, how can I help it that I have by birth and education become the man I am, he is to be answered: if you were not this sort of man in your intelligible character, you could never have manifested yourself in this sort of life. The necessary intercatenation of events in Nature which manifests you in Nature only belongs to the form in which you become self-conscious of your own actions. The acts themselves are free acts of your intelligible character" (*Kritik*, II, p 259).

this is as follows: the motive of reverence for duty appears in us not with infinite, but with finite power, and it can therefore be defeated by other motives. Before our inward judge we do not plead that this is a regrettable matter of necessity; it is rather the greatest reproach of all that it is so, and we will listen to no excuses on the score. This is the Sin which lies as a burden upon us, as original desertion, as a radical failure through individual choice. Existence itself is not Sin, as affirmed in mythological fantasies. But *our* existence of duties unfulfilled is sin. And Sin, not in the mystic sense of the "sin of the world" or the like; personal sin, in the sense of a free and individual failure; and certainly as such an awe-inspiring and unfathomable mystery. This is the whole truth about those religious convictions which have their mythological setting in the dogmas of the Fall of Man and Original Sin. This theory is contained in Kant's teaching of the intelligible character and the radically evil—teaching which, however, is in parts erroneous, for where Kant should have conceived the "propensity to evil" solely under the Idea, i.e. according to our intelligible character, he introduces it simultaneously as a natural factor. (A similar blunder is often seen in Theology, whenever the purely religious condemnation of self as opposed to God, the only Holy, has been exaggerated into a doctrine of the "corruption of human nature", which with its talk of "miserable sinners" and its self-humiliation, culminates in doubt and suspicion as to the very possibility and reality of nobility, goodness, and greatness in human action. *Splendida vitia*.) "Original Sin", in Luther's eyes, lay in the lack of *fiducia* and in *superbia* towards God; the whole conception was thus removed into the sphere of *religious* relation and self-appraisal. The opposition of "the Flesh" and "the Spirit" is also interpreted by Luther in a wholly religious sense; he will not admit that the Flesh in the strict meaning of the word (animal impulse, the actual *concupiscentia*) is a "propensity to

evil". In this connection he is superior to Kant himself; for Kant's great theory of the "radically evil", which at its outset is valid as a purely religious judgment (i.e. as regarded purely from the ideal standpoint), becomes distorted in the *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft* into judgments concerning the empirical moral nature of the human race, judgments as open to objection as the current depreciations of human character found in commonplace dogmatic theology). But this theory leads to "a religious sentiment of humility before the law, to humble reverence for God, to that adoring submission, which not only sees a Lord above who is to be dreaded in His irresistible omnipotence, but recognises in God the infinitely Sublime and Holy, whose Will we acknowledge in pure reverence as Law for ourselves". For temporal existence the knowledge of guilt can only result in the impulse to permit the growth of the ethical impulse, through self-training, until it gains the upper hand; and in the longing for a change of nature, which is, indeed, impossible to conceive in the world of appearance, with the law of degree and the consequent impossibility of a "complete" vigour of will, which, however, in the realm of Ideas is an absolutely possible act of freedom; but also, as such, absolutely a mystery of Religion (*Kritik*, III, p 253).

(c) The practical determination of our highest spiritual idea, namely, the idea of the unity and community of everything in general, through the One, necessary, essential, and supra-mundane cause, Deity, leads, now that Being and Universe have been manifested as a realm of the spirit under everlasting laws of value, to God—God, the absolutely holy and omnipotent Goodness, which, as a creator, fixes and determines the "highest good", the eternal world, as "the best world" in accordance with eternal value and aim. And so we reach the religious mystery of how the world is governed. Belief in a divine government of the world, i.e. in the determination and ordinance of all that is and of all that happens, according to

eternal values and eternal purpose, is in all religion the most vital and immediate property. Therein lies the real life of religion. But it is at the same time a mystery, which is, and remains, absolutely incapable of solution. If we are to say anything of real import as regards the divine government of the world, we must have sat "in the council of God"; we must be able to discern and express the law of purpose in itself, which is the highest thing in the real nature of things. But this, as we have said, is, and remains, incapable of expression as regards the whole; it is therefore still less capable of expression as regards the individuals and the parts, which only find significance in the whole. It is only the practical ethical problems of our own life that we can in religious subsumption bring into relation with the absolute purpose (by lending dignity to our own moral duties as the Will of God). The thought of divine government, of the "best world" through God's omnipotence, is the purest possession of the religious view of things: and through this it is that religion brings for the believer peace and trust unbounded. It is "Faith", and not "Sight"; it is therefore not capable of scientific development; nor can it be applied by way of explanation either in the description of nature or in the science of history. And yet, if the government of the world and the objective purposefulness in the real nature of things is not a matter of "sight", it is more than mere "belief". It becomes *attainable in experience* for real knowledge by means of the feeling which "in the sublimity and beauty of external nature, and in our inner life as well, is aware of eternal Goodness" (*die ewige Güte "ahndet"*).

X

THE DOCTRINE OF "AHNUNG" (MAN'S DEEPEST NEED AND LONGING)

1. Man's Deepest Knowledge of the Eternal in the Temporal given through Feeling. 2. Æsthetic Judgment as against Logical Judgment. 3. A Parable. 4. Examples. 5. The Three Primary Kinds of Religious Feeling. 6. Anamnesis: (*a*) in the Judgment of Beauty, (*b*) in Æsthetic Judgment in General (a comprehension, through Feeling, of the Eternal Unity and Finality of Things in themselves), (*c*) in the Judgment of the Sublime, (*d*) the Three Primary Determinations of the Æsthetic Feeling. 7. The Divine Government of the World made known to us by "Ahnung".

1. Die Geisterwelt ist nicht verschlossen.
Dein Sinn ist zu, dein Herz ist tot!
Auf, bade, Schuler, unverdrossen
Die freie Brust im Morgenrot.¹

So says Goethe. "Thou canst obtain a real revelation of thyself in the form of Feeling" is the voice of all godliness. "Faith" is not the only relation in which we stand to the Eternal. For the religious man in the stricter sense of the word, for the really godly man, godliness first becomes a living thing when he becomes aware of the Infinite in the Finite. In life itself comes the immediate testimony that Nature, ourselves, all that exists and all that happens, are in fact appearance of a transcendental Reality. Transcendental Idealism—the conviction that is already latent in the most primitive religious faith—is experienced in Feeling as a Truth.

The actual knowledge given from Ideas was formed as a theoretical knowledge only in a "negative" way in double

- ¹ Unlocked the spirit-world doth lie.
Thy sense is shut, thy heart is dead!
Up, scholar! lave, with courage high,
Thy earthly breast in the morning red.

(*Swanwick*)

negation. All positive content was here denied to us. But Idea itself is absolutely positive; it denotes an object whose content is inexpressibly rich. This positive content, which eludes our comprehension and can only be manifested to our conceptual knowledge if the barriers of our knowledge are again lifted, is revealed to us, however, in individual *Feelings*, capable in themselves of clear differentiation, particular definition, and of being communicated. The general nature of an eternal, holy, omnipotent universal cause is to us utterly incomprehensible. With all these attributes we offer nothing but negations; by "eternal" we assert that this cause is not temporal—that, on the contrary, it is the very opposite of all that is temporal; by "holy" and "omnipotent" that it is not relatively good and relatively mighty—that, on the contrary, it is the exact opposite of all that is relative. What is this opposite? But in the feeling of devotion we attain by degrees a positive actual knowledge of it, quite solid and stable, if, indeed, utterly incapable of being expressed. Although we cannot *say* what God is, we can feel it, and we need not baulk the inquirer of his answer, for it may well be that we point him to the way in which the feeling can come to life within him.

2. Whenever we are profoundly affected within us, whenever we are deeply moved by joy or sorrow or any other potent mood, the emotion can generally be traced back to some occurrence, some happening, which affects and rouses and excites us. And this admits of clear conceptual comprehension and presentation. At another time emotions are stirred without any motive, without any immediate perception of their cause. There is an obscure sensation that a reason exists, but the real nature of this reason is not for a long time clear to us. Yet this obscure feeling is capable of analysis in the end, and a certain amount of reflection presents the reason for the feeling in quite precise conceptual shape. —Besides these, however, there are emotions of a quite indi-

vidual character, where the feeling is utterly incapable of being analysed and is absolutely proof against presentation in conceptual form. These emotions have their origin in the profoundest depths of human nature; for the criticism of Reason they are the toughest problem of all. They are linked up with concrete individual objects, facts, events. These are the source of the extraordinary affection and emotion. Yet, definite and comprehensible as these objects and these facts may be in themselves, it remains utterly beyond our power to define what it is in them that arouses such emotion. We recognise that they possess a meaning and a value which sometimes lifts us to ecstatic heights, which, however, still remain outside our power of expression. In making this recognition we *judge* them, for we attach to them a particular predicate. And this whole activity is an activity of our faculty of Judgment. The judgment is not a *logical* judgment; for in such a judgment what is predicated is a definite *conception*, under which the subject is *subsumed*. It is an *æsthetic* judgment. And the faculty of judgment now presented to us is that of Feeling. (Feeling, in this restricted sense, is that which is opposed to *conclusion*.)

Fries is usually criticised on the ground that, while Hegel makes religion an affair of logic, he, on the contrary, reduces it to æsthetics; which amounts to this, that he shelves religion as religion, and allows it to be swamped in artistic gratification. This is a sheer misunderstanding. For Fries the term "æsthetic" is, in the first instance, used to denote a type of subsumption in judgment which is quite opposite to logical subsumption. Then it is much more reasonable to censure him for elevating æsthetics into religion rather than for swamping religion in æsthetics; for making æsthetics a matter of religion rather than the opposite process. Unquestionably, the result of his investigation goes to prove that in æsthetic impressions the profounder element, that which rises above "frigid Taste" to the vivid sentiment of beauty and sublimity,

is actually of a religious nature. And how can this be gain-said? But at this point we have to do in quite a general sense with this fact: things, events, persons, that which exists, and that which happens, are in general able to create impressions on our mind in which the content of the intuitive perception far transcends the content of their "concept", transcends that which is presented conceptually by the individual thing. Such things are more than we can indeed say. And we cannot get rid of this *More*, however perfectly we may classify and however completely we may explain their causation. What has here been said can at once be made quite clear by taking any example of an object that we call beautiful and sublime.

3. Imagine a gifted nature, an artistic mind if you like, growing up in lowly circumstances, condemned to a commonplace existence, to trivial work and problems, with no chance of developing, and using, or even of discovering, its inner self. Yet this nature will out; in mental attitude, in feeling, in obscure ideas of something "quite different" which it can only know negatively, i.e. as the "different", and yet in obscure feeling it has actual knowledge of this "different". And further, in desires and longings, in feelings of world-strangeness, in endeavours where the aim is wholly obscure, though as an object of obscure feeling it is real, valid, and potent to the highest degree. This comparison applies itself automatically by way of analogy to Transcendental Idealism. If the reasoning Spirit is really and essentially free and eternal, of an infinite determined destiny, a part of a world of the highest Good where omnipotent Goodness rules; if the quite contrasted world of nature that lies around it, if the reasoning Spirit itself as a part of that world, are really nothing more than an *image* of the truth formed by means of the limitation of conceptual knowledge—then the truth must become living for the reasoning Spirit in the actual, if obscure, knowledge of feeling; it will stand in contrast to the other conceptual

knowledge; it is bound to emerge in moods, impulses, strange and obscure ideas (and these, expressed in the terms of its world of concepts, are the actual foundation of the whole vast realm of mythology and religious symbolism). At the last the mind has a dim knowledge of the eternal truth. And in the feelings this root-knowledge forces its way through as "Ahnung" (Man's deepest need and longing). And, reversing the argument, the *fact* that in every living soul this "Ahnung" is really active in various ways serves as a testimony to Transcendental Idealism.

4. These views find utterance in Goethe's lines, inimitably accurate in their grasp of the psychic facts and in their expression:

In unsers Busens Reine wogt ein Streben,
Uns einem Hohern, Reinen, Unbekannten
Aus Dankbarkeit freiwillig hinzugeben,
Enträtselnd uns den Ewig-Ungenannten,
Wir heissens fromm sein.¹

Fries not infrequently has in view this quite general sense of "Ahnung" as a "being in accord with the Idea", a coming to life of eternal Truth in Feeling. Wherever a thing or an occurrence arouses religious feelings, there "Ahnung" happens. This arousing or awakening of feelings is nothing more or less than Plato's "anamnesis". Through some resemblance or analogous relation, either accidental or more deeply founded, between some thing, some occurrence, and an Idea, the Idea is "brought to remembrance", is awakened, generally in obscure shape, and with it at the same time the corresponding emotion of the mind. In all conceptions of things which we call sublime this is absolutely clear. But it also holds good in the problem of the Marvellous. (In this connection Fries' teaching unravels a peculiarly difficult matter in the history

¹ In the pure depths of our heart we thrill with aspiration to surrender ourselves of our own free-will and in thankfulness to something higher than ourselves, something pure and unknown, thereby explaining for ourselves the Eternal and the Unnamed. And this we call Piety.

of religion, namely, the meaning for Religion of the belief in miracles, and the astonishing fact that miracle and religion are so inseparably joined together. At every period of history Miracle has been the process which is "quite different" from all ordinary and everyday events. And events which in their origin and nature appeared as inexplicable, enigmatic, and mysterious, have actually exercised a wholly marvellous spell, have produced an amazing impression, unquestionably religious in the true sense of the word. It is utterly beyond doubt that it is just these events which have always given the most potent impulse to the general awakening of religious feelings, frequently enough in cases where no clear conception of God or the Beyond had previously existed. But how can this be produced by the force of the mysterious and the uncomprehended? The actual explanation is this: the apparent mystery of some "marvellous" occurrence arouses the "memory" of the mystery of the supra-sensual in the absolute sense, which, latent in the feelings, now seems actively to participate in the actual course of events. In this case the occurrence is not subsumed under the idea by way of conclusions or conceptual thinking, but by way of the immediate judgment of the feeling. And hence the direct force which grips a man as he experiences for himself the religious thrill of the "inexplicable". As our argument shows, it is in this case possible subsequently to analyse the feeling through which the occurrence was subsumed under the idea. It is possible to indicate what really is the tendency that underlies the agreement and the analogy between object and idea; it is the force of the *mysterious*, the inexplicable, the limitation of our knowledge, which is common to both. And thus it is not possible to call this judgment *purely* æsthetic.)

A genuinely religious feeling, easily to be understood in the light of these previous explanations, is classically described in the well-known words of Augustine: *Tu fecisti nos ad te, et inquietum est cor nostrum in nobis, donec requiescat in te*—the

feeling of religious yearning, which would be quite incomprehensible in psychology but for Transcendental Idealism, i.e. but for the circumstance that man's psychic nature has a fundamental knowledge of its place in the order of things; this, however, is an obscure and non-conceptual knowledge. Further good examples of this are given by Apelt in his *Religionsphilosophie* (p. 143). Here the most general factor is that utterly confused feeling which defies any symbolic expression, the general feeling of the unfathomable depth and mystery of existence and universe, which, in spite of the most exhaustive explanation and comprehension of Nature by law and cause, asserts itself unchanged, the same as ever. It can surge up in the guise of a disconcerting force, from the deepest places of a man's consciousness, and can make him quiver in every nerve. It would be important both for the psychology and the history of religion to track down its effects in the Dionysiac cults, in the mourning for Thammuz and Adonis, in the worship of Cybele, and in the "panic terror".¹

Had not the theory of Transcendental Idealism been discovered long ago, it must inevitably have evolved, always in new form, from this feeling alone.

5. The supreme types of religious feeling are the three which correspond to the three fundamental mysteries of religion as before mentioned, which Fries likes to call "Enthusiasm, Self-surrender, Devotion". The mystery of our personality which transcends all nature, and of our imperishable and eternal destiny, is alive in that spiritual elevation,

¹ Cp. Otto, *Naturalistische und religiöse Weltansicht*, ed. 2, p. 33. If it is permissible to speak of personal experiences, this feeling was most vividly present to the writer, in the evening silence of the sandy desert, that faces the huge Sphinx of Ghizeh and its eyes gazing into the infinite. The feeling is latent in every man, and is evoked by the most varied objects, best of all, perhaps, by "noonday silence" on a far-spreading moorland. Schleiermacher, in the exaggeratedly mystic section of his second discourse (which in my edition I call the "intermezzo") and Böcklin in his painting, "Schweigen im Walde" approach the subject from different sides.

comparable with no other feeling, beatific rather than happy, in that *Enthusiasm* which can reach the point of intoxication; which gives religion the strength to perform its mighty works in conquering the world and animates all its ethico-religious energy; which perhaps is, above all, the distinction between the godly man and the worldling. If this religious enthusiasm is to find its self-justification in conceptual form, it will have but little to say. It is imparted, not by argument, but by an outpouring of tongues of fire. The mystery of Good and Evil, the guilt of our natural existence, is alive in the feelings of humble submission when we are confronted with the needs, the obscure and intricate things of our temporal existence, which are then judged and accepted as the consequences of our own guilt; it is at the same time active in the feelings of yearning for salvation and a change of heart. The fundamental thought of the Highest Good through the omnipotence of holy Goodness is alive in the feeling of devotion, of believing trust, of hope. Thus religious Feeling unfolds itself in a diversity of ways. The feeling of "absolute dependence" is in fact one of its phases. This feeling is present as included in the feeling of devotion. But it is not in the least sufficient in itself to describe religious feeling in all its diversity. "Absolute dependence" is only religious in the higher sense of the word when it denotes a dependence of our personality on the *holy* and loving Cause of All, who apportions our final purpose.

6. Let us take another look at our "artist in disguise": imagine, say, a Mozart growing up amongst Lapps or Eskimos. If he heard music for the first time, while it would be for his fellow-Lapps nothing more than a succession of unusual noises, in him there would be a dawn of understanding beyond his own comprehension; there would be an "Ahnen" (an obscure knowledge) of the actual event, a "recollection" and an actual knowledge through peculiar feelings of pleasure. And to apply the analogy: if the spirit of man is really a

citizen of God's eternal world, an organic part of the community of the highest good, the common body in which everything possesses eternal value and everything is conformable to the highest purpose . . . then, if the spirit of man encounters in Nature something of this supreme, incomprehensible fitness, this process of "recollection" is bound to come to life in him by means of a harmony determined through principles that the mind itself fails to comprehend, by means of feelings of particular satisfaction. And the clearly defined realm of this "Ahnem" aroused through a particular satisfaction is the realm of the sublime and the beautiful.

(a) In our judgments there is an absolute difference between Beautiful and Agreeable. By "Beautiful" we assign to the thing we judge a predicate of objective validity; we see at once that this predication is quite apart from our own accidental mood and inclination; and we expect every man of taste to concur in the judgment, if he is sufficiently educated. But what do we really attribute to the thing, and what is the subsumption that we make, when we recognise it as beautiful? That we cannot say for ourselves. It is quite beyond expression. "Beautiful" is incapable of definition. And the genius that produces Beauty can bring forth nothing according to definite rules or conceptions. The following formal definitions are possible, and no more: Beauty only exists when a perceived multiplicity is felt by us in some particular manner as a unity. Single and isolated impressions of the eye or the ear are never beautiful. Beauty can never be produced until these impressions combine into unity as following a definite principle which, for ourselves, is incapable of being expressed. In reality the object judged as beautiful is the form of this unity. The form may be exceedingly varied; it may be beautiful in a greater or less degree. But without it there is no beauty at all. A form of unity like this—whether it be the particular principle that shapes a confused mass of lines into a beautiful design, or a multiplicity of notes into a beautiful

tune, or a multiplicity of psychic qualities into a harmonious character—is in Kantian terminology an æsthetic Idea. And their name is Legion; in the creation of Nature and of Art, in the corporeal and in the spiritual, in the duration of figures and their forms, in the flux and change of the event. But when we encounter them the “breath of magic plays around them”. Our capacity for æsthetic ideas is Taste. Now this may be a mere frigid Taste, the taste of a virtuoso, which discovers the ideas, puts them in order, and finds “entertainment” in the process. But Taste of this kind we may not call a real *experience* of Beauty. Such experience only comes with the deeper æsthetic feeling. And then the æsthetic idea becomes really alive. It now gains a significance, an inner meaning, which speaks to us already in the simple beauty of a flower, but as it rises in intensity through all the beautiful things of Nature and of the spirit its appeal grows ever stronger. It speaks in a tongue which our concepts cannot render; its mystery is wholly revealed to Feeling, and influences it through all its gradations in the most heterogeneous manifestations.¹

In its gradual growth, however, this “æsthetic” judgment spreads itself over the whole immense and unified universal life of Nature and of history in her fleeting phenomena; it speaks to us with a profound meaning, with an inward spirit of the whole, which ever and again comes forth to be interpreted and then slips back again; but at all events it keeps the consciousness awake as to one meaning, though this meaning is only felt.²

(b) We can solve the problem for ourselves as to the possibility of this, if we consent to follow the only element

¹ Cp. Apelt, *Rel. Phil.*, p. 132. The æsthetic ideas of individual trees, after Masius’ paintings from Nature. The “explanation” of single ideas of this kind *feels its way to the inexpressible*, and yet fails to find the expression. This is just where the charm of the description lies.

² I have myself attempted an interpretation of nature as a whole, by thus “feeling my way”, of Nature’s life and evolution, in *Naturalist. u. relig. Weltansicht*, ed. 2, p. 280, by means of the process of the Becoming of the Will.

in the æsthetic judgment that is capable of being firmly grasped. The æsthetic idea is a form of the *unity* of the multiplex, a form that cannot be expressed. In our conceptions of Nature and in the ideas we attain real knowledge of Unity (and of Necessity) in things. In the æsthetic judgment the perception of the multiplex thus comes in an undefined way under the power of the concepts of Nature and of the Ideas. That is to say, in an undefined, obscure manner, by the way of "Ahnung" I gain real knowledge of the universe in a quite particular way, following the supreme laws of its unity and necessity, which are clearly presented in conceptual form in the Categories as a whole, and especially in the completed categories of eternity, spirit, freedom, and deity. In the obscure æsthetic knowledge I recognise, dimly and inexpressibly, ideal existence in the world of phenomena as perceived by the senses, ideal existence in general, without any determination of its particular and individual side. But this is not all. For it is precisely this world, actually known to us under categories and ideas, which is the spiritual world in reality, the world subject to the laws of Good and the Supreme Good, the "best world", the world of the objective Final Purpose. And thus it becomes clear why the æsthetic comprehension, deep but obscure, is not merely of a "speculative" character; why it presents to the feeling something beyond bloodless forms of unity; why it gives these forms the potent emotional content that goes with them. In æsthetic ideas I gain an obscure comprehension of the unity and connection of true reality in the world of appearance, of this reality in its essential nature; and in so doing I also reach an obscure comprehension of its teleology. When I pronounce anything to be beautiful, I attach to it an objective value and purpose; a value which it possesses, not for me, but of itself and for itself; a purpose, through which there is a significance in the existence of a thing rather than its non-existence, which can be conceived as the reason why Eternal Omnipotence

calls things into being. I cannot state in conceptual form this value which the Beautiful possesses in itself. But I feel it and acquiesce in it freely. And the impression of Beauty is nothing more or less than this comprehension, this glad recognition, of the objective fitness of its existence and of its existence in this particular form. Absolute value is given by Reason to the existence of the rational and the spiritual itself. It is an analogous value, which Reason comprehends obscurely in the beauty of Nature.

(c) When we pass from the Beautiful to consider the experience of the Sublime, all these considerations present themselves with still greater force. The experience of the Sublime has in itself so incontestably the nature of obscure comprehension of the ineffable, of a subsumption under the ideas of Religion, that the point has never even been seriously controverted. In the discussion of Beauty it was already necessary to distinguish between "mathematical" beauty and the "Higher" beauty, between physical and spiritual beauty, between the beauty of external form and the beauty of the expression of the spiritual through form. Pursuing these distinctions, degrees and differences in the emotional value of the impressions became evident. And the Sublime is also manifold. The "mathematically" Sublime is that which overpowers us through spatial magnitude: a lofty cathedral, a beetling cliff, the illimitable ocean, the vault of heaven. Such an impression can only arise in the way of "ideal subsumption". For a thing is spatially sublime if it reaches the limit of my powers of comprehension, and thus produces the impression of the absolutely Great, i.e. the Completed. Thus a thing here becomes sublime, as in its apparent absoluteness it becomes an image of the completed, of Absoluteness itself (just as an inexplicable and mysterious thing was seen to be an image of absolute mystery itself). The "dynamically" Sublime, then, is the super-mighty in Nature, all that is menacing and terrible. Its uplifting effect is due to its creation

of a note which is "attuned" to the idea of absolute Omnipotence; it awakens this idea within ourselves. But the "spiritually" Sublime attains still greater heights here also, in greatness of soul, heroism, undauntedness, in action from a sense of duty, and with it all that is sublime in the history and destiny of men and nations.

(d) The possibility of æsthetic impressions is infinitely varied; infinitely varied, too, is the force and impressiveness produced by Feeling in its judgment, as it thus relates the finite and the infinite; and it is hard to distinguish how and in what respect the relation is brought about in individual cases. The usual division and differentiation can, however, guide us in this connection; that is, the classification of the æsthetic impression as epic, dramatic, and lyric. It agrees with the previously observed threefold fundamental division of the religious feeling: Enthusiasm, Self-surrender, and Devotion; and the consciousness of man's eternal destiny, of Good and Evil, of Sin and Responsibility, and, finally, of the eternal significance of things themselves by means of a world-ruling providence—this consciousness gives them their deep meaning.¹

¹ An examination of the examples adduced by Schleiermacher in the "Reden" for his "intuitive perception of the universe" will show that the cogent ones among them will fit quite well into the framework of the Friesian theory of "Ahnung" and "Anamnese". Most of them would apply to the "Sublime". And it follows from a consideration of the synonyms applied by Schleiermacher to this "intuitive perception of the universe" that in a confused way he caught passing glimpses of Fries' clearly formulated theory. In my edition of the Discourses I have assembled them in their original form in the appendix. They are very instructive. This, too, is obvious from these synonyms, that as soon as Schleiermacher's muddled terminology is reduced to order, it amounts precisely to the content of Fries' teaching, to eternal and God-appointed "unity" and "finality" in the real nature of things.—Fries' teaching is altogether based on Kant's Criticism of the Power of Judgment. The theory of "anamnesis" is stated in Kant with great precision: in this respect as well as others Kant is a far better Platonist than the Neo-Platonists of his period, who met the philosopher with a superior air, as if they possessed the inspiration of genius (e.g. Schlosser. Cp. Otto, "Ein Vorspiel zu Schleiermachers Reden über die Religion" in *Theol. Stud. u. Krit.* 1903, pp. 47 sqq.). Kant's chapters "on the Sublime" are especially important in this connection: in these chapters his great theory of Ideas offers

7. To this æsthetic comprehension of objective teleology in Nature and in individual phenomena there would correspond a divination of the world as governed by God in history and in the life of the individual; for government of the world means nothing more than the assignment of aims and their realisation. This kind of "Ahnung" or divination of the government of the world in History was treated by Fries' disciple De Wette as the principle for interpreting the history of religion. The thought is one of importance. Only it is at once obvious that it is not a scientific principle to be used for explanation; it is an "æsthetic" principle which serves for the religious interpretation of historical development.

a far sounder basis for a philosophy of religion than is afforded by the strained and artificial products of the theory of Postulates.

XI

CONCLUSION

1. In Fries there is no Understanding of the Individual Development of Religion in History. 2. Clues to this Understanding in Fries' Own Theory of Feeling and "Ahnung".

1. In this way Fries has demonstrated the place of Religion in the soul, the sources from which it proceeds, the different kinds of its real knowledge, its relations to the other intellectual activities, its general basic ideas, and consequently has expounded its real nature in general. If his Philosophy of Religion is to serve as the basis of a modern Science of Religion, there is one more thing which it must do. It must also give an explanation of religion as a phenomenon in history, of its multiplicity and variety in history, of its degrees and stages, the lower and higher phases of its appearance. Something of this sort is attempted by Fries in the last chapter of his *Philosophy of Religion*; he follows the practice of the Deists in employing the name of "positive religions". It will be easily understood that his contribution to the investigation is but scanty. A real understanding of the altogether inimitable and individual factors which go to make up the special character of a typical manifestation, a particular stamp, of religious feeling and experience, was only given to that age in distant glimpses. In this point Fries himself is still under the influence of Deism, and consequently, in the last degree, of the old scholastic teaching itself. Deism received from Scholasticism its firm belief that, correctly speaking, there was only *the* religion; and that had been the self-evident postulate of the ancient dogmatic system. It could be grasped, so it was thought, in a few plain descriptions and propositions. No one doubted that its purest expression was found in the Christian religion; and yet there was a general belief that it could be discovered

in every race, in every language, in a general form and in general agreement. Deism attempted to make this discovery; and this constitutes the Deistic study of the history of religion. Following this method the zoologist's problem would be this: to comprehend the "real nature" of mammalia, say, in the tortoise, in the eagle, and in man; to trace this real nature in a general sense, while leaving the individual element out of sight as merely "positive". Religions, however, are differentiated among themselves far more precisely, far more profoundly, than the tortoise and the eagle; and their gradations of rank and value are quite as pronounced as those which exist between the tortoise and man.

The gradation in general use in this period—Fetishism, Polytheism, and Monotheism—is also employed by Fries. We are now aware that the classification is the reverse of precise, and tells us nothing of the qualities of the given religions. The principle of division according to the greater or less completeness and purity of the religious "ideas", which is the final result of Fries' attempt at classification, would at most produce differences in degree—and perhaps not even that much—while it could never guide to the deep qualitative differences that exist between one religion and another. And what is more, there was a lack of understanding of the historical phenomena, and in fact, even a lack of knowledge. As regards the history of religion in the Old Testament this deficiency is most striking. What knowledge had that age of the absolutely individual character of the piety of Elijah, as compared with that of Jeremiah, of Ezekiel, of the Psalms, of the Pharisees?

How unimportant in these cases is the "content of ordinary ideas" when compared with the diverse "contents" of human need and piety, which always underlie the general content! What did that age know of the actual, spiritual uniqueness of Christianity as compared with Islam, Buddhism, or Yoga, according to their inner qualitative differences? In Fries, as

in the Deists, something which is, after all, wholly "Positive", something which is equivalent to Christian belief with its precise historical stamp rubbed away as far as possible, is taken as *The* religion, which is then placed in opposition to the "Positive" religions. But Christianity, too, in spite of the finer intellectual content of its forms, and not merely on account of its accidental historical form, is *one* amongst religions. Not until it has been grasped in this way is any comparison possible: when the comparison is made we are convinced that the evidence will be at hand, that Christianity holds the primacy among her sisters in worth and in truth.

2. But the *possibility* of understanding the individuation of religion, the existence of differences in quality, and therewith the existence of differences in value, the necessity of distinguishing the degrees of perfection in religion not only in respect of clarity or obscurity, but in respect of the individual spirit of each particular religion—it is precisely in the foundations of the Friesian Philosophy of Religion that, in our opinion, such a possibility has been presented with incomparable success, although Fries himself makes no further use of it, that is, in his theory of the moral and religious feeling and of the "free" power of judgment in both. Here, indeed, is presented without more ado the possibility, nay, the necessity, of individually and qualitatively experiencing the eternal as one's own, of comprehending it and applying it. *How*, experience and history show. And *where*, in the purest and truest form, is decided once more by the "free" power of judgment of the Feeling. But the two are only possible after the Philosophy of Religion has given a foundation and a guide in the whole undertaking.

C. THE PHILOSOPHY OF FRIES IN ITS
RELATION TO THEOLOGY

(DE WETTE—THOLUCK)

XII

DE WETTE'S PHILOSOPHICAL ROMANCE

1. Importance of De Wette. 2. *Theodore*. 3. New Ideas. 4. The Kantian School. 5. Schelling. Romanticism. 6. Fries. 7. Reason and Understanding. 8. Inward and Outward Revelation. 9. Supernaturalism and Naturalism. 10. The Picture of Christ. 11. Theodore enters the Christian Ministry. 12. Theory of Feeling. 13. Schleiermacher. 14. Kant. 15. Theory of "Ahnung". 16. A Foreign Element.

1. In De Wette, the friend of Fries, we have the Friesian philosophy placed in its firmest and broadest relation to Theology. For any student of theology and modern theology De Wette stands close to Schleiermacher in many other respects, some of which will also be taken into consideration in this section. To speak first in quite general terms, he is interesting because his life and his life-work reveal, and that in a most comprehensive and instructive way, those forces which, after the theological systems of the "Aufklärung" and of Rationalism had had their day, led men back to a form of theology more specifically Christian, and supplied the general outline of nineteenth-century theology, lasting even to the present day; this was effected by leading up, partly to an elimination of the results of previous thought, partly to an alliance with them; both the elimination and the alliance showed a variety of gradations and transitions. The alliance produced the "Theology of Compromise," with its numerous stages of development. For the creation and shaping of this theology De Wette, with Schleiermacher, is typical in the second and stricter sense. But together with Schleiermacher he is of great importance for the problem, perhaps the most characteristic of all for modern theology, for the question: "what is the real nature and the real importance of Religion in connection with the general spiritual life of man?"—and at the same time also for the whole modern treatment of our

religion in connection with religion in general, i.e. for the general *relation of theology to the science of religion*, to the history, psychology, and philosophy of religion.¹

But De Wette in this respect was far in advance of his age. What Schleiermacher cursorily deals with in "Lemmata" in the introduction to his *Glaubenslehre*, Schleiermacher sets forth in works of greater scope. Wellhausen once said to me, talking of De Wette: "A clever chap! Why, all that I did in the Old Testament was in his books already!" An honourable exaggeration, indeed, with a grain of truth in it which would also apply to De Wette's *Ueber Religion und Theologie*, and to his later book *Ueber die Religion, ihr Wesen, ihre Erscheinungsformen und ihren Einfluss auf das Leben*—works which are practically neglected to-day, and quite unfairly so. For our presentation of these problems in our own time it would in many ways be far more profitable to go back to De Wette than to Schleiermacher, in his work with a similar name (*Discourses on Religion*), particularly when students and beginners are to be introduced to these fundamental matters. De Wette's works make clear to us how his own age, in which age with its motive forces are the origins of our contemporary theology, defined the problem, the special nature, and the general relation of theology as a whole to science; and at the same time the relation of a Christian science of religion to the science of religion in general, of the science of religion to philosophy, of religious moral teaching and of Christian-religious moral teaching to Ethics in general. They consequently throw light on the coming development, which the student of theology ought to know and understand; and, lastly, they are helpful in finding newer and sounder determinations for these weighty problems.

And thus we are brought into close connection once more

¹ "Modernity" depends on this new *Method* and not on deviations, whether trifling or considerable, from orthodox academic doctrine. "Modern orthodoxy" is also possible.

with our previous themes. For the philosophical side of De Wette is absolutely determined by Fries, with a few touches of Schelling, which never went very deep. Frequently and with emphasis De Wette acknowledges Fries as his master, as the teacher who first gave him a solid basis for his own world of thought. On this foundation, furnished by another, his own theological structure expands and increases in stages, at first gradually; and this development can easily be traced in the sequence of his works, in their successive editions which always present more matter. And this growth is of marked importance in studying the problem of the relation of the specific element of theology—that is to say, of the theory of the Christian religion—to philosophy and science in general. The errors, too, are by no means the least instructive feature in this development of De Wette.

In the sketch which follows De Wette's splendid achievements in exegesis and historical criticism must be altogether left out of the picture.¹

We are solely guided by the considerations we have outlined, considerations of the fundamental problems and relations of Theology as a whole and of the theory of faith and morals in particular; and also by the wish to place the beginner in touch with the intellectual movements, the forces at work in this period, the conditions under which the New Theology came into being. The constant connections with Schleiermacher need no special explanation.

2. De Wette's own development; the deep impression made on his inner nature by Christianity; the problems of theology and of Church government, which were shaped in new and original form by his age; that ever-recurring, astonishing, and impressive phenomenon, the awakening of a new

¹ For this and for De Wette's life and general importance refer to the article on him in Hauck, *Real-Encyclop.* Vol. XXI, by Frank-Kattenbusch; also to one by Holtzmann in *Allgemeine deutsche Biographie*, Vol. V. Also Wiegand, *De Wette*, 1879, and Stahelin, *De Wette nach seiner theologische Wirksamkeit und Bedeutung*, 1880.

seriousness—a new Christian piety—at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, even before the period of “revival”, and of the period from 1800 to 1820, that period so profoundly agitated and stimulated in the bewildering variety of its intellectual currents, in its fresh and upsurging impulses—all this has been vividly depicted by De Wette in his instructive work of fiction, *Theodore: or the Doubter Ordained. The story of a Protestant Minister and his Development*. De Wette wrote this romance in 1822, while, after being dismissed from his post, he was living at Weimar in expectation of a new call, and found occupation also in preparing an edition of Luther’s correspondence. The first period of his life was over; the educative comradeship of Fries in Heidelberg, the fruitful years as a teacher in Berlin, with Schleiermacher as a colleague, becoming gradually a closer and closer friend. As with Schleiermacher, so with De Wette; as a consequence of his professorial work and the business of training his students for the practical ministerial life, the definitely theological bias of his mind had become more and more accentuated, as compared with the thought of his earlier years and earlier books; and much of the shape that his theories assume is due to considerations of the greatest possible applicability to the religious “community” whose service is in view. And yet the application is never forced; it proceeds from personal inward disposition and experience. As with Schleiermacher, so with De Wette; his personal spiritual life had risen above Rationalism and Romanticism, and had become more closely attracted to biblical-Christian feeling and the spirit of fellowship in the Church. This is the standpoint from which De Wette, with a mixture of fact and fiction, really outlines his own theological development in the character of Theodore; in so doing, however, he permits in Theodore a much earlier and mature development of that which, in his own case, came much later, and in the years of his professorship; and he leaps over several stages which are

much closer to Rationalism, stages which appear in the first editions of his works, e.g. his *Dogmatic Theology*. In Church history the book may be called a first authority: it contains the personal experience of a specialist. In its day it was for many a young divinity student and "doubter" certainly what it set out to be: a consecration; and since in more than one respect there is a resemblance between the spiritual problems of that period and of our own age, it might well perform the service again. Its literary value is of no interest to us. It has no pretence of art; it is written for a period when didactic romances were usual. It falls into a class of novel which Jacobi had made especially popular with his philosophical tales; indicating a type of reader that was less eager for sensation or mere amusement than for solid intellectual food and discussion of the problems of its own intellectual life—a life of real culture. De Wette may well have been stimulated to adopt this form of conveying his thought by similar activity on the part of his friend Fries, whose weighty philosophical tale *Julius and Evagoras, or the Soul's Beauty*, reached a second edition in the same year. The story is pleasant in itself, the character-drawing firm and clear; the characters all stand for types of that period.

3. Theodore is the son of a good and well-to-do family in which Lutheran piety and home discipline are still living things. His mother has long since, in an hour of need, destined him in her vows to the ministerial calling. This accords with his own inclination, and, with his friend Johannes, who has also chosen the ministerial career, he goes up to a university. Johannes' character is quiet and placid; his mind is less inclined to independent thought than to the reception and retention of what is presented to it; his bent is therefore in the direction of languages and history. He goes through all the assaults of the new criticism, the new theories of the new-fashioned exegesis, without finding occasion to stumble. He is the stronger of the pair in his grip of the written word of the Bible, in his

appreciation of the scholarly elucidation of details. Not infrequently he points out how the new rationalistic interpretation of miracle is arbitrary, how it does violence to language; and in all the difficulties and discrepancies of the narrative he sticks to the single points and finds no difficulty in settling them for himself. Theodore, on the contrary, had even as a boy shown a precociously pertinacious and inquisitive mind, had developed in Logic and Mathematics much further than in Classics, and was impatiently longing for guidance in philosophy. He is dissatisfied with Johannes and his hair-splitting apologetics. He preferred to "envisage the Whole", and he ventured on sweeping judgments. As a result of the new critical treatment his religious convictions are generally shaken, while in his friend Johannes they are unimpaired.

4. After the lectures of a thoroughgoing expository professor, who conscientiously sets forth all opinions in detail without making a decision for himself, Theodore goes to a younger professor, under suspicion of heresy, who in spite of this, and in spite of a certain superficiality in his explanation of the text, has an attraction for him, for he has a shrewd way of putting things together; and he explains the miraculous from the morals and ideas of the age, while he refers the utterances of Jesus to general truths of reason. A Kantian introduces him to the world of Kantian thought. And here in the case of Theodore it is evident why the Kantian philosophy had such a potent, even an intoxicating effect on the younger generation; the autonomy of Reason, as it frames its laws, the Will, exalted in its freedom above Nature and fate, the Disinterestedness of virtue without reward. As they once affected Fichte, so now these ideas hold Theodore in their grip with "mighty power" and fill him with a noble self-esteem. And Christ becomes for him the Kantian sage, preaching the identical doctrine in his moral sermons. Certainly at the same time shadows pass across his picture of Christ. Did He not in many ways "accommodate" himself to the

ideas of His day? Was He not in many ways a "visionary"? And, above all—what happens in this theory to the idea of God? The thought of God is added as a postulate, that Reason's supremacy may be assured. Really, "God exists, we also exist, not through Him and for Him, but Reason exists, God exists because of Reason and for it. Is that a real and living God? Is it not a mere figment of our thought?" Darkness and terror descend on his soul. He feels like a child that has lost his father. Prayer is no longer possible; it can at most amount to a gathering and intensifying of one's own thoughts, and God Himself is nothing more than Order, the law of the moral world. And yet his spiritual gladness is not destroyed. Doubts and fears and the sense of inward desolation give place to the enthusiastic self-confidence engendered by the new doctrine. If he has lost in blissful calm and spiritual depth, in the higher consecration of faith, his loss is to some degree replaced by enthusiasm for ethical ideals, and especially by the ennobling thought of freedom, which fills him with passionate ardour.

How much we can learn from this story of development! We can see in a way immediately how the spirit of that age went to work. It was precisely thus that Fichte, too, proceeded from Kantian thought to evolve that theory, so intoxicating for himself and his followers, of the majesty of reason in itself, of the "Ego" which eliminated God as above the "Ego", left nothing but the moral governance of the world, no room for faith, although it admitted the place of action. And it is not too much to say that it was this contrast which, acting like a charm on a pious disposition, brought forth Schleiermacher's *Reden über die Religion*; they cannot be altogether grasped unless they are viewed against this background. And Theodore's mental attitude makes it clear to us at once why these discourses, for all their rhapsodical form and "atheistic" airs, were bound to arouse by their influence a real godliness, and why in quite different characters they were

able to liberate an impulse towards a perpetual activity. They explain at once the apparently quite eccentric statement of Klaus Harms, that the *Reden* had suddenly liberated him from all "sanctity that depends on Works" and boasting about "one's own Works".¹

5. As concerning Theology, Theodore's mind is now in a state of collapse. To please his mother he preaches a sermon in his native village on the value of Self-mastery, but soon finds out that ethical sermons are of little avail, and has to agree with his mother's explanation that if the heart-impulse is present, all moral homilies are superfluous; a very luminous criticism of the moralising type of preaching and at the same time a negative preparation for the knowledge, to come, later as to how this heart-impulse can be awakened.²

Theodore returns to the university to take up legal and political studies, and now falls under a new intellectual influence, that of the Romantic philosophy, of Schelling and Schlegel. His friend Sebald, an æsthete with an original mind and with considerable experience in love affairs, attempts to rescue him from his doubts by introducing him to the higher conception of things and of history which Schelling had principally expounded in his *Lectures on the Method of Academic Study*. This certainly had a seductive ring. Kant's was a philosophy undertaken from the standpoint of a restricted and rational "reflection" alone. Theologians, whether of the natural or supernatural school, were alike shallow thinkers. Their standpoint also, especially in their treatment of the miracle-problem,

¹ Cp. Otto, *Schleiermacher's Reden über die Religion*, second edition, *Nachwort*. Stress is here laid on this antithesis in Fichte's attitude, which is thrown into relief for the first time in these Discourses. Schleiermacher is quite obviously referring to Fichte, even in the application of technical terms. It is curious that, while these Discourses have often been explained from the Fichtean point of view, no one has ever treated them as anti-Fichtean, which would be equally justifiable.

² It is the same contrast which leads Schleiermacher in the Discourses to his exaggerated antitheses of Morality and Religion and to his exclusion of all moral topics from preaching.

was merely that of reflection. But the lofty edifice of the Christian religion was not to be viewed in this way. No; the problem was to rise to a higher standpoint, "intellectual intuition" as Sebald says, "and that without the possibility of giving any more definite account of it". Who is going to worry himself in explaining the miraculous? The new philosophy of Nature (Schelling's) opens our eyes to discern that mysteries lie all around us; that we are therefore so much the more incapable of penetrating these mysteries. But it is only on this lower plane that Reason and Revelation are opposites. Reason itself is the first and primary revelation of the Divine Being. And through this revelation we advance to further divine revelation in nature and history. History, and especially the history of religion, is animated by eternal ideas of Deity. And in Christianity, in the stage of transition from antiquity to the modern age, these eternal ideas have manifested themselves, for all to see, in eternal symbols. In the history of this revelation lies the ground and prototype of ordinary history.—Now, Theodore begins to read Schelling himself, especially the lectures on academic studies previously mentioned, and is profoundly influenced by them.¹

Yet in Theodore the critical faculty comes into play, and at the right place. The subject of these lectures is seen to be, not science and scientific method, but the dream of a poet dressed up as science, and consequently ruinous to knowledge and poetry alike. Reflection is repudiated; yet it is forthwith employed once more, and this time in an impossible undertaking; namely, the rational deduction of the Finite

¹ It can easily be understood how, after the aid rationalism of the preceding age, this heady vintage of original intuitions and daydreams was bound to affect a younger generation. Schleiermacher, too, in his Discourses, plays with the mystical idea in history. And to the very last a breath of this mystico-symbolic treatment of history hovers round the picture of Christ, as presented by this modern Father of the Church, a real offspring of Romanticism. This is still more true of De Wette, in whose case the deep impression made by Schelling was more than counteracted in the severe critical school of Fries; though it never completely disappeared.

and the origin of all things, from the Infinite, and the a priori construction of the same. Religion and Christianity, with their history, while their importance is apparently recognised, are in that recognition brought to denote something which is neither religion nor Christianity any longer; a mere mode of expression for ideas which have absolutely no relation to religious experience. This God, disseminated in the world, this God who is perpetually destroyed by himself and brought to life again, is seen not to be God in any sense of the word; nothing more than Nature's persistent life ever renewed in fresh youth and governed by a mysterious destiny. The "Absolute" so much discussed is seen to be no absolute at all, but subject to a conditionality that it is impossible to explain. And man is nothing more than one of the many transitory phenomena of this universal life, proceeding from it, to be swallowed up in it again. Freedom and morality are seen to be impossible; impossible also is the distinction of Good and Evil, the discernment of laws and values whose validity is absolute. Thus the whole system amounts to a radically insincere playing about with religion by means of allegories and imaginative interpretations, in which the real content and spirit of the matter is treated with sovereign contempt and deliberately undervalued. As a matter of course, Sebald despises Protestantism as compared with Catholicism; for in the latter he finds what he really wants in the place of religion and under her name—atmosphere, mysticism, Romanticism, imagination, and æsthetic satisfaction. Schelling, too, in his lectures had already come down very definitely on the Catholic side; and for the Romantics the season of conversion to Catholicism had already set in. A few years afterwards Theodore meets Sebald once more—this time in Rome—and finds that he has actually become a convert. The object of his previous trifling had now become overpoweringly serious. And now he prostrates himself before crosses and skulls and priestly authority; he has lost his intellectual freedom

and culture, and vacillates between asceticism and a life of pleasure.¹

And yet in spite of this pungent criticism De Wette owes a great deal to Schelling's influence. He makes Theodore himself admit that under Schelling, as opposed to Kantian moralism, there was first aroused in him, in greater potency, the dim and obscure knowledge of something higher "than his comprehension had ever reached", of a significance in religion transcending the ethical side to which he had so far been restricted; and later on he attains greater clearness in this knowledge by means of the Friesian philosophy.²

6. Theodore enters the Civil Service and, by means of Landeck, is admitted into "society" both official and aristocratic. His natural disposition to introspective and religious thought finds little satisfaction; and the happiness of his friend Johannes, whose career is developing along normal lines, arouses his secret yearnings. Intellectually he is uncertain and unstable. Then he meets the Master who is destined to put his inward life in order, to co-ordinate the various disjointed fragments of his thought, as if by a magic spell, into a Whole, and to give the decisive turn to his development. This is the philosopher who delivers a course of lectures to cultured society in the capital city: in reality, Fries, with whom De Wette, as

¹ It is perhaps rather cheap controversy on De Wette's part to describe the Romanticist opponent as the hero of amorous adventures; it does, however, find a parallel in the actual lives of these philosophers and in their attitude to religion. The latter was in their case very seriously like a love-affair.

² It is interesting to note that De Wette does not claim this advance as the result of Schleiermacher's *Discourses*, which he did not study until a much later date, but that he attributes it to Schelling. And yet Schleiermacher's influence is at work here, if only indirectly. For, when Schelling turned away from the utterly non-religious attitude of Fichte—an attitude which he himself assumed in the first period of his teaching, which he asserts in his protest against Schleiermacher's *Discourses* in his *Hans Widerborst*, which, too, Goethe proclaims for him with far greater subtlety and force in his poem "Weltseele"—towards mysticism and the glorification of the Infinite, this change was very definitely due to the influence of these *Discourses*, as can be shown. The lasting influence exercised upon De Wette by symbolism and also by pantheism as a mental attitude, without affecting the lucidity of his thought, can also be demonstrated.

student at Jena and afterwards as his colleague at Heidelberg, lived on the closest terms of friendship and enjoyed opportunities of the most solid intellectual intercourse. The conversations as reported in *Theodore* certainly reproduce, in essentials and with absolute fidelity, the matter and the spirit of this intercourse; it is, however, also obvious that De Wette gives expression through his master to many of his own ideas and to many of his later subtleties. (This is especially true of all the peculiarly theological expositions. When Fries began to teach he was certainly not in the least favourably disposed to any such harmonisation of his own philosophy with Christianity, Scripture, and Theology as is often found in these dialogues. In his own pronouncements there is in fact a harsh and unfriendly note. Unpleasant memories of rigid religious training in his boyhood; the Deistic thought, to which he is allied, with its general decision against the "positive" and its anti-ecclesiastical bias: these influences were still very definitely at work in his mind. His attitude changes very gradually, thanks undoubtedly to De Wette's influence; he likes to head his chapters with biblical texts—he discovers a certain affinity with the scriptural and Christian foundation of our religious life; he takes a personal part in the activities and disputes of theologians as to the form which religious relations in general shall assume.) It is very interesting to notice the side and the angle from which Fries' ideas produce their main impression on the theologian, for here we are undoubtedly dealing with fact. To him the Friesian system seems to stand "midway between the philosophies of Kant and Schelling", and to unite the two. Fries begins with a fundamental consciousness of the human mind which he calls Faith, which is a reminiscence of Schelling's "intellectual intuition". But, unlike Schelling, he does not go on to evolve from this the world with its laws and forces; he keeps to the inward standpoint (the "subjective" turn in the Kant-Friesian philosophy) and demonstrates how this fundamental consciousness—not

Schelling's cosmic consciousness, which could only be attained in our dreams, but our personal consciousness—is revealed in the various activities of the mind (criticism of Reason and reinference by way of deduction); how the whole edifice of human knowledge is built up from experience and inward personal activity by means of combination and intrication; and how in this way there is presented to the mind a world in time and space under natural laws. But this knowledge is nothing more than the incomplete Being of things, while the prototype of that Being is included in complete form in that fundamental consciousness ("the immediate knowledge of reality" in itself, as opposed to its appearance in time and space; to the understanding a mere negation, to the fundamental consciousness, and therefore to the feeling, to "*Ahnung*", a positive thing); and the loftiest truth, the highest intellectual satisfaction, is only to be found in Faith, whose lamp is the light of the world, manifesting it as a harmonious whole in divine splendour. He distinguishes between Understanding and Reason: the former is the lower mediate consciousness, through which the world is conceived in space and time and in its natural laws; by the latter he understands the spirit's immediate actual knowledge, its total life in all its activities,¹ and as its central point he defines Faith. He goes on to show that knowledge is only one side of man's nature, that Feeling and Power of Action are its peers, and that only by means of all three powers can the intellectual life be brought to completeness. He holds that neither the world nor human life can be understood through the medium of mere knowledge (?); that everything receives its living significance through Feeling and Love; and that the truth of knowledge and of feeling is completed by action.

7. Hence arises the especial importance for Theodore of

¹ There is a misunderstanding here, for the spiritual life in its totality can only be *developed* through the understanding, through reflection. Hence the immense importance of Reflection, which Schelling looks down upon with the disdain of genius!

the antithesis of Reason and Understanding, and the profound importance here attributed to the former. It may be said in fact: Here lies the very central point of Friesian thought; here is his most decided advance as compared with Kant. In Kant's thought, too, and this may be affirmed without any doubt, this deeper meaning was there, in the background; it had been the guiding ideal of his investigations, if obscurely seen; but it had not yet been firmly established as the faculty of an independent and individual fundamental knowledge, clearly contrasted with the knowledge of the understanding, which can never be more than mediate. And at the same time Theodore makes the discovery, without much difficulty, a discovery capable of easy confirmation in the examples given by history, that this antithesis throws a new and instructive light on that traditional contrast of "Reason" and "Revelation", and is, in fact, implied in that contrast. What is here called by the name of Reason, and attacked under that name, is really the "Understanding", i.e. the arbitrary and home-made judgment and combination, our views and opinions and imaginations, in which everything is mediate, defective, and exposed to error. But "Reason" in that deeper sense is precisely the opposite of the Understanding; for the latter is just what Luther calls "our own reason and power", and is contrasted with it in the sense in which "Revelation" in the traditional antithesis is contrasted with "individual Reason": namely, as the perception of eternal truth itself, independent of our own views, imaginations, and thoughts, absolutely non-mediate, lifted above all individual caprice and all possibility of error, in its deepest foundations unseen, and obscure in its origin, constituting as such the central mystery of the reasoning spirit.¹

This, in fact, leads the philosopher to assume a position in

¹ The attainment of this knowledge did not depend on philosophic thought alone. In true religious feeling it was ever present, and its source was always known: "If, therefore, the light that is in thee" (Matt. vi. 23, and Luke xi. 35).

regard to the question of Reason and Revelation essentially different from that of the Naturalistic thinkers of the "Aufklärung". It does not concur with the opinions of the Supernaturalists, but it admits a possibility of treating their opinions with justice; and consequently of throwing a clearer light on the controversy as to Nature and Grace, with its deep-lying implications, actually the central point of all problems which are religious in the true sense of the word. The position here reached by Theodore-De Wette is actually identical with that implied in the whole of the later Theology of Conciliation, however much it is often tricked out in traditional terminology.¹

8. His thought proceeds on lines somewhat as follows. The immediate and actual knowledge, which has its seat in the spirit's deepest places—absolutely independent of all experience possible only to man, and to this extent itself meriting the name "supernatural"—is (by virtue of our belief that our knowledge is true) nothing more or less than a perception of the highest and absolutely objective Truth itself, and thus in the converse sense an intimation to oneself, a self-revelation of the eternal truth in the deepest places of the human spirit, which is completely mysterious, for we have no simultaneous knowledge of how it comes to exist there; mysterious in the true sense of the word, since this mystery is absolutely incapable of being solved, being set there together with the limitations of our earthly existence.²

This Theodore calls "Inner Revelation", "Inner Light". This inner revelation, since we merely possess it as a predisposition, and since in itself it is utterly obscure, would amount to nothing at all, unless it were displayed in the course of the developing human spirit in history, as the content of history is deepened and unfolds itself; and then it assumes definite form in the case of gifted individuals—prophets, founders, and mediators; where the implicit enters explicitly into the con-

¹ An example of this, as will be seen later, is Tholuck himself.

² Vide *supra*, pp. 99-101.

scious individual life of the spirit, and is handed on by these men to the life of the community. Now in history as well as in Nature everything stands in rigid causal association; and therefore everything that follows is given with everything that precedes. But the general proposition that something exists, and exists under this precise form and under these precise laws, is absolutely accidental as compared with the order of Nature; it needs its sufficient reason, which must be looked for in God. In consequence of this, the history of the human spirit in its progress, and especially that of the religious spirit, is to be viewed as a destiny of man ordained by means of God. Thus the fact that religion, and with it communion with God, came into being, is God's doing, and the prophets and religious mediators are God's ambassadors to mankind. And this whole divine direction of history, dimly apprehended (by "Ahnung"), this sending of God's messengers, becomes in itself a second kind of revelation, an outward revelation, which assumes the existence of the inward revelation and has in it the criterion of its own validity, while possessing at the same time an important individual value of its own. For it is only through this outward revelation that religion becomes real; without it we should only have the potentiality of religion and should only know it in fleeting and fitful impressions. And not till it is ours does God become for us a living and acting presence. . . . "In a nature of this kind the divine spark, which is the same in all men, not merely avoids being stifled and hidden, as happens in the case of most people; no, it is fanned till it grows into a flame which strengthens and enlightens all the inferior powers of the mind, so that the will obeys, not the passions, but the divine impulse within; so that the understanding lays hold of the divine light, pure and unsullied, and does not allow itself to be misled by sensuous knowledge. In such a nature the reason is transfigured and becomes divine. All that is false and immoral has, one can say, its home in the understanding, which, as the capacity of

arbitrary consciousness, creates for itself illusory images and substitutes them for the true original type, for men to see. But, where a revelation of this kind has really occurred, Reason has remained untouched by any error, has obeyed the divine voice in the secret places of the soul, and has taken hold of its commands and its teachings in their pure form. Every man in whom the divine element has in some measure gained the upper hand of the purely human and won control of it is for his own age the interpreter of a revelation: but he in whom a perfect harmony of the human and divine has come to pass has closed the circle of revelation; and this we believe of Christ."

But the belief in revelation is not the product of the understanding; long before the understanding apprehends it in conceptual form, the *feeling* gives assent. From feeling in its immediacy, in whose depths and without our consciousness processes of agreement and recognition are effected, following standards hidden in our inner self and yet long since in practical application, before the understanding can take account of them—frequently indeed in opposition to the erroneous application that the understanding makes of them—from this feeling there emerges Faith, like a gift from above, unaware of what it is and whence it came. But, more than by speeches and sermons, the Heaven-sent man makes himself known through deeds. And here belong *also* those deeds of power which we are accustomed to call miracles. These are not happenings contrary to the laws of Nature; they are the effects produced on Nature by intensified spiritual power; they lie within the realm of the possible, and for them we have analogies among ourselves. They can be looked for, where the spiritual life is present in an intensified form; and to this extent they are signs of its validity. But a spiritual life of this kind makes itself immediately known only through moral deeds, and as moral actions taken as a whole constitute the personal character, the first and safest pledge of faith is the collective

personal character of the intermediary. On this foundation, above all others, rests the faith of a Christian.

9. This is the way in which he settles the conflict between Supernaturalism and Naturalism: "The Rationalists cling to what they call 'natural,' which amounts to physics and psychology with limitations imposed by experience and the understanding; they do not see that everything which is natural, whether in the spiritual or in the corporeal world, depends on the supernatural and is nothing but the appearance of the latter. They will not see that everything that is immediate and fundamental in the spirit proceeds from a hidden and mysterious source. Themselves accustomed to learning and mechanical repetition, they assume that nothing can be found in Christ but what has been learnt off, worked up, when all is said, from existing matter; nothing fundamental, nothing really original, nothing that baffles explanation. Nor have they the slightest intuition of this fact: that in the corporeal nature hidden forces are paramount, which in a mysterious way connect body and spirit, which defy any explanation through natural science. On the other hand, the Supernaturalists are just as blind to the freedom and non-dependence of man's psychic nature; themselves dependent on tradition for everything, they would imagine Christ and his Apostles as being—if the expression may be pardoned—tube-fed. Themselves passive and inert, they conceive the state of inspiration as passive and inert; they believe in miracles, and conceive them in a natural and material manner. They consider that the laws of Nature are temporarily suspended, that Nature's machine has been differently set. With all their exaltation of Faith they are unable to believe without seeing. And if they had lived in the days of Christ, they would indeed have beheld no marvellous works, for, like the Pharisees, they would have asked for a sign from heaven."—(Compare also *Theodore*, p. 282: "There is the place of supreme Truth, where Reason, unconscious of itself, is merged in the eternal life of the

spirit, where enthusiasm, self-sacrifice, and devotion reign, where all reflection and sophistry are at an end.”)

10. Starting from such premisses, Theodore, in his thinking, approaches closer and closer to the orthodox. From all ecclesiastical teaching he gradually extracts a “sound sense”. And, first of all, his new picture of Christ grows continually in perfection. As for Schleiermacher, so for Theodore; Christ becomes for him the prototype of humanity in general in its perfect manifestation and at the same time the central point of the development of humanity, the initial point of a new creation. In this his thought is so closely allied to Schleiermacher’s theology that we have to assume some extensive collaboration of the two philosophers, which must indeed have been an actual fact in their Berlin days. As to which was the leader, the question would demand a knowledge of the preliminary stages that led to Schleiermacher’s theology. It is, however, ultimately solved when we realise that the motives which inspired the two theologians in their work were identical. Both endeavour to get as near as possible to Christian teaching in its historic form, for both are sensible of its high import and value; and both would struggle to avert its supersession through Rationalism. Both are unconsciously influenced by the after-effects of the humanitarian age, with its faith in mankind; both attempt to interpret Religion as a whole and Christianity in particular as the perfection of *humanitas* itself (and so for both philosophers Christ is the ideal of humanity, manifested in the flesh); in which connection De Wette’s teaching, as also elsewhere, is clearly derivative from Herder, for if we trace the history of this attempt we are bound to return to the latter philosopher. And for both—a very remarkable fact, of decisive importance for that theology which follows them—it is the Johannine picture of Christ that determines their thought. For them, as, indeed, for almost all the more outstanding intellects of that age, the Gospel according to John is the real scriptural foundation of Christianity. The reasons for

this lie very deep, and the consequences are noticeable. In their theology, with its humanising note, in their speculation, in their attitude towards miracles—which they conceive as half allegory and half reality, while they can never get beyond a vague hesitancy—they reflect the style of this Gospel. And De Wette is in most exact accord with the spirit of this Gospel, when he occasionally adopts from Schelling and revives the half obsolete idea of the “historico-symbolic” meaning of the Gospel history. To him the events in the life of Jesus are, indeed, facts also; but at the same time they are “symbols” of religious ideas given through history—symbols which are to present those ideas and to give them life.¹ Under these influences De Wette’s attitude to the legendary elements in the Gospel tradition, at first quite definite, loses its precision by degrees, and much is covered up by the dangerous mantle of “symbolism” which is so easy of application.

11. Theodore now meets a new friend, Härtling, a man of the people and a German patriot, and the motives, highly important in themselves, which are now directing his thought, become clearly discernible. He is profoundly influenced by the idea of *community* in people and church which had become a matter of history; an idea which confronts the individual as something objective, which demands service from him, which it is impossible for every individual to tinker with and refashion to suit his caprice and his subjective way of thinking, which is indeed the higher Good, and in which the individual is bound to take his place and do his part. Now, the current opinions of the community in matters of religious belief, as they have grown up, become for him a thing worthy of respect; it seems desirable to approach them as closely as possible, and the question “can this or that opinion hold good as a general opinion?” becomes almost a standard of criticism.

¹ There is a similar idea in Fries, with this difference, that he admits the corresponding events as myth, and not as history, although he will permit their application as symbols in popular religion—a counsel that has hardly any warrant.

This new mental attitude even leads him occasionally to praise an uncritical simplicity of mind, and to regard that faith only as solid which has never had to suffer the annoyance of doubting questions. These are, however, sentiments which accompany but never obscure his resolute sense of truth. In an exceedingly well-drawn character, Walter, he describes—and certainly he had before him living examples, frequent then as now—the clergyman who has entered on his calling without sincerity to start with, who seeks peace in blind submission to the authority of orthodox doctrine, in aping with self-torture a piety which is really foreign to him, and is led through insincerity and narrowness into fanaticism.

Theodore's change of opinion is completed, when Johannes, the friend of his boyhood, says in a letter that the experiences of his ministerial life have brought him to an absolutely similar conception of Christianity and its importance in actual life, but from another side. "As I go forward in my ministry I see with growing certainty that the doubts that harassed you do not affect the essentials of our Christian faith. You believe as I do in the saving power of the Gospel, in the unsurpassable majesty of Him who declares it—Him whom we acknowledge as our Teacher, Master, and Leader. And with this faith, provided that it is a deep and living faith, the minds of men can be led towards that which is conducive to their peace. The people know nothing of the difference between Reason and Revelation, nor do they desire to know. They are eager for Truth, whether supernaturally or naturally revealed; they only insist that it comes from God and is set down in Holy Scripture. And who is ready to deny this?" Then he goes on to describe in plain and sincere words the happiness of his ministerial activity. Many searching passages in Theodore's own life and in the general life of the German people—he takes part in the war with France—point in the same direction, until at last he once more chooses the ministerial career, with enthusiastic conviction, and receives ordination. The second

volume shows him as making a preliminary tour in Italy, with Catholic travelling companions; and it is now instructive to watch the growth of the newly aroused Protestant consciousness in this new orthodoxy, as it becomes more and more rigidly severed from the romantic aspirations of his youthful days.

12. We find a further interest in the discussion with Kant and Schleiermacher, as carried out by Theodore from his newly discovered point of view; in the just appreciation of Feeling in its importance for Religion; in the relation of *Æsthetics* to Religion; and in the connection of Religion, Ethics, and *Æsthetics*, as determined by him with reference to Fries.—The appeal to Feeling, its general importance for our spiritual life in general, had, as the “*Aufklärung*” developed, simultaneously emerged as a natural reaction and as an accompanying phenomenon of Intellectualism,¹ and the more modern theories are merely a continuation of what was already there. One is rather easily inclined to regard this appeal to Feeling as a relaxation of severe thinking; and, in fact, if uncritically applied it becomes a bed of idleness for every kind of caprice, an easy refuge for every subjective opinion, fantasy, prejudice, especially in our age, with *our* vague way of dealing with conceptions. But that age, with its habit of calm reflection, did not run the same risk in this matter; it endeavoured to arrive at a precise understanding of what it meant by appealing to Feeling and trusting to Feeling. This is the case in Rousseau. And still more so is it true of Kant, whose severe and methodical criticism of the power of judgment amounts, in fact, to nothing more than an analysis of Feeling. And Fries, by his application of careful tests, gives the theory a solid basis. Theodore realises for himself the meaning of Feeling in a discussion with a Rationalist as to Schiller’s *Maid of Orleans*, the mission of the *Maid* and the nature of her inspiration, which the Rationalist would set aside as meaningless ravings. In religion the action of Feeling is, for him, chiefly to be looked

¹ See Chapter II, Section 4.

for where the problem is to discover what actually leads and compels men to acknowledge, in such a phenomenon as Christ, a divine revelation, and to accept it as their guide; in other words, how we come to attribute a binding force to the phenomena here encountered, how we bring our heart and our conscience into harmony with them. It is obviously no clear concepts of the Understanding which effect this, for they do not appear till a much later stage, and often are quite absent from our profoundest thought. No; this process of measuring according to the *spiritus in corde*, according to the eternal standards of Truth and Goodness, latent within us, profound and obscure, which can only be presented to our clearer consciousness by a very difficult process of reflection; this glad harmony, which is so utterly different from a mere acceptance on authority ("we have now ourselves believed and acknowledged") is effected, prior to any reflective understanding, in the form of immediacy, and, as Luther says, "through the secret intuitive ruminating of the spirit." And what is that? It is Feeling which comprehends in a different way from that of the Understanding. It is that kind of "Power of Judgment" which exists in us, parallel to the "subsuming Power of Judgment of the Understanding" and quite distinct from it. On every side its difference from the manifestations of the understanding is apparent. A man who has the feeling for language can grasp the individuality of any language, its spirit, its music and its logic, and its grammatical structure as well, with greater speed, subtlety, and sureness than the most acute understanding can attain when it is working by rules and conceptions. No understanding that deduces and concludes according to rules can ever attain the aptness, readiness, and absolute accuracy of the moral *Feeling*, and the delicate tact, which pronounce their decisions as if by inspiration, without any evident preliminary assumptions or major premisses, decisions which are usually impaired rather than strengthened by the subsequent syllogisms of

the understanding. In the realm of the Beautiful the Understanding is utterly powerless; there Feeling is the sole dictator. (And so the whole former part of Kant's Criticism of Feeling becomes also a Criticism of the "Æsthetic Power of Judgment".) Feeling is a capacity of comprehending and judging before our possessing, without our possessing, a consciousness and a conceptual presentation of that according to which we understand and judge a given and definite thing. Where this latter is *also* capable of being clearly grasped and brought to the consciousness, the feeling admits of being subsequently "resolved"; but there are feelings which do not admit of this "resolution", and that in a relative and in an altogether absolute sense, as a penetrating self-observation will show. In all religion this comprehension and judgment by way of Feeling plays the leading part; and in it alone is the vital power, the truth and immediate sufficiency of religion. Reflection through the understanding is really nothing but a necessary evil, that comes limping along afterwards and has its uses as a cathartic. Now feelings can be communicated (can be aroused in others in harmonious agreement); and thus arises the general feeling through which religion becomes an affair of the community, and as such a matter of special character and special claims on any man whose aim it is to serve the community.—Here it is self-evident how closely De Wette and Schleiermacher approach each other. But in De Wette the whole theory has a far more solid foundation, for it is established upon the exact anthropology of Fries, who continued the pure thread which Kant had begun to spin; while Schleiermacher never quite emerged from that lack of precision which is shown in the *Discourses on the Relation of Feeling to Intuition and Knowledge*, and on the *Conception of Feeling*.

13. It is not till comparatively late that Theodore becomes acquainted with Schleiermacher's *Discourses*, and, it must be noticed, as they appear in the later edition, where subsequent accretions by no means lend additional clearness and impres-

siveness to the original. We may learn much from Theodore's criticism of these *Discourses*, conceived from the Friesian point of view. He asserts that he has never been so much impressed by any book as by these *Discourses*. He approaches them as one who has a profound personal knowledge of Feeling. Schleiermacher's reference to the fundamental and unconscious life of religion, where the mind comes under the grasp of the spirit of the universe, the distinction he draws between this immediate thing and our knowledge about it, our expression, arrangement, and combination of these original feelings into a system of opinions, are to him both illuminating and suggestive. But he asks and with reason: What really is this "spirit of the universe" which is experienced in religious feeling, which is at the same time the actual content of the feeling itself? To this Schleiermacher's answer is still lacking in exactness; the "feeling of the existence of all that is finite in the infinite" (which afterwards develops into "absolute dependence," an idea that only presents one side of the content of religious feeling). Theodore hears the explanation of his master-philosopher, that in inward religion, in a way that cannot be explained, we grasp two things: the eternal *unity* (and necessity) in the real nature of things (which is displayed to the speculative comprehension in the Ideas) and at the same time the eternal *fitness* in things. Now Schleiermacher really has a sentiment of this, and the varied synonyms used by him in describing religious experience amount precisely to the same idea.¹

Not satisfied with Schleiermacher's account of the relation of *religious* and *ethical* feeling, he comes to this conclusion: in the ethical feeling are manifested the aims that we must set for our life in this world of time; the transcendent feeling of religion has in everything an obscure but profound knowledge of the *eternal* value, the divine purpose, and thus confers on

¹ Cp. Otto, *Schleiermacher's Discourses on Religion in their Original Form*, 2nd edition, where a table of these synonyms is given in the Appendix

moral action eternal purpose and lofty inspiration, while acting on it at the same time as a stimulus and a call to life. And this explanation, quite in accordance with Fries' thought, seems to approach very closely to the true nature of both kinds of Feeling. What every religious man knows through most intimate personal experience, i.e. that the experience of God and the feeling of God both stimulate and liberate the ethical feeling and the ethical impulse in a way undreamt of previously: this fact, almost capable of experimental proof, which is clearly the root of all our doctrines of salvation, is ever and again a most difficult problem for the psychological analyst, and our investigations into the "moral driving force of Faith" have not yet carried us any farther. The solution, however, will probably have to be sought along the lines indicated by De Wette and Fries, if, indeed, a solution is to be found at all, if it does not disappear in the realm of the unexplorable. Theodore defines his opinion, distinct from that of Schleiermacher, quite well in these words: "Religious feeling is—how shall I express it? inactive, static, but not passively static. It is the complete satisfaction of the heart, for in it every longing, every yearning of the heart is appeased. And yet it is the spring of all action, inasmuch as man soon returns from these heights of feeling to the sphere of action."

14. Theodore's relation to Kant is then settled in accordance with the views of Fries. The Categorical Imperative first lays down a higher law of value, which tells me what can be my duty, the object of my activity, the aim of my endeavour. This is the objective Good which in the moral feeling becomes known to me in all its abundance, and becomes at the same time the object—not, indeed, of *Inclination*, which Kant erroneously opposes to the pure feeling of esteem alone—but of pure *love*. In this way a living morality first becomes possible, and with it a fully developed ethical theory, in the place of those withering tabulated sequences of so-called individual duties, which the strict Kantians tried to pick out from the

pure formalism of the Categorical Imperative, while none of their derivatives carried any real conviction. Instead of the God according to the theory of Kant, God as a postulate, appearing only as an afterthought (this is Theodore's view of the subject; whether it is wholly justified, may well be doubted), Fries' philosophy had offered him long since a straight path and a special content, both of religious experience and of the idea of God.¹

15. The story also offers a wealth of æsthetic observation. In this respect it follows closely in the steps of Fries, the teacher, and, through him, of Schiller. Here, too, we have that profound conception of Beauty which would regard it as the eternal and divinely appointed Goodness of things in themselves, a Goodness which is made known to us by "Ahnung" (*geahndet wird*) in a manner that is incapable of conceptual expression, but is nevertheless positive and to the highest degree alive, in the experience of Beauty. We realise the goodness of things in themselves, in which goodness we believe, for we believe in a world of God, in their appearance for us, as Beauty and Sublimity.

The Friesian theory of "Ahnung" is often combined with Schelling's ideas of symbolism, to which reference has already been made, and so is readily applied to the Gospel story, which offers numerous points of contact, with the object of giving a "higher truth" to the miraculous and legendary elements in the story. To-day these attempts would make no appeal, and fortunately so. But discussions such as the follow-

¹ Note in this connection the striking description of a genuine "life in God" which Theodore experiences on the field of battle (*Theod.*, I, p. 402). "He often experienced sacred moments of contemplation, when truth, the highest values in life, the true nature of things, the highest aim in all human endeavour, had been revealed in the pure light of a higher world. Now everything combined in the vivid and sublime thought of the Father in Heaven. It was a kind of unconscious rapture that enfolded him, or, better expressed, a state of higher consciousness. And when in unspoken sighs his heart had been freed from its oppression, and he came to himself, he was filled with the most blissful feeling he had ever experienced. Thanks to Thee, O Eternal Father, that Thou hast granted it to me to find Thee again!"

ing are of importance, and are all the more likely to maintain their importance if we leave Schelling out of sight and take our stand on Fries' theory of "Ahnung", a theory in itself lucid and capable of psychological justification, which may well lead the thinker to greater depths, more fertile fields of speculation, than those which the philosopher himself took as the sphere of his theory. In one passage Theodore criticises the Rationalists for viewing Christ "as a mere man". They neglect this, that in the limited temporal phenomenon of Christ's life something unlimited, something eternal, is intuitively perceived; in other words, that in the picture of Christ "there *remains* something that understanding fails to grasp and action fails to reach, something that can be comprehended by feeling alone". To obtain a full comprehension of Christ in his true perfection and sublimity He must be regarded not merely as an object of knowledge or of eager imitation, but as an object of feeling (in De Wette's language an "æsthetic symbol", see p. 234). This is a just and searching observation, and indicates a way of escape from the superficial rationalistic interpretation of the Person of Christ,¹ and admits the sentiment of pious reverence for Him, without falling back on a maze of supernaturalist speculation. The views here set forth will derive additional point from a consideration of the death of Christ; De Wette applies them in the same way later on in his *Dogmatic Theology*. The sufferings of an innocent, good, and just man have from the time of Job onwards exercised the most potent influence on religious feeling;

¹ . . . and of all that is great, profound, and mysterious in human beings and in historical events, speaking generally, as is self-evident from De Wette's position. For he does not endeavour to isolate the phenomenon of Christ from the phenomena of history in general, as the supernaturalists aimed at doing. A process that has its analogy elsewhere, the manifestation of the Eternal in the phenomenon as presented to the feeling through "Ahnung", is to reach its highest level in this Person of Christ, and its attainment of this is once more a judgment of the religious feeling, which as such possesses no claim to appear in a presentation and investigation that are wholly a matter of historical science.

on the one hand they have led the understanding to all its futile attempts at justifying the ways of God to man, while they have revealed to religious feeling those obscurely comprehended ideas (Ahnungen) so astonishingly deep, which find classic expression for all time in Isaiah liii, the profoundest thing ever produced by the Old Covenant. In contemplating these sufferings of the innocent, voluntarily endured in obedience to the Eternal Will, it is clear in fact that, in De Wette's words, "there remains something that understanding fails to grasp and action fails to reach, something that can be comprehended by feeling alone"; something that cannot be theoretically conceived, that can only be presented as in Isaiah liii, as a psalm. Analogies to the theme of this chapter of Isaiah are to be found everywhere in history. Suffering, death, destruction, when borne of free will, always give rise to feelings, "Ahnungen", which find expression in ideas and images quite similar to those of Isaiah liii ("Sacrificial death", "Atonement", "The Curse removed, the Debt redeemed"), a proof that what is here at work is no mere accidental thing, but something universal and necessary. Hence the meaning of the death on Calvary which no Rationalism can explain away; hence its impressiveness for every devout mind that makes a genuine and open surrender to it. This is the most cherished, the holiest possession of Christian piety, and the protest raised by orthodox theology against its rationalisation is absolutely right and necessary; the theologians are badly at fault in this only, that they endeavour to construct a *theory* from materials that cannot be expressed in words. (The Cross of Christ is an object for the altar and the deathbed, for tribulation and alienation from God; not in any way a subject for scholarly reflection. At this point doctrinal theology becomes of no account, as could best be shown by reference to the ever-growing pile of new "theories of the Atonement". The problem here attached is *from first principles* insoluble, and consequently is wholly impossible as a problem. This becomes

clear at once, when the real nature of "Ahnung" has been grasped. And "Ahnung" makes it clear—and this is more important still—that Truth can be experienced without the presence of a concept.)

16. It is in full accord with the inward freedom and independence of this representative of a theology that was renewing its youth, that De Wette, in the character of his Theodore, recognises the existence of certain religious impulses and mental attitudes, which he occasionally permits to emerge in his own case; these impulses and attitudes are probably present in all of us as an undercurrent, moving beneath that specifically Christian piety which is determined by relation to an absolutely transcendent God; and they cannot forthwith be reconciled and assimilated to these last, in spite of the frequent assertion of the contrary, an easy and convenient way out. During a tour in Switzerland these sentiments come before him—and who, indeed, could escape them?—as he contemplates the magnificence, the sublimity, and the beauty of the great universal life of Nature; and his mood now and then, as is generally the case, shows an inclination to Pantheism. He then attempts in a measure to apply the Christian doctrine of the Trinity (now as the "Logos" immanent in the world, now as the "Spirit" of God; alternatively in fancy and in earnest) in the hope of assimilating these æsthetic, non-ethical ("sub-ethical") religious feelings with those of the high-level Christian-ethical kind. (And who would not have made the same attempt? It has the appearance of profundity, and many thinkers have considered it worth while. Perhaps, after all, it is just a scholarly theological diversion about irreconcilable things.)

XIII

DE WETTE'S DOCTRINAL THEOLOGY

1. Character. 2. View of History. 3. Herder. Inspiration. 4. Perception of the Teleology of History through "Ahnung". 5. Sketch of Biblical History. 6. "Value of its Teaching". 7. Method: (a) Foundation of Doctrinal Theology in the Philosophy of Religion; (b) Philosophy and Theology. 8. Theology. 9. The Philosophy of Religion considered in Detail. (a) Fundamental Conceptions; (b) Importance of Religion in the Spiritual Life; (c) Religion made Real in Community and History (Revelation); (d) Dogma, (e) Principle of the Individual Formation of Religion in History, (f) Principle of Unity in Development; (g) Fusion of Religion and Metaphysics.

1. In 1813 De Wette published the first edition of his *Text-Book of Christian Doctrine*. It went through several editions. (The second edition of 1818 is dedicated to Dr. Schleiermacher.) It presents the generally received teaching on Bible and Church "in its historical development", with a critical commentary and a search for "accuracy"; side by side in it are found, without clear discrimination, "Biblical Theology", sections on the History of Religion, the History of Doctrine, the shaping of the author's own teaching, in combination with "Religious Anthropology" (the Psychology and Philosophy of Religion). This book is, in fact, the pioneer work of the new direction which theology was then beginning to take; of modern theology in general; not that it has a determining influence on the development that followed, but it presents for the first time, and in typical fashion, the new intellectual position, with its new and potent forces. Eight years before the appearance of Schleiermacher's *Glaubenslehre* it sets out a plan, a rough and disjointed outline perhaps, of the theology which now is to assume the character of a Science of Religion. Here we have everything in confused juxtaposition; later, as is natural, the separate branches of the subject receive individual treatment.

2. To understand the new teaching as it assumes definite form it is first of all necessary to appreciate the historical picture, the type of historical conception which, explicit or implicit, vague or precise, is seen to underly it. The newer generation, represented by De Wette and Schleiermacher, are particularly at variance with the philosophy of the "Aufklärung", the object of their especial criticism in this point, in their conception of history. This difference of opinion is sometimes called a "return to a deeper comprehension of the historical". The expression is far from correct. In no sense was there a return to an earlier view, for historical observation was altogether non-existent until the special historic sense began to emerge in the "Aufklärung" under the form of Pragmatism. And, moreover, the new activities of this school are merely a continuation of what the "Aufklärung" had begun, i.e. an attempt to reach a really historical understanding. And the scorn with which the Romanticists in particular are accustomed to criticise the historic method of previous schools is cheap and in many senses unfair, for there is a Pragmatism in History *also*, and the other solutions, which up to then were applied to "priestly trickery, religion as a means of influencing the masses, etc.", were offered only too obviously by the particular history of the age. Really, however, a higher stage had been attained. A wider and deeper comprehension of the mechanism of history had been reached; and after the essential pioneering work had been accomplished by the generation immediately preceding, in its occupation with subtler and more searching problems in the realm of art and general literature and poetry, a greater sensitiveness, a more inward penetration was now shown in the handling of the history of religion, with its particular qualities, its delicate questions, its immense intricacies; and the heavy and rigid conceptions of the "natural history of religion", generally determined by subjective dislike, had begun to disappear. In addition to this, a newer and more

precise method of investigating original authorities had been attained by the previous work of classical scholars; in this branch De Wette himself had, in his criticism of the History of Israel, achieved brilliant results, although a novice.

3. Behind the conception of the History of Religion as held by De Wette and Schleiermacher, and by the new epoch in philosophy then beginning, there stands first of all the "Aufklärung", with its quite consistent attempt to bring biblical history into relation with the general history of religion. And next comes Herder, with his depth of vision. Herder,¹ whose judgment, already shaped by the study of the popular poetry of all ages and all countries, led him to a deeper and truer understanding for the interpretation of the history of religion in its creations, and made it possible

¹ De Wette himself, in his *Über Religion und Theologie*, p. 67, mentions the philosopher whom, next to Fries, he found to be most suggestive. He has been speaking on that newer and profounder conception of religion, which, after Rationalism and the Kantian moralisation of religion, began to emerge as a freshly stimulating and liberating influence. He goes on to point out to whom this spirit in his age can chiefly be traced. "Under this form, as the experience of God in the temple of nature and in the epic of history, Religion is also once more presented to us, after an age of doubt had seemed utterly to repudiate it; and it has been made clear to us that we possessed Religion when we thought we had lost it. It is the great merit of Herder that beyond all others he aroused once more within us the sense for this type of observation, for his intellect, being the intellect of a genius, was able to receive all greatness and all beauty in every age and in every nation; he had an equal love for the poetically creative spirit of the Hebrews and of the Greeks, of North and South, for the natural beauty of simple folk-poetry and of the lofty ideals of classic art; with that true humanity to which nothing is foreign he took as his subject the history of the development of human civilisation and in it he taught us how to behold the epic of God. He showed us the path and the circle grew wider. . . . In these strivings, often misunderstood, often misdirected, the German nation stands out as the most religious of all nations. The thought that this way of looking at things, especially at history, was itself religion, is one of the most felicitous ideas in those *Discourses on Religion* which have contributed so much to the recognition of religion amongst us, to make us feel that we were not quite so much estranged from religion as we believed, and that we were learning how to become reconciled to it. It was a free and natural religion that was presented to us in a more vivid and generous form than what had hitherto passed for religion; it made an appeal to feeling and imagination and was lifted above the ordinary vision of things. This religious outlook on the universe, comprehended in feeling with no intermediate stage, constitutes the true life of religion.

for him to rise above the utterly muddle-headed controversy, "natural" versus "supernatural". In popular poetry, and, in fact, in the whole of poetry, Herder saw a creation that urges upwards from the secret and mysterious depths of the soul, a creation of the unconscious, the unwilled, and the uninvented; an inspiration that springs from the profound regions of the spirit, under divine influence, a complete analogy in its own sphere to that which in the realm of religion is "Grace" and "the Spirit that bloweth where it listeth, and thou canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth". This inevitably led to an understanding of the various forms that are presented by the history of religion, utterly different from the unimaginative ideas of the past age. And Herder's own work, *Vom Geist der hebräischen Poesie*, was the first intelligent attempt in this direction. Myth, legend, sacred saga, and the specifically religious account of historic fact now acquire a new weight and meaning, whereas they had for a long time since either been passed over with a gesture of contempt, or reduced to empty fables of an uncultured age, or dismissed in summary fashion as clerical trickery, that favourite verdict. Not Beauty alone, but Truth, is to be found in them, and therefore Revelation, a revelation of eternal truth by means of Feeling, that works through "Ahnung" in earthly analogies. Herder's teaching found a more secure foundation for De Wette in the anthropology of Fries and in his doctrine of religious "symbolism", according to which myth, ritual, and forms of worship are modes of expressing religious feeling. To this was added the belief in spirit and the power of spirit in general, which those philosophers derived from the "Aufklärung", and especially from the epoch of lofty Humanitarianism now closed (which in Germany made such a pitiful surrender to the gradual invasion of French Positivism and Materialism). The mind was really and truly held to be *capax infiniti*, and consequently an escape was found from the struggle between Supernaturalism and

Naturalism. This dispute lost its interest for religion. It is religion's business to listen to God and to make certain that it is God Himself. How this is effected; whether the spirit is brought into the relationship of the deepest life of man by isolated bursts from the supernatural sphere, or whether it is already in position, deep down in the reasoning mind, from which it emerges in might when its time has come—this is a problem of interest for metaphysics and anthropology, but for religion devoid of importance.¹

4. Finally, there is a third idea in the background. And that is the conviction, progressing from Lessing to Herder, to the Romanticists, a purely ideal conviction, that history itself is a teleological process. This idea is expressed in more or less imaginative form; it reaches its height of imagination in the Romantic philosophy, which looks on history as the gradual coming of God to Himself; it is more soberly expressed in the view that history is the account of the development of the human mind, the maturing and evolving process of its own particular implanted treasure, and that this development proceeds in accordance with divine necessity and under divine providence. (Thus history as a whole becomes a process of revelation, as was discussed in B., Chapter X, Section 7, "The divine government of the world made known to us by 'Ahnung'").²

The starting-point in this evolution was not conceived as a state of utter brutality and savagery, as in the current

¹ If in the theology of a later period this view tends once more to be wrapped in obscurity, the reason is to be looked for in: (1) the disappearance of a thorough training in philosophy and anthropology, which is to be observed in the following age in theology as well as in general intellectual life, (2) the easy-going and unprecise fashion in which those later theologians and their followers adapted themselves to the old supernaturalist terminology and to the so-called "theology of the community"; a criticism to which Schleiermacher also is open, which is responsible for the peculiarly unstable position of the whole "theology of reconciliation."

² Schleiermacher gradually arrives at this less complicated view after he had at first shown in the *Discourses* an eagerness to follow a more imaginative course of thought. (Cp. Otto's ed. pp. 63-4.)

anthropology, determined as it is by the doctrine of Natural Selection; it lay rather in undeveloped simplicity; as an analogy for the origins of the human kind it adopted, not the conditions of life obtaining in Tierra del Fuego and among the most degenerate races to be found, not the manners and customs of gorillas and baboons, but the state of childhood and non-developed intellectual life, just as they are found in our midst to-day.¹

5. In his critical researches on the History of Israel, De Wette had laid the foundation for a real history of Israel and its religion. There was still a long way to go to a real comprehension, to Wellhausen, to Duhm's *Theology of the Prophets*, to Smend's *History of Religion*. Especially was there a total lack of any firm grasp of the significance of Prophecy, and consequently of the source and nature of the real religious content of the Old Testament religion. The crude hypotheses of the "Aufklärung" are still operating. Moses "introduces Monotheism",² which he had presumably borrowed from the more profound thought of the Egyptians. He combined it with the cult of Jehovah, who since the days of Abraham had been worshipped as a tribal god. To this he added the religious "symbolism" of Theocracy, the central point of "Hebraism". Law, ritual, public order are only partially to be ascribed to him; they, like Messianism, are a later development. The "æsthetic content", i.e. the religious feelings which find expression, are the invariable object of search in concluding chapters, and are determined according to the three funda-

¹ And in this they were nearer to the truth than those biologists and writers on the history of religion who try to depict the "primitive" according to current theory. For even in the evolutionary theory there is no compulsion to assume that the first stage must be as brutal and savage as possible; in which case it would really be not at all obvious how roses could ever develop from such thorns; it only insists on something undeveloped, something still latent. And a consideration of sub-human life points in the same direction, for there we have traces, not merely of the savage and the "bestial", but to perhaps a far greater extent of the "latent mind".

² It was possible to think of a religion as owing its origin to "introduction" in an age when religions were actually "introduced" by governments.

mental religious feelings as established by Fries. Judaism develops from Hebraism after the Exile, through contact with Parseeism (the "Oriental philosophy"). Now the doctrine of the Messiah with its eschatological content reaches completion, and the ideas of demons, the soul, and the beyond are formed in their New Testament shape. De Wette had already discovered in the account of paradise and in the genealogies a transference of foreign legendary material. In his explanation of Judaism as influenced by Parseeism he relies on Herder's hypotheses, which themselves go back to Perron d'Anquetil's translations. Judaism evolves in two types, the Philonian and the Palestinian, both of which become important for the development of Christianity. The intrinsic worth of the Old Testament religion is centred in Hebraism, already determined in its essentials by Moses, and defended by the prophets against an exuberant priestly caste, against clericalism, and the contamination of its ideal features. . . . In this first outline of his Theology the historical picture of the New Testament is extraordinarily clumsy and awkward. In this it is akin to Schleiermacher's; with much toil, and without ever reaching complete success, they labour on towards a more lifelike picture. The picture of Christ is drawn after the Gospel of John in essential features; this Gospel, accepted in parts with surprising adherence to the letter of the text and in parts interpreted in a new sense, is taken as the authentic source of history, or at least as being relatively the soundest. As in John, nothing is mentioned as to Christ's birth and childhood, which are taken as legendary. Acknowledged as the Messiah by the Baptist in baptism, Jesus appears as making this claim at the outset, but in a spiritual sense. Miracles are expected: miracles happen because they are expected. Death is necessary for the accomplishment of the spiritual view of Christ's Messiahship. "Unexpectedly for the disciples and himself, the Cross did not involve death. Some real event must have happened. The testimony is too firmly

established to admit the contrary." What did happen? Here there is silence. At first the hypothesis of a trance is clearly present in the background. This is also the case in Schleiermacher. Later there is no ordinary trance; that spiritual power through which Jesus worked miracles on the sick, on the dying, perhaps even on the dead, is now especially effective in his own person. Or there was something else, which as time goes on becomes less and less clearly expressed, something in which the only thing still clear is the effort to remain as near as possible to the scriptural conviction and method of expression. Pentecost and the Conversion of Paul are "told as myths".

6. So far we have the historical framework and no more. What is the "Value of the Teaching"? It is first of all necessary to observe at this point that this exceedingly controversial question as to the "value of the teaching" is for De Wette the standpoint from which he writes his *Theology of the Old and New Testaments*. The traditional orthodox treatment of the subject, scrupulously followed by the old-fashioned Rationalists, is here continued, and the supreme purport of the history of the Old and New Testaments is seen in their teaching.

7. The work is preceded by an Introduction, which deals with nothing but the philosophy of religion, and reappears with material extensions in the book *Theology and Religion*, designed as a complement. To arrive at an understanding of religion in its history, the aim of the succeeding part, it is first of all necessary, as the author says, to know what religion is; otherwise no comprehension of it would be possible, no elimination of strange factors, no testing of its purity and validity. Such a conception of religion can only be contained from anthropological methods. And the first part of the book is devoted to this task. The matter presented is Fries' philosophy of religion right through. De Wette says expressly in his preface that "he can only count on the approval of such

as have followed the rigorous and penetrating investigations of the philosopher he had chosen as his leader—Fries". These investigations we have followed, and no discussion of this part is necessary. There we have a general determination of the essential nature of religion, of the psychic faculties from which it proceeds, of the foundations on which its peculiar means of conviction are based, of the standards by which we form our judgments in religious matters.

(b) It is now of interest to observe how De Wette goes on to define the relation of philosophy and theology. He shows clearly that theology must be preceded by a philosophy combined with anthropology; and this has been a long-established principle in theology.¹ And also at the present day it is winning more and more recognition, both from right-wing and left-wing theologians. Then the importance and appreciation of this philosophy may increase in such a manner as to jeopardise theology itself, i.e. by making it impossible clearly to define its relation to philosophy, or, indeed, by seeming to effect a total eclipse of theology as compared with the philosophy of religion. The latter point seems especially near when the philosophy is so rich in content as that of Fries; it might then seem as if the task of theology has already been performed. The religious philosophy of the "Aufklärung" did not aim at being a mere preliminary training, an introduction, to a doctrine of religion which should follow; it claimed to be the doctrine itself. The belief was held that it was possible to construct a religion in itself, partly by comparison, partly by rational speculation, i.e. the "natural religion", which was to be something beyond a canon and a standard; it was to be religion itself which appeared in the "positive", i.e. the historic religions, and in Christianity, but under a disguise. And the real object of the historical treatment of religion was only this: to demonstrate

¹ In Schleiermacher in the well-known form of his "Lemmata" at the beginning of his *Theory of Faith*.

how the natural religion occurred in the individual religion in greater or less extent, in pure or contaminated form. It cannot be disputed that in the first outline of De Wette's theology the question approximately assumes this shape. The conception of religion, anthropologically discovered, which he here offers as a preliminary, is far more suggestive and comprehensive than the "natural religion" of that bygone age. But the relation of philosophy and the history of religion with the theology which is to be established on foundations given by the history of religion, especially by the scriptural record, is, after all, very much like the old idea of their relation. That, however, would seem to be a very surprising state of things, and would be accepted by philosophy with suspicion. For here philosophy would be deemed capable of performing what is nowhere else demanded from it. In general, philosophy is held to be the science of first principles; it therefore precedes each individual science, since it determines its highest and most general part, its basic conceptions and starting-points; but never is it at the same time the individual science itself, which is subject to these principles and shapes itself quite independently. Natural philosophy is not the same as natural science; it is something entirely different. The philosophy of history can only give the highest conceptions with which history goes to work; it produces no single item of historical knowledge in itself. Moral Philosophy elaborates the general ideas of goodness and beauty; but what in itself is individually good and beautiful can only be known by inward experience. In this way it is already possible to form a preliminary notion of the true relation. There must be a philosophy which shall present those supreme concepts, wholly abstract concepts, as we have already observed, such as eternity, the antithesis of existence in the world and existence beyond the world, that series of ideas which are necessary and effective in all religion, and without which religion would have to grope along in obscure feelings with no clear view,

with no sure defence when it comes to the test. Next must come a demonstration of the deeper-lying faculties and their just claims (of their limitations as well), which in the first instance make any religious experience possible. The multiplicity of phenomena, however, which is to be subordinated to these principles, in themselves quite lacking in content, can, once more, not be presented by philosophy; it can be presented by experience alone; and that, not by the experience of the individual, but by "a broader experience", and that is history; not by the experience of the average man, but by the experience of men God-gifted and sent of God, the leaders and the ambassadors, those men who gather us up "into the might and rapture of their consciousness of God" and give us what is not ours. So the exposition of these matters will be the science of religion; and such is the duty of theology to-day. In contrast to theology, a mere philosophy of religion will be just as inadequate as moral philosophy when compared with a system of ethics displayed with living force.

The first edition of De Wette's book in this respect marks but a slight advance on the theology of the "Aufklärung". It falls into the same error; it still regards the evolution of biblical religion as the "introduction to the religion of Reason", and so it handles the Old Testament with pedantic criticism, the Gospel of Jesus Christ eulogistically indeed, but with grave misgivings; but the best thing of all, the particular and individual spirit in the prophets and the gospel, remains in deep obscurity. If the "introduction" were the main thing, then Plato's *Timæus* would have more value for religion than Isaiah. For undoubtedly its conceptions are much "purer". Plato does not imagine God as Jehovah, nor as seated on a throne, nor as encompassed by angelic beings in the guise of serpents. And yet we could easily do without the *Timæus*; Isaiah vi we could not surrender. Why not? May we not find here a signal indication of the mystery in the relation of philosophy and theology?

In De Wette the biblical theology of the New Testament marks a great advance on the average rationalistic thought, inasmuch as it aims at a purely historical understanding and does not distort the writings to suit the dogmatic theology of the period, as was the case with the orthodox as well as the rationalist theologians. But on this point he is not clear; that the importance of these scriptures does not lie in their agreement with the "Ideas", nor in their teaching ideal convictions (which are not in any way *taught* and *introduced* in them; they are *assumed* and appealed to as being absolutely self-evident). The importance of Jesus is not that he *teaches* faith in God; it lies in the fact that he has experience of God and fellowship with God, that he founds this experience and fellowship, and in so doing gives a meaning to the relation with God which would otherwise be totally absent in this particular way. And the dogmatic theology of Paul, whose philosophic tinge De Wette feels it necessary to praise, is abstruse; but the non-dogmatic part of him, the purely experimental, his "blessedness through grace", we cannot surrender; no religious philosophy can give it in the way of deduction.

"In dogmatic theology, by which is here understood a scholarly compilation of the whole doctrine of the Christian faith, under the guidance of philosophy, there are three main points: (1) the historical conception of the doctrine of the Christian faith; (2) the methodical treatment and co-ordination of this historical matter; (3) philosophical criticism, or the tracing back of these ideas to the universal laws of human nature." In this way De Wette at the beginning of Part II prescribes the task of Dogmatic Theology. And of such a nature does he conceive to himself the relation of theology and philosophy. The first duty of theology as a purely historical branch of learning is to present the doctrine of the Christian faith as it has grown in history and is given by history. Then philosophical criticism is to step in and

determine if the doctrine is valid, and how far it is valid. This is to be accomplished by a "Tracing back" to universal laws of human nature, i.e. to anthropology. This is an important definition, and after the elimination of errors it does really with fair accuracy represent the programme of theology's task, the outline of the relation of theology, as a system of religious instruction, to the philosophy of religion. It cannot be the task of religion to begin by producing the "right religion" from its own head, then to examine historical religions and discover which of them are in full agreement with it, and which in partial agreement only, and finally to attempt to readjust the system in which one has grown up, so that it will be as far as possible adapted to the "right". No; we must begin with the concrete reality as given in history. Therefore Point 1 of the programme is in the right direction, but needs supplementing. For the "doctrine of faith" is at any rate only a part, and by no means, in fact, the main part, in the real content of the Christian religion. The essential thing now is an examination, at once profound and extensive, of that religion, a similar scrutinising of what is like and related to it, and a comprehension of Christianity in its relations with religion in general. Criticism will step in at the same time, and will begin to distinguish the essential from the accidental, the eternal from the transient. But from another side philosophical anthropology will meet the task. Its work may be quite well defined as "tracing back to general laws of human nature", provided that these words are not taken as implying the resolution of what is conceived in historical form into something to be interpreted a priori and by way of reasoning, a method the least fruitful of all when applied to the subtlest and profoundest things in religion; provided that they do imply an investigation of the powers of the human spirit which enable it to attain religion and religious certainty, an investigation of the spiritual sources of these things, a search for the hidden standards by which

we judge in religious things, by which we estimate the degree of value, by which we establish the fact of validity, and which determine our acceptance or rejection. Something of this kind must be accomplished, consciously or obscurely, as soon as the attempt is made to traverse the disordered realm of the general history of religion; otherwise it will be a guideless venture into a limitless waste.

8. De Wette's treatment of theology in the following section of the work leaves much to be desired. In a very scanty epitome he repeats the scholastic Lutheran system of the academies—if he had only tried to get a live grasp of Luther's Christianity itself, and used it as the basis of his criticism!—and, precisely as before in his *Theodore* with the doctrine of justification, so here he laboriously examines the single points of a system that is really strange to him, seeks to extract from them "a good sense", without really approaching the centre of all, from which everything first has its significance, the Church's stupendous doctrine of Grace. It is therefore scarcely worth while to dwell on his detailed attempts at conciliation, on his teaching, concerning Scripture, Inspiration, the Trinity, the personality and work of Christ, numerous as the single good points may be.—In the edition of 1818 there is an essential advance. If the first stood closer to the type of rationalistic dogmatism, this second edition, and the third, quite similar to it, are typical for the new theology of conciliation (*Das Wesen des christlichen Glaubens vom Standpunkte des Glaubens*, appearing in 1846, shows the closest approach). Here, too, it must be admitted that there is no real historical grasp of the Old Testament prophetic religion, and consequently no deeper understanding of it. Nothing is given beyond the preliminary rough outline, and that inadequate; there are still clear traces of the old dislike of the Old Testament entertained by the "Aufklärung" philosophers, who struggled hard to recognise in the actions and opinions of Jacob and David some example for future

ages. (Schleiermacher, too, failed to gain an intimate understanding of the Old Testament; which is, indeed, only possible if it is spiritualised in the manner of tradition or if a historical comprehension of Yahwism and prophecy has been reached; and in that age such a comprehension was far distant.) But the conception of the Christian religion, of the New Testament, of ecclesiastical doctrine, obtains now a meaning of its own; it becomes rich and vivid. That certainly gives no really energetic impulse to the development of an independent theory which should promise a fruitful future. For, it must once more be observed, there was no real and peculiar centre-point in De Wette's theory; and, again, the historical basis was the same as before, the fourth Gospel; and the unspoken aim was the maximum of adaptation to the "doctrines of the Church", to the orthodox theology, for which object De Wette soon exploits to an unjustifiable degree the Friesian doctrine of "Ahnung" and "æsthetic-symbolic meaning". There is much greater wealth of matter in the introduction on the philosophy of religion, which, in its comprehensiveness, method and helpfulness is superior to the "Lehnsätze" (Lemmata) with which Schleiermacher prefaces his Theory of Faith. Here was given a germ, which might well have lived and increased, if the systematic theologians of the next period were anxious to maintain a scientific standard. But the capacity for that scrupulous, steady, firmly conceived working-out and handling of problems, inherited from the "Aufklärung", with its mathematical training of the intellect, for the subtle analysis which Kant had applied in his Criticisms, had ceased to exist; and with it had disappeared that real quickness of intellect which is displayed, not in "happy thoughts", but in a true and single grasp of the problem that is at the root of the matter, and in the ability to discover "methods" for its solution. Thus little progress was made. The distinguishing features of the development that followed are these: eclecticism, vacillating methods, attempts to combine different types

of thought, much ado about natural and supernatural, far-reaching general culture, with no sound foundation in philosophy; and, on the other side, the scholarly game which sought to build a system of theology out of the subject-matter of parochial sermons, to assume pontifical airs with an obscurely impressive terminology, or most ingeniously to deduce the small details of the orthodox theology, the wild dreams of Schelling's cosmogony (down to his cosmic ashes) from the "new-born consciousness". It is not a matter of wonder that Ritschl, with his stern intellectual concentration, dissociated himself emphatically from this method of handling the subject, and with a strong and single resolve towards unity, clarity, and definiteness built up a doctrine which certainly possesses value rather as being the enlivening and stimulating utterance of an essentially religious nature than as an exposition of the true nature of the Christian religion, or of religion in general, established in accordance with scientific methods and standards; nor is it a matter of surprise that, on the other hand, there was a general and uncere- monious return to the ancestral home, a willingness to be content with summaries, abounding indeed in extracts from the old masters, where the original matter, although in large type, is as thin as possible both in extent and content—justly so, for all the authors have to say is much better said in the old books.

9. (a) De Wette further worked out the philosophy of religion contained in his *Dogmatic Theology* by means of the two books, *Über Religion und Philosophie*, 1815, 1821, and *Über die Religion, ihr Wesen, ihre Erscheinungsformen, u. ihren Einfluss auf das Leben*" (Religion, its real Nature, the Forms of its Phenomena, and its Importance for Life), 1827. The former work deserved a new edition. In a fresh, breezy, and generally popular style, he begins by explaining the idea and real nature of religion; in this he follows Fries or assimilates his teaching with enthusiasm. Over the whole work

one discerns the free and independent spirit which De Wette never lost; this gives it the stamp of virility. And the new churchmanship of these men was not a new prostration before an ancient tyrant; it proceeded from love unconstrained, and therefore there is ever present in it the spirit of liberty. "If *Gotze* is destined yet to prevail over *Lessing*, then we may abandon the dream of human progress, we are fated to revolve in a circle, and it would be better to stand still where we are." There are three types of human conviction: through knowledge, through faith, through feeling ("Ahnung", which expressed in the æsthetic judgment). In logical sequence is developed the theory of the world of knowledge, which excludes supernaturalism from the world of phenomena. And in this connection there is not the least sign of loose thought. —The ideas of faith, in themselves cold and formal, receive their content, and thus produce religion, through the practical side of the intellect and through religious feeling. Here religion begins to live indeed, and to *experience* the world of faith. "Only in feeling, according to the law of 'Ahnung', that the eternal is manifested in the temporal, can we bring things into order under the religious ideas." "A judgment of the feeling, or an æsthetic judgment, is one which subordinates the particular to a rule that cannot be expressed in concept-form, as contrasted with the *understanding* judgment, which is carried out in accordance with a definite rule" (*Dogm.*, p. 17). As in the case of Fries before him, so De Wette is reproached for an attempt to "æstheticise" religion on the strength of this definition. This is an almost comic misrepresentation. For in this instance "æsthetic" implies nothing more than a contrast to "logical", and is used to define a kind of judgment opposed to the logical judgment, and depending in general on feeling, i.e. a judgment which is not effected by subordination to concepts. If the term "judgment of feeling" is always used, clearness is always attained. The characteristic of such a judgment is this: that

it is incapable of proof or of logical conviction; it proceeds without any proof "freely"; the conviction depends on a demand from within. Nor, indeed, is there any doubt that all religious judgments are like this.—The three essential forms of religious feeling are the mood of "enthusiasm", that of pious exaltation, humility, and submission, and, finally, that of reverence and adoration, in which "we seek to grasp the divination of holy omnipotence and the Spirit of God in the real nature of things, to discover the traces of divine government in the universe, to listen to the voice of God within us". The latter is the principle of revelation in history; all three together are undoubtedly a far more suggestive and a truer exposition of the religious feeling than Schleiermacher's "absolute dependence", which is included under the third form; in itself it is a deeper conception.

(b) For an understanding of the real nature of religion it is essential to have a clear vision of what is really to be done with it, of its importance for our spiritual life. This question afterwards becomes an actual starting-point for the methodical investigation of the real nature of religion. In the first of Schleiermacher's Discourses it is proposed and answered in these terms: religion is necessary as the supreme and ultimate guiding force of humanity. If the question is taken as correct, it is bound to be asked at the outset of any research into the real nature of religion; it is bound to determine the whole method. De Wette introduces the question in the conclusion, in Section 33, and discusses it at greater length, with greater eloquence and charm, in *Religion and Theology*, pp. 50 *sqq.*: "The value of religion is this: on the side of knowledge it offers humanity a solution of the riddle of existence; on the side of action, in face of the restless impulses of the world of sensation, it offers a liberty and a calm in action through the deep and sacred feeling of love that it cherishes, and through its manifestation by means of 'Ahnung', amid the chaos of earthly aims, of the eternal purpose which a man

now seeks to serve in these earthly aims, and in general through its offer of eternal consolation against destiny, tribulation, and failure." These are characterisations borrowed without method from the language of piety, and the whole is, in the first instance, only a passing comment. And yet it seizes on the cardinal point of all religious research.

(c) The foundations of religion have been determined: how, then, does it become real? In the religious community. This addition is made in the second edition of the *Dogmatic Theology*. Here we become aware of the turn given to Theodore by "Härtling" in the novel, which, in the first edition, is very little in evidence. The ideas and feelings which emerge in the individual are passed on, become common property, create a community, in which these ideas and feelings are stored up, bequeathed to posterity, and continually increased. And thus is formed an association, in which religion can develop historically, can assume shape, in which there is now also scope and sphere of action for the emergence of individuals of supreme distinction, in whom the disposition for religion is manifested in an ever-increasing degree, so that new forms are created and new heights are reached. Every true religious idea that rises from these profundities into the mediate world of language and symbolism can be called a Revelation, since it proceeds from the immediate (inward revelation), and since such emergence would be impossible without the spirit of God in Reason, which acts as a guide in the capricious ways of observation and imitation, and secures from error, and would be, moreover, impossible without the feeling of dependence on something higher. In this it is possible to imagine a gradation. But that revelation which holds up before a man the most perfect picture of the divine that is within himself, and gives him the clearest consciousness of himself, will be capable of recognition by all who are prepared by a certain preliminary training, and will find acceptance as the ultimate and final one. In this revelation the divine understanding

(Logos) will have come down among the race of men, since human understanding is carried to free and independent development. Henceforth the Spirit of God will rule in man, to interpret this revelation to him, and to join it with his inward revelation; but messengers of God will no longer appear on earth. In this way Supernaturalism, which really stands for the correct view, the ideal view of feeling that has faith, becomes united to Naturalism, which aims at a natural view of religion, purely historical and given by the understanding, to combine into Rationalism, to which school in this deeper meaning De Wette definitely acknowledges his adherence. If Revelation is opposed to Reason, if the divine element in Reason is denied, if the fallibility of the Understanding is ascribed to Reason, which can do no wrong—then the cause must be looked for in a lack of inward comprehension as to the nature of the human spirit. Reason is admitted to be the pure and unerring perception of eternal truth itself; it cannot be deceived. Only when its immediate and actual knowledge is received into the consciousness through the understanding, the fallible understanding, the “work of man” comes into being, as opposed to the work of God. Thus also originate in the evolution of mankind, as the pure currents in the feeling of religious truth become contaminated, the pollutions, grotesque distortions, caricatures that appear in the histories of religion and ritual, ἐβελοθησκεία, “will-worship”, the parody of religion in paganism and superstition.—It is evident that De Wette is very far indeed from the easy-going motto, which is also applied in the making of the history of religion: “*omnia humana et divina omnia*”. And his philosophy of religion gave him the useful possibility of holding fast to the right idea in the old doctrine of revelation; the absolute divine standard, utterly superior to the currents of human opinion, and unaffected by the relativities of “Evolution”.

(d) “Dogmas” originate in a religious community, as reli-

gious ideas are conceived as matters for instruction and communication. Strictly speaking, they can only be "negative", since all that is positive is comprehended only in the feeling, which is incapable of adequate expression. Religious feeling comes to expression in images (son, father, children, kingdom of God, God as the lord of the tribe): the expression is thus symbolico-analogous, and therefore "floating"; again, it can only be rightly comprehended by the feeling. Its purest expression is in symbolic action, in ritual and ceremonial—which emerge of necessity in all religion—and in the poetico-artistic presentation through hymns and religious music. Here, too, is the root of myth and sacred legend. But, as the matter for instruction assumes shape, Dogma, and the expression of the feeling by analogous forms, tend to unite; the subject of teaching is subsequently handled in a way that appeals to the understanding alone, and thus the scholastic type of orthodox theology originates, which rationalistic criticism assailed, and rightly; but itself became involved in the identical error, and, from a purely intellectual conception, rejected the "ideal æsthetic content" as well as the scholastic form.

(e) The second section of *Über Religion u. Theologie* contains the transition to theology. It insists that theology shall have a philosophic spirit, and shows very convincingly the special merit of the Friesian philosophy as applied to theology. The author points out with lucidity that the gnostic doctrine of the new-fashioned Philosophy of Identity had drained the very life from theology and had filled it with radically non-religious ideas, while employing the religious ideas as allegories for quite different contents. The Critical Philosophy, however—i.e. that of Kant and Fries—does not establish a system of religious theory and transfuse its teaching into Christianity; it does not seek to dominate Christianity; it demonstrates the principles, on the basis of which Christianity is free to develop itself. De Wette will accept no "meagre philosophical dogmatics"; he demands a particular doctrine

of Christian Faith, rich and complete. And in his exposition his settled purpose is to offer more—and his efforts meet with a large measure of success—than the rediscovery of a “natural religion” in its various historical disguises, which philosophy had already effected. Yet he cannot find a certain solution. And in truth he had not even made the problem clear to himself. On page 205 he says: “Thus there must be another and special mode of viewing the matter, and this will be founded on the *characteristic difference* in each religion.” This is *not* to say that the general and essential nature of religion has chanced to find a pure interpretation in one religion, an obscure one in another, a refined comprehension in one, a mythical handling in another. That would constitute a difference merely relative, which, moreover, is frequently the case in the history of a religion. The true individuality must lie in a principle, which may be said to constitute the very core of the religion in question. He now establishes this principle,¹ and quite justly asserts that such a principle must have an “æsthetico-ideal” content, and must lie in the realm of “Ahnung”, a position he would inevitably have reached long before in the part of his philosophy dealing with first principles. “This”, says he, “is an individual thing, and, although resting on a general foundation, must be capable of *particular* development.” Although this thought is quite precise, and its discovery is an almost necessary result of Fries’ teaching, it is practically safe to assume that in this instance De Wette is dependent on Schleiermacher. The cleverest discovery Schleiermacher made in the whole of his Discourses is the discovery of the *individual* formation of religion in history (Discourse V). This was his first signal advance on previous religious philosophy, his first actual approach to the historic fact of religion. For nothing is more clearly taught by a comparison of religions than this: the *qualitative* difference of

¹ And, what is more, as a material and formal principle. Can this distinction, which was for so long important enough to create a school, have originated here?

religions in their higher stages. There is no single thing which marks the difference between man and man so penetratingly as his religion; neither race, nor climate, nor way of life can compare with it. There is an unlikeness in a human being who conceives and has an inward experience of the Eternal Being as an omnipotent Karma urging from birth to birth, with an ever-recurring agony of the lust for life, who finds salvation in a blissful cessation of the desire for existence; and in another who has experience of it as an official of the law, auditing one's own life in a debit and credit of "good works"; and an absolute unlikeness in another, who has experience of it as the "Father of Jesus Christ", who feels that salvation is the possession of eternal love itself, and knows nothing of the deadly torment of works, of "law", and of drill in morality, because his innermost self is in harmony with the Highest, and he does right from a free impulse. And it is evident that where the individual difference is so great, the value of life, its significance and its work, i.e. the *Ethos* of the individual as well, must have a different and individual development. Thus religion confronts religion, and "natural religion" is only found where the particular spirit of a genuine religion has evaporated, and that generally in the form of a rather insipid residuum. For this fact, with which the subtler treatment in the history of comparative religion can be said to begin, the Friesian theory of "feeling" presented the best explanation conceivable. All these fundamental modes of experiencing the eternal are in fact "free judgments" of the feeling through "Ahnung", which freely constructs a "symbolic" of its own for the experience, i.e. its particular circle of ideas and terms. Where such experience has occurred, it cannot be communicated by a conviction that depends on conceptual reasoning; it can likewise only be imparted through action on the "free power of judgment"; and yet the possessor of this experience attributes to it an objective validity, as in every other "æsthetic judgment". Of this

Schleiermacher had a clear impression in the work of his novitiate. And De Wette's dependence on him as regards this point is also obvious from the fact that he defines the principle of Christianity in precisely the same terms and with precisely the same inaccuracy as Schleiermacher at the same stage, i.e. as the Principle of "Salvation". Now this is clearly inaccurate and one-sided, for this principle is *not* a peculiar possession of Christianity in its widest sense; the great religions of the East are also, one and all, at once seen to be out-and-out religions of salvation, since this tendency appears as inseparable from religion when religion emerges in more precise shape. The principle of Christianity, the uniqueness of the "spirit of Christ" and of the "being in Christ", is just as incapable as the principle of other religions of being pinned down with a hasty catchword; it is to be understood in the history of its origin and morphological development, by "feeling", like all else that is individual. To grasp this principle and to reproduce it, as well as can be done—this is Christian Theology; a task that can never be successfully carried out by scholastic systems of "dogma", while in "theories of faith" it is barely possible. Thus, in fact, there must be a science of religion in general, and a science of Christianity in particular. This science will be very precisely divided off from the philosophy of religion; although the science necessarily assumes the existence of the philosophy, and through the philosophy alone becomes capable of a more rigorously scientific attitude.

That Fries himself failed precisely to grasp this relation is not surprising. In De Wette there is more reason for surprise. The cause may well be looked for in the silent operation in his case of that old dogmatic view, which really saw in Christianity *the* religion, and in other religions nothing more than an indistinct preliminary stage, on which no really individual structure is based. The Christian believes that, taken for its spiritual content, Christianity is the absolutely highest type of religion amongst mankind. But there is

religion, and true religion, outside Christianity. And a resistance to Christianity on *religious* grounds is a possible thing, but would be impossible if Christianity were itself the lowest common denominator in which all religions are contained. And again, Christianity is in no sense simply able to assimilate every genuine religious feeling that is found in other stages—the conception is not absurd, but it would imperil the firmly outlined and unique character of Christianity. Quite the reverse; to serve the highest, it dethrones gods who are by no means “nonentities”.¹

(f) The relation of the Philosophy of Religion to the History of Religion is once again clearly set forth by De Wette himself on page 198. If the history of a subject is to be presented, one must first of all know what the subject is. It is necessary to have a conception of the matter before starting. For example, to write the history of agriculture one must know what is meant by agriculture. So it is with the history of religion. Its principle is the idea of religion, and that must be first possessed, or the history will be a haphazard wandering among events. That now is certainly the business of “anthropology”. And the example of agriculture interprets quite well the relation of the philosophy of history to the science of history. The previously formed conception of agriculture, which I must have as a starting-point and a guide,

¹ This fortunate discovery in the Discourses, as is the case with so much of the excellent matter contained in them, was not really followed up by Schleiermacher in his later work. With his later monosyllabic feeling of dependence a *principium individuationis* could only be introduced by a *tour de force* and in quite another way. And, in addition, the expression “positive”, which he reintroduces to denote the separate forms of religion in history, is incorrect. By “positive” the Rationalists understood that which derives its validity from prescription as opposed to that which derives its validity from nature and reason, in correspondence with the original sense of these words, which the Sophists in their period had expressed in *φύσει* and *θέσει*. But the principle of Schleiermacher’s so-called positive religion is in itself absolutely opposite to all prescription and to all that derives validity from authority, and is precisely *ratio* itself, which the Rationalists implied in their “natural religion”, only as far as it is also the principle of the individual.

obviously cannot help me to say what there has been in the world in the way of agriculture, what forms of agriculture may exist, how these forms are related, and what in the concrete individual case is to be considered as agriculture, i.e. which among its possible forms is the valid one. But, on this side, De Wette's application of his own example is merely tentative. All the more important is his recognition that in the history of dogma also one can discern the development of an underlying unity; by this he supersedes the pragmatism that had predominated, and the baldly descriptive, chronicle-like method in which the history of dogma had been set forth. "All history represents a unity in multiplicity, a something that is developing amid the process of development, which is persistent amid change" (p. 197). And his maxim on page 212 is difficult to beat: "The historian of dogma will have to set before him the task of a psychology of religion which shall penetrate to the inner working of religious opinions and show how they originate in the mind: an investigation which, aiming as it does at the understanding of religion as a thing in growth, not fixed for ever, presupposes a most delicate religious sense, a most intimate familiarity with the true nature of religion: and therefore, as must be granted, it is not everybody's business."

(g) We are not to follow De Wette as he presents individual dogmas, as he criticises them, and accepts them with modifications. Once in possession of the key, we can do all that quite well for ourselves. Here there are many good and true observations; there is no definite and individual central point, and consequently no strong guidance in the formation of the theory. He follows the path of orthodox theology and shows that it has an excellent sense if it is understood correctly. Nothing in all this is in harmonious completeness. But the tendency is noticeable which appears later on under the name of the "fusion of metaphysics and religion". De Wette discovers also the "good sense", i.e. the *philosophically*

useful content of many dogmas, for example, the doctrine of the Trinity or that of the Resurrection.¹

When matters of this sort find a place in the presentation of the theory of religion, the way is open for those pernicious "systems" which envelop the purely religious exposition in a dust-cloud of speculation, and end by affording far better information on the sequence of the æons than about the soul's welfare. It is certainly incorrect to say that religion is devoid of metaphysics. But the great value of the realisation that Theology *presupposes* a Philosophy is this, that it is now certain how far this philosophy must be carried. Tertullian was seriously exercised in mind by the question: To whom did the hair of a wig belong at the resurrection—to the owner of the wig or the original grower of the hair? The philosophers of his period would have laughed at this naïve metaphysic. Theirs was the better metaphysic; his the better religion. After all, it must be possible to comprehend each for itself and each in its proper place.²

¹ Without a special organ "soul" is inconceivable; this organ is the "spiritual body" of the myth.

² We may note that De Wette gave the world at a later date his views on the Nature, History, and Importance of Religion in his book *On Religion, its Real Nature, the Form of its Appearance, and its Influence on Life*, 1927. The book is written in a charming style; it is penetrating, shows a more extensive experience of history, and is helpful even to-day. Everything has become more mellow and mature; and is presented without the cumbrous methods of a text-book. Yet the principles are the same, and his book, composed late in life, *The True Nature of the Christian Faith from the standpoint of a Believer* is only interesting for the gradually progressing development of the individual theories in the more narrowly dogmatic sense.

XIV

DE WETTE'S MORAL THEORY

1. De Wette's View of the Relation of Philosophical and Christian Ethics. 2. Rectification.

In 1819 appeared De Wette's *Christian Ethics* (3 volumes; in Vol. III the History of Christian Ethics). It is dedicated to Fries in these words: "Friend, accept this dedication of a work whose scientific originality is due to yourself. . . . You pointed out for me the path of practical speculation and of the moral criticism of history. You guided me amid the biassed and erroneous opinions of the age, straight to the goal of true knowledge. You will, however, discover in this *Christian Ethics* not merely your own philosophic system of ethics, rendered into scriptural language, but an independent theological structure. That, too, you will not expect; for nobody knows better than yourself, nobody has taught with greater force, that between the laws and ideals of science and their realisation in history there is a difference; and the one-sided rationalistic view which is blind to this difference brings serious consequences with it. And so let us go on in harmony, each on the base of his scientific calling; you as an independent philosophical thinker, I as a servant of history and the Church, preaching the doctrine of eternal truth." What is meant by "preaching the doctrine of eternal truth in the service of history and the Church"? Or, differently expressed, what is for him the relation of philosophical and theological ethics? Or, in more precise words, the relation of Ethics in general to religious ethics, and particularly to Christian ethics? Thus, with a new turn of meaning, the question as to the relation of philosophy and theology is once more before us.

1. First of all, the relation of religion and ethics is defined,

quite in the manner of Fries. In the moral feeling we comprehend the aims of our temporal existence and activity. In the religious feeling we divine the eternal goodness of things and their fitness for their aim. Moral aims in themselves are nothing more than the eternal and divine destiny of humanity itself, comprehended as in a phenomenon in time and as a task for the will. Philosophy has already thus fixed the relation and has made its exposition of ethics in accordance with it. What, then, will constitute the determining factor in the difference between philosophy and theology? Does such a difference exist in fact? De Wette tries to define this in his introduction, and reaches a greater degree of precision than before. He brings forward several considerations which have some weight, although they are not very clearly related. They can be discriminated and summarised as follows. As for their subject-matter, both types of ethics are fundamentally the same in content, for there are not several kinds of Good. But the method of philosophy is synthetic; it looks for its moral ideal, according to its separate characteristics, in the reason, and brings it into combination through the understanding. The method of theology is, however, analytic; its ideal is already given in the personality of Christ. This ideal it comprehends by means of feeling and then develops.

Behind this statement, obviously quite impossible, can be discerned the "Doctrine of the Archetype", which De Wette holds in common with Schleiermacher. It was only a loftier and more subtle phase of the rationalist theory of types, and of the idea of humanity. Herrmann, perhaps, was the thinker who did the soundest work in delivering us from this theory.¹ The doctrine blunders in the following respects. In defiance of history, it makes Jesus into a summary of mankind in general, a Universal Man; and this *He* was less than all others, with His most powerfully stamped singleness of personality. And thus it in fact destroys altogether the elevating and

¹ Through his *die Sittlichen Weisungen Jesu*.

strength-giving impression of his personality. And further: the whole notion of a Universal Ideal in one person, needing only to be unfolded by way of analysis, is impossible in itself; it is an utter monstrosity. So the whole attempt is impossible from the start; it either leads to insincerity, as meanings are previously read into the ideal, only to be extracted from it afterwards, or, when a concrete application is at hand, the attempt is tacitly abandoned, to serve only as a dummy entrance gate. And this happens in De Wette's case.—The second consideration has more in it. According to Fries' own teaching, the peculiar material substance in ethics, which becomes subject to the form in the idea of the essential Good and Duty, is wholly a matter for the feeling; it is thus capable of individual shaping, and is altogether dependent on the special "*culture*" of a particular circle. On a foundation of the most general ethical postulates, in harmony with one another, special ideals can in this way be built up which cannot be generalised without further ado, depending as they do on the type and degree of that circle of culture to which the individual belongs. The simplest knowledge of history tells us the same lesson with immediate clearness. This is pointed out by De Wette, but in a hesitating and half-hearted manner. There exists, most assuredly, a "circle of culture" that is specifically Christian, and in it a special "Ethos" of highly individual formation. To comprehend and to present this in its pure form, to develop it and to advance it, is a business which belongs to theological ethics as apart from philosophical ethics, unless the latter itself "theologises". It is self-evident that such a work can only have significance if done by one who acknowledges the Christian ethos as his own. And with it is involved an obligation to criticise and go forward in culture. In his exposition De Wette makes but scanty use of this thought.—Then the third consideration that matters is rightly the following. Philosophical ethics can at most draw the empty geometrical outlines; religious ethics

fills in this outline, as religion itself, its practice in the community, in worship and education, grows to be an essential life-work. And religious ethics must set up standards for all this. Last of all, it is its particular and practical duty to watch over the education of those who are marked out for the ministerial office; and at this point it gives place to the practical teaching of morals, to didactic and pedagogic.

The most important distinction subsequently made by De Wette in his exposition is this: he finds place in the Ethics for a long chapter on "Salvation" and its importance for the liberation of moral force, and here is seen in a general way the specific difference of theological ethics from all philosophical ethics. The distinction, however, is to some degree misleading. For "Salvation" as a *magic* atonement and in-pouring of strength cannot constitute a distinction between different types of ethics; it entirely abrogates all ethics whatever. But, if salvation is taken to mean, as it ought to in the Christian religion, an experience that happens in the heart and the will, and therefore an experience of an ethical rather than of a magical nature, then the contrast is in no sense absolute. Rather will it be true that in every "philosophical ethic", if only consideration is given to the actual fact of religion and its psychological effect upon heart and will and resolution, with the liberating power that goes with it, an analogy to this doctrine of salvation will be found. For this question the relation of De Wette to Fries is of marked importance. If De Wette's teaching on this point and on the efficacy of Christ is carefully examined, a very clear and beautiful analogy for it will be found in Fries (*Ethik*, pp. 367, 368), where matter might be found for a far wider and deeper treatment than that followed by De Wette in his attempts to adapt the orthodox academic Christology.

2. The true relation, dimly perceived but never exactly understood by De Wette, will take the following shape. We understand theology, as it must needs be understood since

De Wette and Schleiermacher, as the theory of religion with the actual aim of the practice of religion. We contrast religious ethics and secular ethics; understanding by the former a system in which religion, on the one hand, appears as a life-work and as a moral task, while, on the other hand, life and life's business in general are appraised by religious standards, which may vary in character and degree. (We must leave undiscussed the question whether it is not the case that all ethics, that is really ethics and rests on the fundamental conception of Good and Duty, does not include in itself the tiniest modicum of the religious.) Then it is clear at the outset that there is no distinction, that there can be no distinction, in respect of the general foundation of ethics, "morality" in the more precise sense, i.e. in respect of the clear development of the theory of Good and Duty. It is meaningless to set something like a "theological morality" in opposition to a "philosophical morality". A "Christian morality" is just as impossible as a Christian geometry. Differences only begin with the *subject-matter* of moral judgments, which are differently assigned by the power of moral judgment. But here, too, there is a broad basement common to all, which must be present in a fairly equal degree in every ethical system which is to be a real one. Now this is that "law" of which the Apostle says that it is written in the same way in the hearts of Jews and Greeks, the "law" which no artful theological side-issues, systematisations, or subtleties can refine upon. But over this stage begins the place of all possible individual formations, estimates of life's value, ideals for private life and the life of the community; and this can certainly exercise a deep-reaching influence on the lower stratum. And here is the one geometric place for the possibility and necessity of a peculiar Christian ethos, which can be understood and expounded and carried on for itself. The second is as follows. The estimate of life's values, the growth of ideals, become essentially changed as soon as religious

convictions come to real life in a human being, a nation, or a circle of culture, and in proportion to the intensity of this life. First, a change occurs in what may be called the mood or spirit of the ethos, even if it has possibly not yet received a new *content*. Two men may perhaps acknowledge the same ethical code; yet they will be profoundly different in their type, in their way of thinking, if one of them, following Kant, immediately conceives the fulfilment of his moral duties as his service to God, while the other does not; or, in more general religious terms, performs his daily work and his moral duty, feeling that he is doing something which possesses an *eternal* meaning and relation, deeply hidden though it be . . . while the other does not. But at the same time very important changes that involve real differences are produced in the ethical material itself. The religious sentiment of the inner life begins at once to be exercised and fostered, religious asceticism, every kind of "divine service" in the sense of the independent practising and cherishing of the religious feeling; this is a new and mighty individual sphere of action. And it depends utterly on the particular individual nature of the single religion, as to how far these results will follow, and how much the whole ethos will be influenced by them. It may be refined and intensified to a remarkable degree; it may gain in robustness and practical force; it may be feminised or virilised. It may, on the other hand, become limited, minimised, and biassed. If Nirvana is the meaning of the universe, then Christian, and especially Protestant Ethics, aiming at action, achievement, and service, lose all meaning. There, too, will be developed an ethos, perhaps a very well-defined circle of duties and standards for the shaping of this life; but how infinitely different from every other!—Thus are produced separate types of religious ethos, and their understanding will produce in every case a special theological ethic. A Christian-theological ethic will also be produced every time in this way. It will not be distinguished from

"ethics in general" by employing an "analytic" as against a "synthetic" method. Possibly it will not submit to be deposed by a "general ethics"; for there can only be one "morality", whereas all ethic is individual. From religious ethics in general it will be differentiated by the special spirit of the Christian religion, which, like everything that is spirit, cannot be conceived in rules and catchwords; it can only be understood *extensively*, in pictures of life and feeling, in wide-reaching historical observation, with imitative experience. It will lay claim to universal validity, while having no ground for the claim but the "spirit, that bloweth where it listeth", i.e. acceptance without proof, by means of the inward conviction of the free power of judgment.—The relation might be presented through the following parable. Imagine pyramids, built up on a common base, eccentric to one another, differing in height, and each constructed on a different inner plan. The base common to all would stand for formal morality, the single pyramids for the possible ethical systems raised upon it. Besides the common base, these pyramids would, in proportion to the degree of their eccentricity, have considerable spaces in common where they overlapped, differing in extent. It might happen that one was wholly included in another. Others might incline away from one another in their main bulk, and fill space not covered by the others. The varying principles of construction would not differentiate them in their common space. A large number of actual systems of ethics might easily be figured as overlapping in a diagram of this kind.

(In Vol. II De Wette makes a very noticeable attempt towards the understanding of Christian Ethics in the wider connection of its course in history. It cannot be said that this attempt produced much result for the content of his own ethical system. What he offers here is Friesian matter, both in structure and in subject. The same is true of the four volumes of *Lectures on Ethics* [Bâle, 1823 and following]. In

the latter work the portion of Friesian origin is set out and conceived with so much originality, maturity, and beauty that the lectures can well claim a value of their own. The later ones still deserve to be recognised as pleasant and instructive ethical reading.)

XV

THOLUCK

1. Awakening.
2. Friesian Matter in Tholuck.

1. In 1822 also, close after De Wette's *Theodore*, appeared Tholuck's *Guido und Julius* (the doctrine of sin and atonement). Tholuck denied that his book was meant as a counterblast to *Theodore*. But in afterwards naming it "the *true* Consecration of the Doubter" he shows very clearly that he did not admit *Theodore*'s. Nothing is more instructive than to read Schleiermacher's Discourses in their original form, De Wette's *Theodore*, and Tholuck's little book, in succession. Here can be seen in stages how that age turned away from the cold disposition of Rationalism, how a new inward life was awakened, first of all in the guise of a religio-romantic enthusiasm, then in a more and more pronounced reversion to Christian piety and its particular content; next, how it culminated in a tempestuous rush, back to the almost obsolete experiences of Sin and Grace. It was a coherent phenomenon in the psyche of that age, and is itself but a part of a yet far more extensive group of phenomena, which includes that reinvigoration of Catholic sentiment, the new birth of the Papacy and the Jesuit order, the birth of Ultramontanism, of the dogmas of Infallibility and the Immaculate Conception. To grasp the unity of these phenomena, to relate them to laws of the universal psyche, would indeed be a task for a psychology of history in the grand style.—When viewed solely from the side of religion, Guido is superior to Theodore in the force of his religious experience, in its coherence and solidity. Here a real central point exists; these men can say with great precision what their religion is for them: salvation, health, intense consciousness of blessedness, liberty; the

firmest of foundations for life's conduct, strength to overcome self and the world. Religion with them is no side-issue; it is possessed for its own sake; nor is it the end-point and perfection of humanity. A new and original spirit was infused into theology from this source, through causes numerous and deep-lying. He who fails to discern and to esteem this feature of the "Awakening" has no business to discuss religion, for he is ignorant of its nature.—Were there inward reasons why the possessors of the new religious experience were fated to explain it to themselves so inadequately, or not at all? Why are their accounts of it veiled in a certain "Scripturalism", literary and romantic in its general conception, which would have been better served if all pretence to theological and scientific treatment had been abandoned?

It would be unfair to reproach men like Tholuck for reactionary tendencies and an abandonment of the progress made by culture. He makes no voluntary and complete return to the orthodox academic theology, with its narrow scope of vision. He is perhaps, indeed, the most perfect exponent of the "Theology of Conciliation". His intellectual type is that of Lavater and Hamann; he stands, in short, for that artistic and refined Pietism, which thought it could unite the intellectual culture of contemporary poets and philosophers with the cult of the Lamb. But how appalling is that general softening in brain and thought which affects the age and its theology, as the new sentimentality gains ground! How rapidly the inheritance from the "Aufklärung"—sternly disciplined thought, method, precise concepts—is dissipated! Tearful devoutness takes the place of scrupulous examination. Only compare Theodore with Guido.—In the former, a tough, courageous, indefatigable progress as he conscientiously works through the great problems of the age, with a thorough grounding in philosophical and scientific method; in the latter, nothing of this kind, nothing but a ridiculous dilettantism, and, in the place of a really deeper culture, an osten-

tatious display of scholarship in Greek and Arabic quotations. A bad example for theology, with the unfortunate result that edifying homilies and a comfortable appeal to the "new birth" were too frequently substituted for conscientious study of problems and for clear-cut methods. The immature reasoning of a young man not twenty-four years old on the spirit of his age and its philosophy is comic; and most comic of all is the patronising tone in which he speaks of Kant's work in moral philosophy; he almost deems Kant worthy of recognition as a forerunner of his own new and sublime attainments. How could there be scientific method in a theology which followed such an example! With the decline of the ability for independent work at a problem there is nothing left but the relation of facts: Tholuck himself is an example of this, and it has often happened in fact that historical scholarship has been the substitute for scientific study of theology.

In this respect Tholuck was in a better and more sheltered position than many of his successors, as he still possessed a good share in the cultural heritage of the past period, which he never lost. He always remains a disciple of the spirit of the "Aufklärung", and the theological modicum that can be found in the soaring rhapsodies of Guido is, in spite of all its pretentious expression, quite different from the old-fashioned dogmatic teaching on Christ; it is fundamentally the same as that which had assumed shape under Schleiermacher and De Wette. This is most clearly displayed in his attitude towards "Revelation" and "Supernaturalism" in general. Here he stands for opinions which clearly and precisely differentiate him from many later writers who weakly allow themselves to slip back to the old childish notions. Whether he brought these opinions to their logical conclusion is a question for itself. The philosophic ideas which guide him in the matter are derived from Fries, a palpable fact which has hitherto escaped notice; and thus, with this observation, we return to our starting-point.

2. Tholuck added supplements to his little work. No. 5 deals with the relation of Reason to Revelation. In this he occasionally mentions the Friesian school. Whether he had a personal knowledge of Fries' writings is doubtful, and, considering the general intellectual type of the man, not exactly probable. But his explanations evidently are dependent on Fries, and they have such a striking similarity to those of Theodore that we are justified in assuming that they originate in that book; and thus in the last instance they derive from Fries.—Here he affirms that the real nature of the mind itself is actual knowledge, and that it consequently can never entirely succumb to error. Reason is to be distinguished from Understanding; only in the understanding is error possible. The controversy between Rationalist and Supernaturalist is defined and settled precisely as we have noticed it in Theodore. The inward contrast (in respect of the "*quale*" of their faith) is still there, but it is not situated, or, at any rate, not immediately situated, in the realm from which the parties in the controversy derive their names. There must be a principle within us which compels us to recognise what is to be truth for us. That principle the Rationalist calls Reason; and rightly so. The spirit of man, as such, has for the foundation of all its phenomena an immediate Existence—the Life-in-God—proceeding from within, which, viewed in itself, constitutes the real essence of Spirit, makes the spirit to be a spirit. Here is the focus of the spiritual life. This immediate factor in the spirit was already shown in Plato: he, too, placed this immediate intuition, this instinct of reason, in opposition to knowledge as reflected in the concept (the former is *ἐνθουσιασμός, μανία*). The great and the divine within us we owe, not to *τέχνη* (understanding), but to a harpstring of the soul, played from within us, that inward thrill which is the parent of all science, art, and health-bringing invention. It comes into the soul as something given from within; and as man is conscious that he did not create

it, to whom is it to be traced unless to the God who impels and urges from within, and thus to inspiration?—The error of the Rationalists and the Supernaturalists was the same; they failed to recognise this life of God in the soul. The actual knowledge of religion, severed from immediate inspiration through the inward sense, from the perception of God in the spirit, becomes a barren and arbitrary reasoning on divine things. And as the later theologians, in their one-sided tendency, became more deeply committed to mediate knowledge, their explanations of reason, of actual religious knowledge, of enlightenment, of the divine in man, are more and more exclusively related to the mediate element of critical reasoning, of the understanding. Feeling is jettisoned. Since Man is born of God, he has an evidence of God, and the foundation of truth for man is the life of God within him.¹

And this of itself brings us to a point above mere subjective thinking and dreaming of the divine. We listen to God teaching us on these things; not to *ourselves* alone.² This is the interpretation of the way in which historical revelation is comprehended and inwardly recognised. What Christianity seeks to attain in mankind is declared to each individual man by the divine within him, as his goal and his destiny. He who will understand Plato must have the spirit of Plato. The understanding reader must be the author in extension. He who will understand Christ must have the mind of Christ. But this very understanding is the same as proof (conviction). What we recognise as akin to ourselves, what is attached to our inner self as its own possession, that has an inward compulsion for us—that is the True.

¹ Here is manifested quite plainly, and decidedly without intention, what was actually understood by that school of thought under the term "God-Man", and their consequent facility of approach to the ancient dogma. Was it a real gain that they made such extensive use of it?

² Here, just as plainly, the key is given to the new doctrine of "Revelation". The Key fits, and the Word of God is contrasted, clearly and well, with man's world.

The Redeemer, too, speaks of an inner light, of the single eye, in a man. "If the full purport of these texts had been grasped, and then made the foundation of theology, the results would of necessity have been important."¹ (In reality they would have prevented all the serious embarrassment about "natural" and "supernatural", and would have directed the activity of theologians towards the discovery and presentation of the peculiar experience and content of Religion and Christianity.)

¹ The affinity of all these statements of doctrine to De Wette's ideas in *Theodore* and in the last instance to Fries should be apparent. I find a gratifying confirmation of this recognition in a letter from Herrmann which says that Tholuck had in his own case emphatically pointed towards Fries.

XVI

CONCLUSION

1. The Task of Theology is a Science of the Christian Religion.
2. Philosophy and Theology. 3. The "Broader" Method in Theology.
4. History of Religion and Theology. 5. Doctrine of Faith, and Ethics in Theology as a whole.

1. Now let us summarise the knowledge we have gained in our discussion of the beginnings of modern theology, as to its spirit, its duty, its relation to science in general, and to philosophy in particular.

1. The old theology was a metaphysic about God, Man, World, and their relations, drawn from reason and revelation. Religion itself would prefer a narration of the deeds of God. Modern Theology proposes, as a task that can be performed, something less than the latter, something different from the scope of the former. Modern Theology is a Science of Religion; Christian Theology, a Science of the Christian Religion.

2. The Science of Religion is not a description of religions, just as jurisprudence is not a description of existing law or of law in general. The history of law is for jurisprudence merely the means to an end. The science of religion searches for the validity of religion and for religion that is valid. It may not return to supernatural standards (for historico-critical reasons and reasons in religion itself); its procedure must therefore be identical with that of moral science, jurisprudence, and all sciences of the mind in general. They are all forced to apply themselves to an examination of the rational-intellectual nature of the human spirit, to a criticism of reason and anthropology; they must ascertain with precision what Spirit is, and its kinds; what the Mind and Spirit are capable of as regards activity, experience, expression in various

directions; in this way they are to obtain the general conception of science, of ethics, of æsthetics, of religion, of religious experience. This is a philosophical undertaking, and without this preliminary work in philosophy no science of religion can be achieved, as a solid, methodical, and scientific task in general. It will be performed in various ways according to a man's nature, intellect, and ability, and in any case according to the type of philosophy recognised. In our case the philosophy of Fries, born from the spirit of the Kantian critical method, suggested itself. De Wette (*Religion and Theology*, pp. 167-8) has lucidly proved its particular suitability for this undertaking. In the theories of immediate knowledge; of transcendental idealism; of feeling in general, and the moral, æsthetic, and religious feeling in particular; of the threefold mode of real knowledge, attained through knowing, believing, and through "Ahnem"; in the supersession of knowledge, with its ultimately limited view, in favour of faith; in the demonstration of the practical side of the human mind and its "impulses"; in the schematisation of the idea through these impulses, and in the bestowal of life on the ideas in feeling—in all these respects this philosophy reveals the disposition to religion in the spirit of man in general, the hidden source of all its manifestations in history, the ground for its claim to be true, to be indeed the supreme and ultimate Truth. And in its teaching on Feeling can be found the solution, never adequately applied by the discoverer himself, to this problem: how religion can appear in such varied phases, alike in the fact that they are all really religion, and yet different, the basis of their differentiation being not merely their respective clearness or obscurity, but their quality, nature, and spirit, so that it is possible, and indeed necessary, to assign a lower value to one religion as compared with another. And at this point Fries' anthropology performs a final service: it exhibits that faculty of the mind which makes such an assignment of values possible, the free power

of judgment from unaided feeling, and its claim to be accounted valid without any proof. That is a firm foundation, an unerring guide for the labour of the science of religion itself. (What is more, it is the necessary foundation and preliminary assumption for the task of the Christian Science of Religion, for Christian theology.) In greater detail, this work will proceed on the following lines.

It will have two separate starting-points and will follow two paths, at first different, which, however, lead to each other and must meet at last.

At first it proceeds from an inward survey and observation of some fully-developed, mature, and vigorous religious life and experience (best effected within oneself), thus obtaining empirically an example of religion; and is thereby in a position, through comparing similar, allied, and corresponding phenomena in other people, other places, other ages, and ultimately through the whole of history, to secure by induction an empirical conception of the properties, character, and real nature of Religion as a whole.

On the other side it follows the work of the *Critique of Reason* as a whole, and here learns what are the faculties of the reasoning mind for actual knowledge in general and for the higher actual knowledge in particular, and how reason can claim that her kinds of actual knowledge are right and valid. And just as this foundation is seen to underly the general principles, the supreme conceptions, the ultimate laws of every single branch of human knowledge (the "metaphysic" for every individual science), so in corresponding fashion is discovered the supreme and universal content for knowledge, feeling, experience, in the realm of ethics, æsthetics, and religion, under whose sway the three latter will exist and develop. Thus we find the "metaphysic of religion" in the same sense as Kant sought and found the metaphysic of morals, of right, and of æsthetics.—The two paths, then, have long since joined. For it is now demonstrated that

these faculties of the reason and this "metaphysical" content are alive in just that which was previously conceived by empirico-inductive methods as the *real nature* of religion. And thus the question of the *truth* of religious conviction is settled at once, a question that can never be answered by a mere empirico-inductive comprehension of the actual fact.

3. The task of Christian theology will then be this: on the foundation described to conceive and present the real nature and spirit of Christianity, and in the form of doctrine, which is to be assayed critically, brought into shape, and developed, to expound it and to impart it, so that it may be practised and fostered. The latter part can only be performed by one who is a Christian himself, i.e. whose "free power of judgment" affirms the truth of Christianity that is felt but cannot be proved. This, in the very case when Christianity is acknowledged to be the one form of religion which is superior to all others, can only be effected in a truly scientific manner if Christianity is understood in its natural affinity and connection with religion in general, i.e. against a background of comparative religion and the history of religion, to which the right approach is once more given by the philosophy of religion. To construct history I must first know the subject of the history. To make a comparison I must know the object of comparison. On this background it is, then, the chief and immediate duty of the history of the Christian religion to trace the development of its primitive and authoritative nature in the growth of Old and New Testament religion, and, closely connected with this, its assumption of shape and the manifestation of its own particular spirit in the history of Christianity. This "broader" method is indispensable; for it is as impossible to give the spirit of religion through definition as to state by a definition the nature of a triangle. Nor can the matter be reduced to a summary form by shirking a broad historical observation. For with this spirit no dis-

tillation is possible; it must be obtained from the personalities, events, and other products of history in which it first came to life. We cannot comprehend the spirit even of an Isaiah or a Jeremiah with clearness, vigour, and truth without their history: how much less, then, can we understand the spirit of Christ without the fragmentary accounts of His life and death, scanty though they may be! In this case Spirit and Personality are inseparable. And every successful attempt to regain through research something of the historical and the personal is a gain. To enter in this way into the spirit and nature of religion, as it grows and has attained shape, is theology's most delicate task. Then to reach a full and clear conception of the nature of Christianity it will be necessary to observe how it overflows into general history, how it expands and alters and assumes peculiar forms. To this end "Church history" in the narrow sense is of very little use; and one-sided accounts of theory or dogma are equally futile. Most may be learnt from a study of religious types, from biography, from a description of personalities, from "creed-lore", not as a science of "separate doctrine", but as the general study of the spirit of Christianity, as shown in special types (Typologie).

4. The physician has to deal in the narrower sense only with the anatomy and physiology of man; the practical Christian theologian only with the real nature and spirit of the Christian religion. But in the former case the task expands of itself to "general comparative anatomy and physiology"; the latter will arrive at an understanding of his own religion in the first instance in its connection in the comparative history of religion.

The question whether the oft-adopted method which proceeds "from the lower to the higher" is really correct and serviceable to a deeper comprehension is open to argument. At any rate, the problems of a real *Science* of religion, working, not for religious museums and record offices, but for the

comprehension, formation, and regulation of a religion that is to be cherished, and rightly bearing the name of such a religion, generally begin just at the point where the "historians of religion", with all their mythology and "primitive religion", leave off. The complete is not understood from the incomplete, nor is the perfectly developed explained from the undeveloped; quite the reverse. We shall possibly once again be able to understand what Buddha aimed at; we shall probably never understand the real meaning of Totem and Tabu for "primitive man". The focal point, the starting-point for all science of religion, and especially for the Christian branch of that science, is Religious Experience, a thing that is not interpreted by mythology and archæology, that in default of immediate personal knowledge must be understood from the life of those who are religious in the narrower and more forcible sense. The theology of the Awakening set this personal experience in the very centre, and rightly so. Thereby it gained for itself a solid ground to rest upon. This experience is also important for the interpretation of religion in general, for the method of inquiry (the school of theology last referred to would have been most reluctant to admit this). Every peculiar spiritual phenomenon can best be understood at its highest level, where its force is concentrated. But that, in the sphere of religion, is the experience called by the Pietists the "breaking through of Grace" (i.e. Conversion), approve or disapprove the expression as one may. It is what is in more general Christian terminology "Grace", and is connected with "new birth" "awakening". Now these things are usually referred to Christianity alone, and quite correctly, when the specific content of the experience is taken into consideration. The matter, however, as such is the property of religion in general. What Buddha experienced in those weeks that preceded the "breaking through of the illumination", and afterwards under the Boddhi tree, his new subsequent life as one redeemed, is the closest parallel conceivable to this

"conversion", and could easily be described in the terminology of the doctrine of *gratia antecedens, operans, et succedens*. And a deeper reaching history of religion would have to try to find analogies for it on every side. They can be found. (The standard for their appearance is not the spiritual elevation of the religion in question, but its intensity. Even in such a crude religion as Islam the analogies are present, and Mohammed himself is the example of it.) With this appearance of religion in intensest form it begins to be clear what is the real and actual meaning of religion as a whole: that it is no mere complement to humanity, no mere sedative, not just a means to an end beyond itself, e.g. not a mere pledge that our desire for happiness will be gratified and our moral shortcomings aided; it is a thing of itself, a gigantic thing of immeasurable significance, which glimmers in multifarious forms in the depths of the human soul, which is everywhere astir in soft movements and gentle tremors, while in particular places it forces its way upwards and breaks forth with irresistible might. The accompanying experiences often find the strangest expression, and always in dependence on the ideas and ideals of the period. But in every case we find the feeling and the conviction that a thing has been attained on which everything else is dependent; and that all other life must lose its value when compared with it, must be regarded as "error", "ignorance", as sin and failure, and at best as a preparation and a state of transition. And with it there is present, not happiness, but salvation. Where religion urges to such experiences (and even in crude negro religions such analogies seem to be afforded, even if they are crude and grotesque. Can this be wondered at? For it is absurd presumption to suppose that we alone have a spiritual life) there begins the real matter of the history of religion. And in the quest of real religion one must submit to be guided by this thread, by the deep yearning quest ("Ahnung"), by the awakening of a spiritual state and experience, which, as

compared with all preceding experiences, is quite different and is absolutely authoritative.¹

Our foundation in the philosophy of religion gives us a general method of interpreting this strange phenomenon, the true centre of religious experience: it is the obscure knowledge of the Eternal in general and of the eternal determination of Existence, which comes to life in Feeling. And as Christians we believe that this is in truth "adoption" and "the kingdom of God". But, whatever place it may assume in our philosophy, whatever content we bestow on it from our own religion, we must descend from these mountain-peaks and penetrate into the country of religion; from these points of illumination we must understand the light which shines in other places with a feebler gleam. Then only shall we have understood religion in its history, when we have achieved the writing of that history from the view-point of "grace" and the experience of grace, beginning with its clearly marked forms, proceeding backwards and downwards to its crude analogies and its indistinct and no longer typical manifestations.

5. The doctrine of Faith, and Ethics, next stand out in all this philosophy. The delimitation on the ethical side will of necessity not be severe; and so in reference to our preceding exposition. The firm foundation for both is the Christian-religious experience itself, the experience of the Grace of God, the Christian "salvation"; only to be understood in completeness from the spirit of Christianity, unfolding itself in its history. Then it becomes our duty to develop the spiritual health which is a part of this experience, the liberation of the whole higher life within us, the new values it sets on life, life-work, and life's problems; and this is to be effected

¹ The fact that in all theologies, and not alone in the Christian, the teaching on these subjects almost always assumes a supernatural form, is easily understood, and as long as the doctrines of Transcendental Idealism and "Ahnung" are not grasped intact, it is a perfectly correct mode of expression, suitable to the uniqueness and dignity of the experience.

independently and with regard to all sides. In doing this we must abandon that painful effort to follow the orthodox theology, as attempted by De Wette and others after him; we must avoid the feeble adaptations of this theology: and we must reject the eclecticism which confuses all. The ideal is rather to find a firm and sure foundation; and then in strict alignment, with resolution and singleness of purpose, to construct a clearly defined whole, of convictions, attitudes to life, aims of the will; and the relations of this to other systems, whether religious or non-religious, can once more be illustrated by the architectural analogy given at the end of Chapter XIV.

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